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ABSTRACT 
 
 The way humans cooperate is unparalleled in the animal kingdom, and coordination plays 
an important role in human cooperation. Common knowledge—an infinite recursion of shared 
mental states, such that A knows X, A knows that B knows X, A knows that B knows that A 
knows X, ad infinitum—is strategically important in facilitating coordination. Common 
knowledge has also played an important theoretical role in many fields, and has been invoked to 
explain a staggering diversity of social phenomena. However, no previous empirical work has 
directly explored the psychology of common knowledge.  
Paper 1 demonstrates that people represent common knowledge, distinguish it from lower 
levels of shared knowledge (e.g., A knows that B knows X, but nothing more), and that common 
knowledge facilitates coordination for mutual benefits. The paper reports results from four 
experiments in which groups of participants interacted in coordination games, with varying 
levels of knowledge and payoffs. Results showed that common knowledge facilitates 
coordination, and thus provides an important proof of concept. 
 Paper 2 provides support from a large dyadic psychophysiology study for a recently 
proposed theory of strategic indirect speech, in which common knowledge plays a central role. 
Participants’ affective reactions to different types of illicit propositions were consistent with 
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predictions from the theory, as were their responses to survey questions that asked what they 
would tell their friends about the propositions. By supporting the strategic theory of indirect 
speech, these results provide indirect evidence that common knowledge plays an important role 
in explaining certain kinds of indirect speech. 
 Paper 3 provides evidence from two experiments that the self-conscious emotions of 
embarrassment, shame, and guilt are sensitive to the distinction between common knowledge and 
lower levels of shared knowledge. In the first experiment, participants read fictional scenarios 
that might induce these emotions, and reported that they would feel them more strongly if a 
transgression was common knowledge than if it was merely shared knowledge. In the second 
experiment, participants performed a karaoke song for a panel of judges, and reported higher 
levels of embarrassment when their performance was common knowledge than shared 
knowledge. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The way humans cooperate is unparalleled in the animal kingdom. Coordination plays a 
central role in human cooperation, such as in organizing social events, agreeing on common 
currencies, norms, and communication systems, or bringing down a dictatorial leader. 
Coordination can offer many benefits, but it is also potentially costly, from the awkwardness of a 
dead party, to lost investments in currencies, norms, or signals that others don’t recognize, to 
brutal repression at a poorly attended protest. Psychologists have largely overlooked 
coordination, despite its ubiquity throughout human social life. Yet, it reveals important 
unanswered questions about how we represent other people’s mental states, which are critical to 
understanding how cooperation evolved and works.  
This dissertation provides the first direct evidence that humans have psychological 
mechanisms designed for one such mental state—common knowledge—which is defined as an 
infinite recursion of shared knowledge levels, such that A knows X, A knows that B knows X, A 
knows that B knows that A knows X, ad infinitum. For decades, the concept of common 
knowledge has played an important theoretical role in disciplines that span practically the entire 
range of the social sciences—including economics, sociology, linguistics, legal studies, political 
science, history, psychology, and anthropology—as well as in game theory, philosophy, and 
computer science. It is thus unsurprising that common knowledge has been invoked to explain a 
staggering diversity of seemingly unrelated phenomena: from currency valuation and market 
bubbles, to pluralistic ignorance and scandals, direct reference and indirect speech, laws and 
norms, international diplomacy and bargaining, coordination and cooperation, rituals and social 
constructions, and even how words acquire meaning and databases are networked (for a review, 
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see Thomas, DeScioli, Haque, & Pinker, 2014). What is surprising is that despite this breadth, no 
previous research has directly investigated the psychology of common knowledge. The studies 
presented here begin to fill this gap. 
All of the phenomena listed above involve situations in which two or more agents (or 
even computers) can coordinate their actions for mutual benefit, and game-theoretic analyses of 
coordination games demonstrate how common knowledge is inexorably linked to coordination. 
Coordination games capture situations in which two or more people can benefit by coordinating 
their behavior, but there is more than one way to do so, and coordination failure is costly. For 
example, two individuals may both benefit by meeting up for lunch at one restaurant or another, 
but each would rather eat at home than incur the cost of an expensive meal without the benefit of 
the other person’s company. Because each person’s best option depends on what their partner 
does, one should do whatever they expect their partner to do, which is dependent on what they 
expect their partner to expect them to do, and thus on what they expect their partner to expect 
them to expect, and so on. Common knowledge facilitates coordination by focusing all players’ 
attention on a singular outcome, so that all of these interdependent expectations line up. 
Furthermore, it can easily be demonstrated that coordination games are the only context in which 
common knowledge affects strategic behavior1.  
This link provides some simple guidelines and a roadmap for psychological research: 
1. Common knowledge should affect any psychological domain involving coordination; 
2. Common knowledge should only affect behavior in contexts involving coordination; !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 More precisely, recursive shared beliefs only affect play within games that have multiple 
equilibria (i.e., common knowledge should only cause agents to shift from one strategy to 
another in coordination games). It should be noted that common knowledge plays an important 
role in other areas, such as in preventing speculative trading or allowing for backwards 
induction, but in these areas it’s simply a static assumption, as opposed to dynamically affecting 
whether players choose one strategy over another. 
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3. And, if common knowledge is shown to affect behavior in some domain, this is 
diagnostic of some underlying coordination problem, which can reveal and/or clarify 
features and functions of psychological mechanisms related to the domain. 
These three insights are both simple and profound. They generate numerous testable predictions 
about the psychology of common knowledge, some of which are explored in Papers 1 and 2. 
And, Papers 2 and 3 show how common knowledge effects can help elucidate the structure and 
function of other psychological mechanisms, by revealing design features for coordination. 
A Brief History of Common Knowledge: The Mathematics of Coordination 
 The concept of common knowledge has been around at least since David Hume (1739-
1740/1969), but its modern treatment begins with Thomas Schelling (1960). Schelling 
introduced common knowledge to explain how people could coordinate their behavior if one of 
many possible options is made uniquely salient to everyone. The concept was then independently 
formalized by a sociologist, a philosopher, and a game theorist, each of whom developed similar 
frameworks to address very different problems. It’s widely believed that David Lewis (1969) 
provided the first formalization of common knowledge—as an infinite hierarchy of shared 
knowledge states—which he developed to explain how words acquire meaning (a coordination 
problem in which everyone must converge on the same definitions for arbitrary symbols, e.g., 
“cat” means cat and “dog” means dog, and not vice versa). However, this was actually predated 
by Morris Friedell (1967), who independently developed the same formalization in an obscure 
sociology paper that also presaged the role of common knowledge in a number of the phenomena 
listed above, such as pluralistic ignorance. Although it came a bit later, it seems that Robert 
Aumann’s (1976) set-theoretic formalization was also developed independently2, in a line of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 See http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/raumann/documents/epistemiclogicfinalversion.pdf 
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work on how subjective beliefs can affect coordination. Aumann’s formalization models two 
agents who use public information to systematically eliminate possible worlds until both 
converge on the same real world, which is then commonly known.  
Two later papers, both published in the same year, examined what happens when 
different assumptions about common knowledge are relaxed. Rubinstein (1989) loosened the 
“common” assumption to evaluate what happens when recursive levels of shared knowledge are 
finite, and found that even arbitrarily high levels are insufficient for two agents to shift from one 
coordination option to a better one. Monderer and Samet (1989) instead loosened the 
“knowledge” assumption to explore what happens when beliefs are less than 100% certain. They 
replaced common knowledge with common p-belief, where p represents the probability that two 
individuals believe something to be true, and demonstrated that as long as p is sufficiently high 
the dynamics of coordination and common knowledge still apply (i.e., common p-belief is 
sufficient to switch from one coordination option to another). They reconciled their results with 
Rubinstein’s by suggesting that “...a complete analysis cannot be carried out on the basis of 
truncated hierarchies [of shared knowledge levels, because] two situations in which truncation 
takes place after the same number of [knowledge levels] may differ dramatically because 
different beliefs are held beyond the truncation point” (p. 189). More recent work confirms that 
common p-belief provides a general solution, which can account for Rubinstein’s results and be 
used in games with more than two people (Dalkirin, Hoffman, Paturi, Ricketts, Vattani, 2012). 
From the Mathematics to the Psychology  
What does all this have to do with psychology? Set-theoretic formalizations and common 
p-beliefs may seem far from the purview of psychology, but are crucial for understanding how 
people might identify, assess, and condition their behavior on different kinds of events and 
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knowledge states. First, common p-belief shows how real people living in an uncertain and noisy 
world can actually attain something akin to common knowledge, and demonstrates how insights 
from models that assume complete certainty can still apply to real-world strategic behavior. 
Second, the models suggest that beliefs must somehow be assessed as sufficiently likely in order 
to affect coordination, which presents important psychological questions about how people 
assign subjective likelihoods to shared beliefs and what constitutes “sufficiently likely”. Third, 
although set-theoretic formalizations seem to provide implausible descriptions of actual 
psychological mechanisms, by specifying what kinds of events, observations, or data might 
produce relatively certain shared beliefs, they can help define the input criteria that more 
plausible psychological theories must account for. Lastly, the mathematical models demonstrate 
that the key issue isn’t whether something is 100% certain, or whether people can represent an 
infinite level of recursive beliefs, but whether certainty decays with increasing levels of recursive 
beliefs. This last point is not directly explored here, but it plays a critical role in the theory of 
indirect speech tested in Paper 2, and offers an intriguing avenue for future research. 
Cognitive scientists have largely converged on the view that the brain is a computational 
organ that evolved to process information, and that the most efficient approach to understanding 
the mind is to reverse engineer its computational mechanisms. According to this view, 
experimental psychologists should begin with a task analysis to precisely define a problem and 
the engineering specifications required to solve it, come up with plausible information-
processing mechanisms that can accomplish the task, and then translate these hypothesized 
mechanisms into testable empirical predictions (see Tooby & Cosmides, 2005; Marr, 1982). A 
proper task analysis requires “some independently established finding of science or mathematics 
to show that some mechanism can attain some goal in some environment” (Pinker, 2000, p. 441). 
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Game theory, the mathematics of strategic social interaction, provides the best source for task 
analyses for most social cognition problems, which cannot be defined by more concrete physical 
properties (as opposed to how the physics of optics and lenses can be used to reverse-engineer 
visual systems, for example). The mathematical models outlined above thus help define the 
properties that information-processing mechanisms must have to solve coordination problems, 
and also help clarify and delineate exactly how and when common knowledge might affect 
various domains of human social life. Of course, empirical research is required to establish the 
precise nature of the actual psychological mechanisms for common knowledge. 
Establishing an Empirical Foundation for the Psychology of Common Knowledge 
Common Knowledge and Coordination. Paper 1 provides the first direct evidence that 
humans have cognitive adaptations for common knowledge, and that people use different 
knowledge states strategically when deciding whether they should try and coordinate with others 
for mutual benefits. In four experiments, participants interacted in stylized coordination games 
with real monetary payoffs. In the interactions, participants could earn more by working together 
than by working alone, but this required all participants in a group of either two or four people to 
make the same choice; otherwise, participants who decided to work together earned nothing. 
Participants could thus achieve higher earnings by deciding to work together, but choosing this 
option also carried the risk of relinquishing a lesser, but guaranteed payoff for working alone. 
We manipulated both what participants knew about what their partners knew about the 
prevailing payoffs, as well as the payoff amounts, to test how knowledge levels and the ratio of 
potential costs and benefits would affect participants’ decisions to try and work together. 
Across all experiments, the percentage of participants that decided to work together was 
highest when they had common knowledge, consistent with game-theoretic predictions. We also 
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found multiple converging lines of evidence suggesting that theory of mind representations for 
common knowledge are categorically distinct from representations for lower levels of shared 
knowledge (e.g., A knows that B knows that A knows X, but nothing more). These findings 
provide the first direct evidence that people have psychological mechanisms for recognizing 
common knowledge, differentiating it from lower levels of shared knowledge, and strategically 
conditioning their behavior on the prevailing level of knowledge when trying to coordinate. The 
paper concludes with a discussion of the many potential psychological applications of common 
knowledge. 
Common Knowledge and Indirect Speech. Paper 2 presents results from a large dyadic 
psychophysiology experiment that supports a strategic theory of indirect speech in which 
common knowledge plays a central role. This strategic speaker theory proposes that indirect 
speech offers speakers an optimal way to try and transition from one kind of relationship to 
another with a like-minded partner (e.g., from friends to lovers), while also preventing 
unnecessary damage to an existing relationship by preventing common knowledge of any 
conflict of interests (e.g., one person wants to just be friends, while the other wants to be lovers) 
(Lee & Pinker, 2010; Pinker, Nowak, & Lee, 2008). The theory is predicated upon abstract 
models of costs and benefits, and hypothesizes that these costs and benefits are realized 
psychologically as different affective states. The theory also hypothesizes that indirect speech 
can help speakers prevent rumors from spreading to third parties. 
In the experiment, participants’ cardiovascular responses were measured while they acted 
out two scripted role-playing scenarios. One scenario involved a bribe proposition and the other 
involved a sexual proposition, each of which was delivered either directly or indirectly. 
Participants’ cardiovascular responses were measured throughout the interactions to provide an 
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indirect, online, and unobtrusive assessment of their affective reactions to different kinds of 
propositions to test the affective predictions of the theory. The rumor-prevention hypothesis was 
tested through survey questions that asked participants to report what was asked in the date 
scenario, what was meant, and what they might tell a friend. 
The cardiovascular results from this experiment were a bit complex, and not completely 
as predicted, yet they nonetheless seem to support the strategic speaker theory’s affective 
hypotheses. The survey results were much clearer, and unequivocally support the rumor-
prevention hypothesis. The paper concludes with a discussion that ties indirect speech to other 
well-established findings, to suggest that the models employed by the strategic speaker theory 
apply to many aspects of social life beyond just different speech acts, such as the omission bias 
in moral cognition and the nature of scandals. 
Common Knowledge and Self-conscious Emotions. Paper 3 reports the results of two 
studies showing that the negative self-conscious emotions of shame, embarrassment, and guilt 
are sensitive to the distinction between common knowledge and lower levels of shared 
knowledge. In the first study, participants read stories involving different levels of knowledge, 
which were designed to evoke either the negative self-conscious emotions or the negative basic 
emotions of anger or sadness. After each story, participants rated how strongly they would 
expect to feel different emotions, and how likely they thought they would display associated 
physical reactions (e.g., blush, hang their head down, clench their teeth, etc.). Results showed 
that participants expected they would feel more embarrassed, ashamed, and guilty when a 
transgression is made common knowledge, than when the transgression is merely known by 
others (e.g., a participant knows other people know about their transgression, but it is not 
common knowledge), and would similarly be more likely to display physical reactions associated 
! 9!
with the self-conscious emotions (e.g., blush, hang their head down, etc.). In contrast, 
participants’ reports to the basic emotion scenarios showed that simply knowing about the event 
had the largest effect on their expected reactions, and the difference between shared and common 
knowledge was minimal. 
The second study reveals a similar pattern in actual experiences of embarrassment in the 
lab. In this study participants performed a karaoke song for a panel of judges, and reported 
greater embarrassment when their performance was commonly known between them and the 
judges, than when the participant thought the judges were unaware that the participant knew of 
their presence. This paper thus provides two lines of converging evidence that the negative self-
conscious emotions are sensitive to the distinction between common knowledge, and lower 
levels of shared knowledge, and concludes with a discussion for why these emotions may have 
evolved this way. 
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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COORDINATION AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE 
 
Kyle A. Thomas1, Peter DeScioli1,2, Omar Sultan Haque1, Steven Pinker1 
1Department of Psychology, Harvard University 
2Department of Political Science, Stony Brook University 
 
Copyright © 2014 by the American Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission. 
The official citation that should be used in referencing this material is Thomas, K. A., DeScioli, 
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of this information does not imply endorsement by the publisher. 
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Abstract 
 Research on human cooperation has concentrated on the puzzle of altruism, in which one 
actor incurs a cost to benefit another, and the psychology of reciprocity, which evolved to solve 
this problem. We examine the complementary puzzle of mutualism, in which actors can benefit 
each other simultaneously, and the psychology of coordination, which ensures such benefits.  
Coordination is facilitated by common knowledge—the recursive belief state in which A knows 
X, B knows X, A knows that B knows X, B knows that A knows X, ad infinitum. We test 
whether people are sensitive to common knowledge when deciding whether to engage in risky 
coordination. Participants decided between working alone for a certain profit and working 
together for a potentially higher profit that they would receive only if their partner made the 
same choice. Results showed that more participants attempted risky coordination when they and 
their prospective partner had common knowledge of the payoffs (broadcasted over a 
loudspeaker) than when they had only shared knowledge (conveyed to both by a messenger) or 
private knowledge (revealed to each partner separately). These results support the hypothesis that 
people represent common knowledge as a distinct cognitive category that licenses them to 
coordinate with others for mutual gain. We discuss how this hypothesis can provide a unified 
explanation for diverse phenomena in human social life, including recursive mentalizing, 
performative speech acts, public protests, hypocrisy, and self-conscious emotional expressions.  
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Introduction 
A strange and ethereal protest took place in Belarus during the summer of 2011, 
consisting solely of protesters’ phones ringing simultaneously. Police swarmed the event, 
recorded who was there, and made aggressive arrests (Barry, 2011). What were the protesters 
trying to accomplish? And why were the police concerned with such a seemingly trivial event?  
People interact in a variety of situations in which they need to coordinate their actions to 
achieve common goals, such as opposing unfair governments, capturing gains in trade, agreeing 
on the use of standard symbols and protocols, and countless everyday activities such as 
scheduling meetings, contributing complementary courses to potluck dinners, and carrying two 
ends of a heavy object. Because it may be costly to engage in a coordinated activity when no one 
else does so, attempts to coordinate can be risky when it is unclear what other people will do. In 
repressive regimes a single protestor risks prosecution and violence, a risk which can be 
mitigated only by overwhelming numbers of people successfully coordinating their actions: If 
one protestor shows up he gets shot, if a million show up they may send the dictator packing. In 
these situations, even modest displays of synchrony, such as simultaneous phone rings, can set 
the stage for larger-scale coordination. However, even when it’s clear that other people want to 
work together, coordination can be a challenge. Exactly how, for instance, do thousands of 
would-be protestors converge on a single time and place to voice their concerns?  
Coordination problems are a subtopic in the psychology of cooperation. Though 
cooperation has become a burgeoning area in psychology, economics, and evolutionary biology, 
research and theory have concentrated on the subtype of cooperation that is altruistic (in the 
biological sense): A cooperator confers a benefit on a partner at a cost to himself. Altruistic 
cooperation has received the lion’s share of attention because it raises the evolutionary puzzle of 
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how a behavior that harms the actor could be selected for. The paradox is often captured in the 
game-theoretic scenario of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and the challenge to the psychologist is in 
characterizing the cognitive abilities and emotional motives that allow humans to surmount it. 
These include the ability to recognize individuals and detect cheaters, and a suite of emotions 
that police reciprocation, such as sympathy, anger, gratitude, forgiveness, guilt, and trust 
(Trivers, 1971; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992, 2005b).  
Coordination, in contrast, is mutualistic: Each cooperator confers a benefit on the other 
while simultaneously conferring a benefit on himself or herself. Despite this convergence of 
interests, coordination, too, poses an evolutionary challenge. The challenge is not motivational 
but epistemological: accurately representing the other actor’s state of knowledge. The 
epistemological problem results from the difficulty of converging on a single solution when 
more than one is available. For instance, two friends both benefit if they meet at Starbucks, or at 
Peet’s, but for this to happen each friend has to know that the other knows which location they 
have agreed upon.  
If this problem can be resolved, the incentives of the game pose no further obstacle, and 
can even help guide optimal behavior rather than hinder it (Lewis, 1969; Schelling, 1960; 
Skyrms, 2004). The paradigm game-theoretic model of a coordination problem is the Stag Hunt, 
first introduced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Rousseau, 1754/1984; Skyrms, 2004). Two hunters 
set out in the morning either to hunt stag together (a large payoff) or to hunt rabbits separately (a 
small payoff); a single hunter cannot fell a stag and will return empty-handed (a high opportunity 
cost). To attain the highest payoff, each hunter must not only know that stag offers higher 
payoffs, but they must also know that the other hunter knows the payoffs, know that the other 
hunter knows that they know the payoffs, and so on.  
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Yet despite this epistemological problem, humans are adept at achieving coordination. 
Protestors meet up in Tahrir Square at 5pm on Friday, different suppliers produce the parts for a 
complex product, allied battalions converge on an enemy, diners use the bread plate to the left, 
coworkers in a building settle on an informal name for a meeting space. Given a long 
evolutionary history of group living, human cognition may have been shaped by natural selection 
to solve coordination problems (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010; Tooby, Cosmides, & Price, 2006). If 
game theorists are correct that common knowledge is needed for coordination, then humans 
might have cognitive mechanisms for recognizing it.  
This paper attempts to begin to redress the imbalance in the literature on the psychology 
of cooperation by exploring the epistemological challenges and the possible cognitive and 
motivational adaptations surrounding the problem of mutualistic coordination.3 We focus on a 
special kind of representation called common knowledge (sometimes called mutual knowledge or 
common ground; Clark, 1996; Clark & Marshall, 1981; Lewis, 1969; Pinker, 2007; Rubinstein, 
1989; Schelling, 1960; Smith, 1982). Common knowledge is defined as an infinite string of 
embedded levels of mutual knowledge, i.e., Michael knows X; Lisa knows X; Michael knows 
that Lisa knows X; Lisa knows that Michael knows X; Michael knows that Lisa knows that 
Michael knows X; ad infinitum. 
The infinite levels of knowledge required for common knowledge may seem to present a 
different kind of epistemological problem, namely that a finite mind cannot represent an infinite 
set of nested propositions. However, people need not represent each level of knowledge 
explicitly, but could simply represent a recursive formula that entails all levels of knowledge, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3 A PsychInfo search reveals that in the years 1992-2013, 1,936 papers listed “altruism” as a 
major subject heading or keyword, whereas only 71 listed “mutualism” (and most of these were 
for studies of nonhuman animals). There were 400 references to the Prisoners’ Dilemma, but 
only 4 to the Stag Hunt. !
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such as Y = “Everyone knows X, and everyone knows Y”, or even just a single symbol that 
indicates the state of common knowledge itself (Clark, 1996; Pinker, 2007). This formula or 
symbol, moreover, can be activated in people’s minds by any salient public signal which reliably 
causes the knowledge, such as a message broadcasted on a loudspeaker: Everyone who receives 
the signal knows that everyone else has received it, and can deduce that everyone else can 
deduce that, ad infinitum (Aumann, 1976).  
Nor is it necessary that that the commonly entertained propositions be known with 
absolute certainty, which is often impossible in real-world environments. Coordination may be 
achieved with the weaker notion of common belief, in which two agents each believe that a 
proposition is likely to be true with probability at least p, each believes that the other believes it 
with probability at least p, and so on (Monderer & Samet, 1989). For any situation with a stag-
hunt payoff structure, there is a minimum level of p whose value depends on the relative 
advantage of coordination over acting alone, for which it is rational for agents with common p-
belief to choose to coordinate (Dalkiran et al., 2012). In the rest of this paper, we will use the 
term common knowledge broadly, to include “sufficiently high common p-belief”. 
Common knowledge can be contrasted with what we will refer to as shared knowledge, 
any string of embedded levels of knowledge that falls short of infinity, and with private 
knowledge, knowledge that individuals possess without knowing whether anyone else possesses 
it. Shared knowledge can be further broken down into distinct levels, such as second-order or 
secondary knowledge, in which A knows that B knows X, but nothing else, and third-order or 
tertiary knowledge, in which A knows that B knows that A knows X, but nothing else. Common 
knowledge is intimately connected with the logical problem of coordination; in theory, 
coordination can be irrational without it. With the help of four experiments in which participants 
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are given the opportunity to engage in a simple form of economic cooperation, we examine the 
extent to which people really do depend on common knowledge and other levels of knowledge to 
achieve coordination.  
The Game Theory of Coordination and Common Knowledge 
Research in game theory on coordination games shows why shared knowledge may be 
insufficient for coordination. Technically, coordination games are situations of interdependent 
decision-making that have multiple equilibria. Conceptually, they are situations in which two or 
more people each make a decision, with the potential to achieve mutual benefits only if their 
decisions are consistent (Lewis, 1969; Schelling, 1960). The rendezvous example is a 
coordination game because both friends benefit from choosing the same location, but that 
location could be either Starbucks or Peet’s. To choose among multiple solutions an individual 
must take into account what she expects the other actor to do. However, what another actor is 
likely to do is in turn dependent upon his expectations of what she will do, leading to 
interdependent expectations that generate an infinite recursion of embedded beliefs.  
A classic paper demonstrated the importance of common knowledge for maximizing 
payoffs from a coordination game: Rubinstein (1989) developed a model which showed that 
under a specific, restrictive set of assumptions any level of knowledge short of common 
knowledge is no better than no knowledge at all. Subsequent work has suggested that this 
conclusion was too strong, and that shared knowledge or less-than-certain beliefs can enable 
coordination better than private knowledge (Binmore & Samuelson, 2001; Dalkiran et al., 2012; 
Monderer & Samet, 1989). However, even in these models, common knowledge has a privileged 
role to play in facilitating coordination, in part because it avoids a second-order coordination 
problem presented by shared knowledge. With shared knowledge people must decide how many 
!17!
levels of shared knowledge is enough to attempt coordination: How can individuals be certain 
that everyone requires the same number of levels of shared knowledge to attempt risky 
coordination? In short, all of these models demonstrate that common knowledge provides the 
most effective and reliable path to coordination. 
The problem of coordination and common knowledge has been examined by many 
disciplines, including political science (Ostrom, 1990), philosophy (Hume, 1739-1740/1969; 
Lewis, 1969; Rousseau, 1754/1984; Skyrms, 2004), economics (Chwe, 2001; Geanakoplos, 
1992); linguistics (Clark, 1992, 1996; Smith, 1982), sociology (Willer, Kubuwara, & Macy, 
2009; Zuckerman, 2010), legal theory (McAdams & Nadler, 2005), and even computer science 
(Alberucci & Jäger, 2005; Halpern & Moses, 1990). Yet despite the fact that common 
knowledge is fundamentally a psychological phenomenon, little is known about the psychology 
of common knowledge (some notable exceptions include Chaudhuri, Schotter, & Sopher, 2009; 
Clark, 1996; Lee & Pinker, 2010; Nov & Rafaeli, 2009). We briefly review two literatures, 
experimental economics and theory of mind, that are indirectly relevant to the phenomenon 
before outlining our own research questions.  
Experimental Economics: Coordination Using Salient Focal Points  
 A few experiments have examined whether people are better at solving coordination 
problems than classical game theory suggests. They focus on Schelling’s (1960) concept of a 
focal point, an option that stands out from a set of possible choices as uniquely salient, 
encouraging everyone to converge upon it as a single choice. Schelling suggested that in practice 
people may rely on focal points to solve coordination problems because they generate common 
knowledge of a single solution (Schelling, 1960; Sugden, 1995). Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden 
(1994a, 1994b) examined people’s play in coordination games and their ability to converge on 
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focal points (what they called “Schelling salience”). Participants responded to questions with 
many possible answers (e.g., “Write down any positive number,” and “Name any flower”). In 
one group, participants were paid to answer any way they wanted. In another, they were paid 
based on how well their answers matched with those of another randomly chosen participant. 
Participants were far more successful at coordinating answers when they were trying to do so 
than when they answered as they wished. This suggests that people can meet the challenge of 
coordination by identifying it as a problem distinct from the primary demands of a task. Though 
the finding, by itself, cannot distinguish whether people used shared knowledge or common 
knowledge to improve their coordination, recent unpublished studies suggest that people really 
do use common knowledge in these tasks (Bardsley, Mehta, Starmer, & Sugden, 2008; Chartier, 
Abele, Stasser, & Shriver, 2012). 
Theory'of'Mind'Research:'Representing'Shared'Knowledge  
Most existing research on knowledge about other people’s knowledge falls in the area 
known as theory of mind, intuitive psychology, mind-reading, or mentalizing, all terms for the 
mental representation of other people’s mental states (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith & Frith, 2003; 
Wimmer & Perner, 1983; for recent reviews, see Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Saxe & Young, 
2013). Developmental psychologists have found that by 6-7 months children are able to use 
implicit representations of attention, desires, goals, and intentions to guide their behavior 
(Hamlin, Hallinan, & Woodward, 2008). By fifteen months, children implicitly differentiate their 
own knowledge from another person’s knowledge; for example, infants are surprised when 
someone seeks out an object in a spot where it was moved when the person was absent (Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005). By 3-5 years, children show an ability to explicitly represent others’ mental 
states in the false-belief task (Callaghan et al., 2005; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). By 6-7 
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years, children are able to represent two levels of shared knowledge, as evidenced by their ability 
to understand that someone else can have false beliefs (Perner & Wimmer, 1985). By adulthood, 
people can correctly answer questions about fourth-order levels of shared knowledge (e.g., Bob 
knows that Carol knows that Ted knows that Alice knows X), but they tend to fail questions 
about fifth-order knowledge (Kinderman, Dunbar, & Bentall, 1998), possibly because this 
exceeds the capacity of short-term verbal memory (Cowan, 2000).  
Although people are capable of representing other people’s mental states, they do not 
always do so effectively. Both adults and children tend to assume that their knowledge is shared 
by other people. This shortcoming is evident in the well-documented failure of three-year-olds to 
pass a false-belief task, and is also seen in adults in work on the curse of knowledge (Birch & 
Bloom, 2003, 2007; Camerer, Lowenstein, & Weber, 1989; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003).  
Since coordination depends on the ability to anticipate other people’s actions, and since 
people’s actions depend on their mental states, one would expect mentalizing ability to facilitate 
coordination. Indeed, Curry & Jones Chesters (2012) found that people who are better at 
employing theory of mind are also better at coordinating their answers with other people on 
questions with many possible responses. Yet, characterizations of theory of mind focus on shared 
knowledge as the paradigm case, and shared knowledge is in general insufficient to solve 
coordination problems. Researchers have shown that increasing the salience of shared knowledge 
in cooperative and competitive environments can lead to more competitive behavior (Epley, 
Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006; Pierce, Kilduff, Galinsky, & Sivanathan, 2013), and have begun to 
map the neural correlates of representing shared knowledge (Coricelli & Nagel, 2009). Despite 
such progress in understanding how people represent shared knowledge, far less is known about 
how people represent common knowledge and use such representations in coordination. 
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To appreciate the distinctive role of common knowledge in coordination, recall the 
example of two friends, Sally and Ann, who are trying to find each other downtown. They 
previously discussed meeting at Starbuck’s or Peet’s, but never came to an agreement. Where 
should Sally go to meet Ann? Sally can represent Ann’s knowledge of the two locations, and her 
desire to meet at the same location, and vice-versa. Yet even if Ann thought it would be best to 
meet at Starbuck’s, and Sally knew that Ann thought so, but Ann worried that Sally thought it 
would be best to meet at Peet’s, Ann might go to Peet’s while Sally went to Starbuck’s.  No 
matter how many nested levels of shared knowledge Sally represents, she will not know where to 
look for Ann. Coordination games thus pose a key problem for theory of mind research: How 
does one read the mind of a mind reader? 
The Present Research 
In these experiments we examine the cognitive processes underlying coordination. 
Participants interact with partners in a role-playing scenario that involves a symmetric one-shot 
coordination game, with payoffs that instantiate a Stag Hunt. In the game, participants must 
decide either to work alone, which offers a small but certain profit, or to try to work with a 
partner, which offers the potential to make more money but only if their partner makes the same 
choice: If a participant chooses to work with a partner but the partner does not, they receive 
nothing. We test whether people differentiate between shared and common knowledge in making 
this decision, whether shared knowledge and common knowledge have distinct cognitive 
representations, and whether people use workarounds to a lack of common knowledge.  
The game involves two merchants, a butcher and a baker, who decide each day whether 
to work independently to sell chicken wings and dinner rolls, respectively, or to work together to 
sell complete hot dogs, for which they earn more (Figure 1.1). No one will buy just the buns or 
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just the hot dog meat, so they risk earning nothing if they fail to coordinate their actions. 
Moreover, participants are told that sometimes the hot dogs can earn them both more money than 
working independently, but sometimes hot dogs earn less money, so the merchants need 
common knowledge of higher profits to coordinate. But, their only means of communication 
with each other is an unreliable messenger boy. (This is a stylized instantiation of the 
coordinated attack problem, see Halpern & Moses, 1990; Rubinstein, 1989.) 
 
  Butcher’s options 
   Work Together  
(Hot Dogs) 
Work Alone  
(Chicken Wings) 
Baker’s options 
Work Together  
(Hot Dogs) $1.10, $1.10 $0, $1.00 
Work Alone  
(Dinner Rolls) $1.00, $0 $1.00, $1.00 
Figure 1.1 An interaction between a butcher and a baker in Experiment 1. The baker chooses a 
row and the butcher chooses a column. The four cells show the payoffs (baker’s payoff, 
butcher’s payoff) for each combination of choices. These payoffs generate a coordination game, 
specifically a stag hunt game (Skyrms, 2004), in which one equilibrium is better for both players 
than another equilibrium. The other three payoff conditions substitute $2.00, $5.00, or $10.00 for 
the $1.00 payoff, and $2.10, $5.10, or $10.10 for the $1.10 payoff. 
 
To appreciate the need for common knowledge in this scenario, consider what happens 
on a given day that the baker sends a message to the butcher telling him to bring hot dogs. The 
butcher sends a confirmation to let the baker know he received the message. The baker receives 
the confirmation, but realizes that the butcher cannot be sure whether the messenger delivered 
the confirmation. So, the baker sends a confirmation of the confirmation. Upon receipt of this 
message, the butcher realizes that yet another confirmation is required. In fact, no finite number 
of successful confirmations can help the hapless merchants because they can never be sure that 
the most recent confirmation message was delivered by the unreliable messenger boy, and 
neither knows how many messages might be sufficient for the other merchant to bring his 
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ingredient for the hot dogs (embodying the second-order coordination problem presented by 
multiple shared knowledge solutions). Common knowledge is therefore needed to reliably solve 
the merchants’ problem.  
To test whether people tacitly appreciate this requirement, we manipulated what they 
knew about their partner’s knowledge about the payoffs—whether knowledge of the payoffs was 
private, shared, or common. The game-theoretic analysis of coordination suggests the common 
knowledge recognition hypothesis: In coordination environments, people strategically 
differentiate between shared knowledge and common knowledge, working together more 
frequently when they have common knowledge of the payoffs than when they have shared or 
private knowledge.  
Alternatively, people may not represent common knowledge as a distinct state. The only 
major distinction affecting their coordination decisions would then be the difference between 
private and shared knowledge (as suggested by the theory of mind literature). We call this the 
shared knowledge hypothesis.  
Finally, the literature on the curse of knowledge raises the possibility that people do not 
reliably use either shared or common knowledge to solve coordination problems. If people 
attribute their own knowledge to other people, then distinctions among levels of knowledge 
would be irrelevant. This curse of knowledge hypothesis predicts that participants will try to 
work together with the same frequency across all knowledge levels.  
Knowledge-level Representation 
If people do distinguish between common and shared knowledge, this raises the further 
question of how they represent the distinction. One possibility is that these knowledge states 
have a single cognitive format and the distinction between them is simply quantitative, with 
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common knowledge represented as an upper limit of shared knowledge. Alternatively, shared 
and common knowledge may have distinct representations, which would make the distinction 
qualitative and categorical.  
These possibilities can potentially be distinguished by the pattern of classification errors 
people make when reporting their level of knowledge. Research on theory of mind capabilities 
suggests that shared knowledge becomes more difficult to represent as the levels of knowledge 
increase. If people entertain a single kind of representation (the single-representation 
hypothesis), then the most errors will be observed in the common knowledge condition (the 
maximum number of shared knowledge levels), with fewer errors made as the levels of shared 
knowledge decrease. If, in contrast, common knowledge has its own representation, it need not 
contain multiple levels of embedded knowledge; it could consist of a single mental symbol 
which means, “We have common knowledge.” Thus, errors will increase only with the number 
of levels of shared knowledge, whereas errors on common knowledge will be few (similar to the 
error rate for secondary knowledge, which also requires only a single level of representation). 
The distinct-representation hypothesis makes the further prediction that errors will be systematic, 
respecting the boundary between the two kinds of knowledge: Different levels of shared 
knowledge will be mistaken for each other, but not for common knowledge. 
 Sensitivity to Costs and Benefits  
 To further characterize the decision processes behind coordination, we vary the game 
payoffs to test people’s sensitivity to costs and benefits. Rational choice theory (e.g., Becker, 
1976) models human decisions as expected utility calculations, which in coordination situations 
involves comparing the payoffs of different decisions scaled by the probabilities of achieving 
each outcome. According to this approach, people should decide to work together if they 
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determine that the expected value—the amount earned for successful coordination multiplied by 
the probability that they think their partner will do the same—is greater than the amount earned 
for working alone. This rational actor hypothesis, in which the assumptions of economic 
modeling are directly interpreted as a psychological theory, predicts that as the benefits of 
working together decrease relative to the payoff for working alone, people will be less likely to 
try to work together, and their decisions will track this ratio in the interaction.  
In contrast, a more explicitly psychological approach treats game-theoretic models not as 
literal theories of decision-making, but as task analyses to help identify possible evolved 
information-processing mechanisms (Gigerenzer, Todd, & ABC Research Group, 1999). The 
probabilities associated with another individual’s behavioral choices are not directly accessible 
to a human perceiver, but must be heuristically inferred in real time from available cues. Rather 
than basing their decisions on potentially indeterminate probabilistic calculations of expected 
utility, humans may instead use simpler heuristics, which categorically distinguish common, 
shared, and private knowledge using ecologically typical cues to infer whether another person 
will attempt to coordinate. This knowledge-level heuristic hypothesis predicts that people’s 
decisions will be driven primarily by categorical perceptions of knowledge states, and thus may 
be relatively insensitive to the costs and benefits of coordination. 
Other Motivations for Coordination 
Coordination decisions may be influenced by factors other than public knowledge. Since 
coordination requires elusive knowledge that another person has made the same choice as 
oneself, people may use their own decision-making processes to simulate how their partners will 
think and behave (Gallese & Goldman, 1998), particularly when they view themselves as similar 
to their partner (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; Tamir & Mitchell, 2013). Indeed, perceived 
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similarity has been shown to help people solve coordination problems in which coordination 
requires that both make the same decision, but not when it requires that they make different 
decisions (Abele, Stasser, & Chartier, 2013). According to this perceived similarity hypothesis, 
the more similar an actor perceives himself or herself to be to a potential coordination partner, 
the more likely the actor will be to predict that their partner will choose as they do, and thus 
attempt risky coordination.4 
People may also be motivated to coordinate by altruistic or other-regarding preferences. 
Altruistic and reputational motives have been well documented in social psychology and 
experimental economics (e.g., Haley & Fessler, 2005; Messick & McClintock, 1968; Milinski, 
Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; Van Lange, 1999). The Big-Five personality trait of 
Agreeableness is associated with altruism, pro-sociality, friendliness, heightened self-
presentation concerns, and generosity (Goldberg, 1992; Graziano & Tobin, 2002; Roccas, Sagiv, 
Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002; Sun & Wu, 2012), and has specifically been associated with altruistic 
motivations towards non-relatives and strangers (Graziano, Habashi, Sheese, & Tobin, 2007). 
The altruistic motives hypothesis predicts that people who are higher on Agreeableness will be 
more likely to try to work together. 
Finally, some people may simply be willing to accept the potential cost of 
discoordination in the hope that they can earn more money through high-payoff coordination. 
The Big-Five personality trait of Openness is associated with risk-seeking (Nicholson, Soane, 
Fenton-O’Creevy, & Willman, 2005), and in particular with the seeking of chances for gains 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!4This is related to the concept of superrationality, in which rational actors decide to cooperate in 
a Prisoner’s Dilemma because they each assume that both they and their partner rationally see 
the wisdom of mutual cooperation, and know that the other sees it, knows that the other knows 
that they know that the other sees it, and so on (see Colman, 2003; Fischer, 2009; Hofstadter, 
1985). The same logic can be applied to coordination games with symmetrical payoff structures. !
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(Lauriola & Levin, 2001). The decision to work together is as a social gamble where one can bet 
a certain payout to win an additional increment of profit. The risk-seeking hypothesis predicts 
that people who are higher on Openness will be more likely to take the bet by trying to work 
together.  
We report four experiments designed to test these hypotheses. In Experiments 1 and 2, 
we test the effects of knowledge level and payoff structure on coordination decisions involving, 
respectively, one and three partners. In Experiment 3 we investigate how shared and common 
knowledge are cognitively represented and test the three social motivation hypotheses. In 
Experiment 4 we verify that the participants’ coordination behavior generalizes to a different 
fictional context and thus is not an artifact of specific features of the first scenario.  
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 implements the butcher-baker coordination game explained above. Each 
participant interacts with a partner, playing the role of either the butcher or the baker. They read 
that they could work either alone or with the partner; the amount they could earn for working 
alone was constant, but the amount earned for working together would vary from day to day and 
might be less than or greater than the amount they could make by working alone. They were then 
told that on the day of the actual decision facing them the payoff for working together was 
greater than the payoff for working alone, and were then given one of four kinds of information 
about what their partner knew about the payoff, which we varied in a between-subject design.  
In the private knowledge condition, a participant was told he or she could earn 10 cents 
more for working with the partner, but were not given information about what the partner knew. 
In the secondary knowledge condition, the participant was told that their partner also knew about 
this payoff. In the tertiary knowledge condition, they were told that their partner knew the payoff 
!27!
and knew that the participant himself or herself knew the payoff. In the common knowledge 
condition, the payoff was presented as public information, commonly known between the two 
participants. This information was given to participants in one of two boxes presented on their 
screen. Private, secondary, and tertiary knowledge information was presented in a private 
knowledge box that they were told only they could see, while common knowledge information 
was presented in a public knowledge box that both they and their partner could see.  
To see whether coordination decisions were sensitive to costs and benefits, we 
manipulated, between participants, the amount the participants could earn by working alone and 
together, yielding four payoff structures (see Figure 1.1): $1.00/$1.10, $2.00/$2.10, $5.00/$5.10, 
and $10.00/$10.10 (hereafter referred to as the $1, $2, $5, and $10 payoff conditions). We note 
that these stakes are typical for games run on Mechanical Turk (Amir, Rand, & Gal, 2012), and 
that previous research has shown that while real cash incentives are critical, the absolute size of 
the stakes tends not to alter the pattern of results (see Camerer, 2003 and Camerer & Hogarth, 
1999 for review). We chose small incremental payoffs for coordination (and thus relatively high 
opportunity costs for discoordination) to counter the typical demand characteristics of 
experimental games, which tend to encourage cooperative actions (Pedersen, Kurzban, & 
McCullough, 2013).  
Method 
Participants. We used Amazon Mechanical Turk to recruit 1600 participants (100 per 
condition) from the United States to complete a short study for a small payment. Mechanical 
Turk presents special challenges to ensuring internal and external validity, since online 
participants may not understand or engage with a task. Data quality and validity can be enhanced 
with either ex ante prescreening tasks or ex post exclusion based on comprehension questions. 
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Research shows that both methods can effectively reduce statistical noise without systematically 
biasing the results (Berinsky, Margolis, Sances, 2013; Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2012; 
Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011; Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009; Rand, Greene, 
& Nowak, 2012; Suri & Watts, 2011). However, prescreening with comprehension checks can 
potentially alter participant behavior (Rand et al., 2012), and may increase self-presentation 
effects (Clifford & Jerit, 2012). Hence, we used ex post exclusion based on comprehension 
questions about the game’s payoff structure (see Procedure).  
The final sample consisted of 1033 participants (58% female) with a mean age of 32.8 
years (SD = 15.0). This 35% ex post exclusion rate is within the range of rates observed in 
previous research using multiple comprehension checks with Mechanical Turk samples, which 
can vary between 25% and 50% (Berinsky et al., 2013; Downs, Holbrook, Sheng, & Cranor, 
2010; Goodman et al., 2012; Horton et al., 2011; Rand et al., 2012). Furthermore, researchers 
that have compared similar procedures in the lab and on Mechanical Turk have observed 
equivalent exclusion rates (Oppenheimer et al., 2009; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010; 
Rand et al., 2012).  
Procedure. Participants read instructions explaining that they would earn a minimum of 
50 cents, which they could augment based on their decisions in their interaction with another 
participant on Mechanical Turk5. They were told that one of them would play a butcher and the 
other a baker. Each could either work alone for a sure profit (the butcher could make chicken 
wings, the baker dinner rolls) or attempt to work with their partner, the butcher making hot dogs, 
the baker the buns. By choosing to work together, they were told, the participant could earn a 
profit, but only if the partner also chose to work together; if either decided to collaborate but the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5!A sample of the experimental stimuli can be viewed at 
http://www.pdescioli.com/CK_Materials/CK_Materials.html 
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partner did not, that person would not earn anything, because one cannot sell a bun without a hot 
dog or vice versa. Participants then read that they would earn a certain amount ($1, $2, $5, or 
$10) if they decided to work alone, but that the hot dog price varied from day to day, and thus the 
earnings for working together might be more than or less than this sure profit. Finally, they read 
that the information about hot dog earnings might be conveyed to them by a messenger boy 
(displayed on their screen in a private box they were told only they could see), or by a 
loudspeaker (displayed on their screen in a public box they were told the other participant could 
see on his or her screen as well). 
The participant then clicked a button to reveal the day’s information about the price of 
hot dogs and hence the potential profit for collaborating; in each case it was ten cents more than 
each would earn by working alone. In the second between-subjects manipulation, participants 
received one of the following pieces of information (presented here from the perspective of the 
baker):  
1. Private knowledge—In the private box the participant read, “The Messenger Boy has not 
seen the Butcher today, so he cannot tell you anything about what the Butcher knows.” 
The public box stated that the loudspeaker was silent.  
2. Secondary knowledge—In the private box the participant read, “The Messenger Boy says 
he stopped by the butcher shop before coming to your bakery. He tells you that the 
Butcher knows what today's hot dog price is. However, he says that he forgot to mention 
to the Butcher that he was coming to see you, so the Butcher is not aware that you know 
today's hot dog price.” The public box stated that the loudspeaker was silent.  
3. Tertiary knowledge—In the private box the participant read, “The Messenger Boy 
mentions that he is heading over to the butcher shop, and will let the Butcher know 
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today's price as well. The Messenger Boy will also tell the Butcher that he just came from 
your bakery and told you the price. However, the Messenger Boy will not inform the 
Butcher that he told you he would be heading over there. So, while the Butcher is aware 
that you know today's price, he is not aware that you know that he knows that.” The 
public box stated that the loudspeaker was silent.  
4. Common knowledge—In the public box the participant read, “The loudspeaker broadcast 
the market price of [today’s price] (of which you could earn [earnings for working 
together]).” In the private box the participant read, “The messenger boy did not come by. 
Because the market price was broadcast on the loudspeaker, the Butcher knows [today’s 
price], and he knows that you know this information as well.” 
The participants then made a decision to work alone or with the partner and indicated the 
choice with the keyboard. They were then asked to explain how they made the decision, and 
were given two sets of comprehension questions. The first set was used to (ex post) exclude 
participants who did not understand the game’s payoff structure, and contained three questions 
about the profits under various combinations of decisions: 
1. “If you and the Butcher both chose to make hot dogs then how much money would you 
earn for the interaction?” 
2. “If you chose to make hot dogs but the Butcher did not, then how much money would 
you earn for the interaction?” 
3. If you chose not to make hot dogs, regardless of what the Butcher decided, then how 
much money would you earn for the interaction?” 
The second set was used as a manipulation check, and contained four questions about what they 
and their partner knew: 
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1. “Do you know the price of hot dogs today? 
2. “Does the Butcher know the price of hot dogs today?” 
3. “Does the Butcher know that you know the price of hot dogs today?” 
4. “Does the Butcher know that you know that he knows the price of hot dogs today?”  
Finally, participants filled out a brief demographic questionnaire, submitted the task, and 
received the base rate payment for completion. Offline, we randomly paired participants to 
implement the conditions described in the scenario. To calculate each individual’s payoffs, 
private-level participants were matched with private-level participants and common-level 
participants were matched with common-level participants, but secondary-level were matched 
with private-level participants, and tertiary-level were matched with secondary-level participants. 
(Participants were paid based on their pairing with lower-level knowledge partners, and not on 
pairings with higher-level knowledge partners.) This matching procedure is necessary to avoid 
deception because the shared knowledge instructions specify a partner at a lower knowledge-
level (which is required to establish secondary and tertiary knowledge). Participants were paid 
their game earnings using Mechanical Turk’s “Bonus Payment” feature.  
Results and Discussion 
 Figure 1.2 shows that with all four payoffs, the percentage of participants who tried to 
work together was significantly affected by their state of knowledge (see also the first row of 
Table 1.1).  
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Figure 1.2 Percentage of participants who tried to work together in Experiment 1, organized by 
knowledge condition and payoff condition. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
 
Table&1.1!Comparison of knowledge levels in each payoff condition, Experiment 1!
Knowledge 
Levels 
$1.00 Payoff  $2.00 Payoff  $5.00 Payoff  $10.00 Payoff 
χ2 n ϕ  χ2 n ϕ  χ2 n ϕ  χ2 n ϕ 
All Levels 63.70*** 276 .48  62.79*** 272 .48  56.71*** 236 .49  70.41*** 249 .53 
Private vs. 
2o 21.26*** 147 .38  23.27*** 134 .42  2.66 121 .15  19.06*** 118 .40 
2o vs. 3o 0.69 141 .07  0.63 139 .07  10.88*** 113 .31  0.01 126 .01 
3o vs. CK 8.84** 129 .26  7.12** 138 .26  4.02* 115 .19  23.05*** 131 .42 
Note. Chi-square tests for the proportions of subjects who tried to work together across all 
knowledge levels, and adjacent knowledge levels by payoff condition. We compare private, 
secondary (2o), tertiary (3o), and common knowledge (CK). The comparisons across all 
knowledge levels have three degrees of freedom, and the comparisons across adjacent 
knowledge levels have one degree of freedom. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
 
Planned comparisons across adjacent knowledge conditions (i.e., private-secondary, 
secondary-tertiary, and tertiary-common) are shown in Table 1.1 for all payoff conditions. In all 
four payoff conditions, more participants tried to work together with common knowledge than 
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with tertiary knowledge. In three out of four payoff conditions, more participants tried to work 
together with secondary knowledge than with private knowledge (the difference was only 
marginally significant in the $5 payoff condition). Coordination rates were the same with 
secondary and tertiary knowledge, except with the $5 payoff, for which the rate with secondary 
knowledge was anomalously low. 
These results are consistent with the Common Knowledge Recognition hypothesis: 
Participants were more likely to try to work together with common knowledge than with any 
other state of knowledge. The results were inconsistent with a strong Curse of Knowledge 
hypothesis, because the likelihood of working together differed across knowledge conditions. In 
line with the Shared Knowledge hypothesis, few of the participants tried to work together with 
private knowledge and more tried to work together with secondary knowledge. However, only 
slightly more participants tried to work together with tertiary knowledge, while far more 
participants tried to work together with common knowledge (statistics presented in Table 1.1). 
The pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that people maintain a dual representation in which 
shared and common knowledge are thought of as qualitatively distinct.  
These results were inconsistent with a strict Rational Actor hypothesis because the 
proportion of participants who decided to try to work together in each knowledge condition 
varied little across the payoff conditions, even as the ratio between the cost of the forgone profit 
from working alone to the additional benefit from working together increased tenfold (Private:!
χ2(3, N = 261) = 3.13, p = .373, ϕ = .11; Secondary: χ2(3, N = 259) = 7.66, p = .054, ϕ = .17; 
Tertiary: χ2(3, N = 260) = 6.81, p = .078, ϕ = .16; Common: χ2(3, N = 253) = .76, p = .859, ϕ = 
.05). A rational actor would expect that as this ratio increases, the other rational actor would take 
the increased opportunity cost into account, and the probability that they would try to work 
!34!
together should correspondingly decrease, creating a positive feedback loop that would drive 
each of them to work alone. The fact that the proportion of people who tried to coordinate with 
common knowledge was invariant across payoffs contradicts the idea that coordination decisions 
were based on maximizing the expected payoff, and is instead consistent with the Knowledge-
level Heuristic hypothesis.  
Another test of the Rational Actor hypothesis may be obtained by examining the actual 
payouts that the participants would earn given their collective pattern of choices. Inspection of 
the frequency of coordination attempts in the secondary and tertiary knowledge conditions 
reveals that this payoff is likely to be low: Participants who decided to try to work together 
generally failed to coordinate with their partners (and thus relinquished their sure profit from 
working alone). To assess the overall rationality of these choices we calculated expected 
earnings based on all possible matchups with the other participants (rather than the actual 
earnings from the matchups we arbitrarily arranged in order to calculate their payments). This 
consists of the sum of the proportion of participants who chose to work alone, multiplied by the 
smaller certain payoff, and the proportion of participants that would, on average, successfully 
work with a partner (when both they and the partner chose to coordinate, which is the product of 
the proportion of participants that tried to work together and the proportion of potential partners 
that made the same choice), multiplied by the higher risky payoff. The discoordination payoff, 
from cases in which they would choose to cooperate but their partner would not, was zero, 
eliminating this term from the calculation. Figure 1.3a shows that for all payoffs, efficiency was 
higher with private and common knowledge than with either level of shared knowledge.  
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Figure 1.3 Average expected earnings as a percentage of maximum possible earnings for 
Experiment 1 (1.3a, on the left) and Experiment 2 (1.3b, on the right) by knowledge condition. 
We calculated expected earnings as the average amount a participant would earn across all 
possible pairings with the other participants. 
 
 
In sum, Experiment 1 shows that when people make coordination decisions, they 
differentiate between private, shared, and common knowledge (though apparently not among 
different levels of shared knowledge). Moreover, the level of knowledge, and the special appeal 
of common knowledge, are far more salient to them than the expected value of the options: 
Increasing the cost-benefit ratio tenfold had no observable impact on their choices.  
Experiment 2 
How general is the sensitivity to knowledge and insensitivity to payoffs observed in 
Experiment 1? Presumably, if achieving coordination is difficult enough, and the stakes are high 
enough, then even with common knowledge people would opt to work alone; as an extreme 
example, imagine risking a sure payoff of $1000 for working alone for a chance at earning $1001 
by coordinating with a million partners. To test the limits of common knowledge as a qualitative 
coordination heuristic, we designed Experiment 2 as a four-person coordination game in which 
all four partners had to decide to work together to achieve the benefits of coordination. 
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Coordination on the higher-paying option of working together is far more difficult with four 
people, because the probability of success is equal to the probability that any one partner decides 
to work together cubed.  
In fact, the perceived probability of successful coordination may fall even faster than that. 
In addition to common knowledge of the payoffs, coordination also requires individuals to be 
confident in their partners’ rationality. An irrational partner could prefer lower payoffs, choose 
blindly, or make some other unpredictable choice. With only two players, the chance of an 
irrational partner might be negligible, but this risk can be greater in larger groups. Since even a 
single irrational partner can be enough to torpedo coordination in a group, as the number of 
players goes up the likelihood of discoordination increases rapidly (everyone must be both 
knowledgeable and rational, and believe everyone else is as well). For this reason the cost-
benefit structure may become more salient to a participant as the number of other partners 
increases. Recall that a rational actor may choose to coordinate with less-than-perfect common 
knowledge (i.e., with common p-belief) as long as the probability of the other’s belief exceeds a 
critical value which depends on the relative payoffs: The higher the opportunity cost, the higher 
that probability must be. Thus we may see a greater sensitivity to payoffs in a coordination game 
involving more people. 
Methods 
Participants. As in Experiment 1, 1600 participants were recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, evenly distributed across the sixteen combinations of four payoff and four 
knowledge conditions. After we excluded participants who did not understand the payoffs, the 
sample consisted of 1150 participants (48% female, Mage = 31.9, SDage = 11.1).   
!37!
Design and procedure. Participants were told they could work together to make 
“superburgers,” which require a burger, a bun, cheese, and toppings from, respectively, a 
butcher, a baker, a cheese maker, and a produce vender. One participant was assigned to each of 
these four roles. As in Experiment 1, each participant also had the option to make a food item on 
his or her own for a sure profit. Participants were told that they would receive a profit for 
contributing to superburgers only if all three of the other merchants made the same choice, and 
would receive nothing otherwise. In each of the four knowledge conditions the participant’s three 
partners were said to have the same level of knowledge. This was conveyed with identical 
instructions to those of Experiment 1, except that “the Butcher” or “the Baker” was replaced with 
“the other merchants” (so all other merchants were said to have the same level of knowledge). 
All other aspects of the procedure were the same as in Experiment 1. 
Results and Discussion 
 As in Experiment 1, players’ state of knowledge affected their decision to work together 
(Figure 1.4). Table 1.2 shows that in all payoff conditions, significantly more participants tried to 
work together with common knowledge than with tertiary knowledge, and in three of the four 
payoff conditions, significantly more tried to work together with secondary than with private 
knowledge. In none of the payoff conditions was there a significant difference between 
secondary and tertiary knowledge. This consistent lack of significant differences between the 
shared knowledge conditions suggests that people treat secondary and tertiary knowledge 
similarly. 
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Figure 1.4 Percentage of participants who tried to work together in Experiment 2, organized by 
knowledge condition and payoff condition. Error bars represent standard error.   
 
 
Table&1.2!Comparison of knowledge levels in each payoff condition, Experiment 2!
Knowledge 
Levels 
$1.00 Payoff  $2.00 Payoff  $5.00 Payoff  $10.00 Payoff 
χ2 n ϕ  χ2 n ϕ  χ2 n ϕ  χ2 n ϕ 
All Levels 68.24*** 281 .49  45.32*** 297 .39  46.36*** 283 .41  24.72*** 289 .29 
Private vs. 
2o 13.59*** 142 .31  14.95*** 147 .32  1.77 148 .11  11.54*** 140 .29 
2o vs. 3o 2.50 132 .11  0.69 153 .07  2.26 137 .13  0.03 149 .01 
3o vs. CK 10.14** 139 .27  6.21* 150 .20  12.39*** 135 .30  4.23* 149 .17 
Note. Chi-square tests for the proportions of subjects who tried to work together across all 
knowledge levels, and adjacent knowledge levels by payoff condition. We compare private, 
secondary (2o), tertiary (3o), and common knowledge (CK). The comparisons across all 
knowledge levels have three degrees of freedom, and the comparisons across adjacent 
knowledge levels have one degree of freedom. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
Unlike Experiment 1, people showed some sensitivity to the payoff structure. In all 
knowledge conditions, increasing the relative costs of coordination failures brought down 
coordination rates. This is consistent with the observation that the minimum level of confidence 
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in common knowledge (i.e., the minimum common p-belief) required for rational coordination 
rises more steeply with opportunity costs when the number of players (and hence the chance that 
at least one will be ignorant or irrational or both) increases.  
Though participants’ sensitivity to payoffs was more consistent with the Rational Actor 
hypothesis than in Experiment 1, another aspect of the results was not. Unlike what we obtained 
in Experiment 1, the most profitable knowledge condition with all four payoffs was Private 
Knowledge (Figure 1.3b); Common Knowledge was less profitable than Shared Knowledge 
except with the least costly forgone payoff of $1. This shows an important limit to the 
advantages that people can obtain from common knowledge. When either the knowledge state or 
the rationality of all the necessary potential partners is less than perfect, coordination is difficult 
to achieve and hence poses a high risk of failure. In those cases even high rates of decisions to 
coordinate may not be enough to consummate successful coordination, and the temptation to 
coordinate presented by common knowledge can actually reduce the coordinators’ payoff. Yet 
more than half of the participants provided with common knowledge still opted for the risky 
higher payoff.  
Experiment 3 
 Experiment 3 is a replication of one of the payoff conditions from Experiment 1 with 
additional components that allow us to test how shared and common knowledge are represented, 
and why people sometimes make what appears to be an irrational decision to cooperate with just 
shared knowledge.  
 At least since Miller & Nicely (1955), cognitive psychologists have used confusion 
matrices to test hypotheses about underlying mental representations, based on the assumption 
that confusable stimuli are likely to be represented similarly. A similar logic underlies the 
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memory confusion paradigms commonly used in social psychology to reveal the dimensions of 
social categorization, such as the “Who said what?” paradigm (e.g., Klauer & Wegener, 1998; 
Lieberman, Oum, & Kurzban, 2008; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). In our case, we 
use errors in responses to our questions about participants’ comprehension about the level of 
knowledge as evidence of whether shared and common knowledge are represented in the same or 
in qualitatively distinct ways. Unfortunately, in the first two experiments these questions were so 
easy that almost all participants got them all correct. In this experiment, we made the questions 
more difficult in three ways: by putting them at the end of the survey, by adding a task before 
participants answered them, and by concealing the relevant information while they answered the 
questions (in the first two experiments, this information was visible on the screen).  
This experiment tests several additional hypotheses. Recall from the Introduction that 
there are several reasons that people may choose to coordinate even in the absence of common 
knowledge. One is that an actor may ascertain that she has similar values and biases to a 
potential partner, and thus that the partner is likely to assess the situation in the same way that 
she does, including an assessment of whether she herself is likely to choose to coordinate with 
the partner. We thus manipulated whether the participants thought they were interacting with a 
partner who was similar or dissimilar to themselves in age, political orientation, tastes in music, 
and decision-making style. The other social motivations for coordination consist of personality 
traits that make the choice inherently appealing, including Agreeableness, which impels people 
to act in a pro-social manner, and Openness, whose risk-seeking component may impel people to 
gamble for a big payoff rather than accepting a smaller but surer payoff.  
Methods 
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Participants. We recruited 800 participants from Mechanical Turk, evenly distributed 
across similarity and knowledge conditions. After eliminating people who failed the 
comprehension questions, we were left with 550 participants in the final analyses (approximately 
46% male, Mage = 31.6, SDage = 11.3).  ! Design and procedure. The design added three components to the $2 condition from 
Experiment 1.  
 Similarity manipulation. At the beginning of the experiment, participants answered four 
questions: 
• “Do you prefer more intense kinds of music (e.g., rock or rap) or more mellow kinds of 
music (e.g., classical or jazz)?”  
• “If you had to pick, would you say you are more liberal or more conservative?” 
• “How old are you?” [available answers: “I'm 35 years old or older,” and “I'm younger 
than 35 years old”] 
• “When making decisions do you tend to rely more on intuition or more on reason?” 
In the Similar condition, participants were told that they would be matched with a partner 
who gave the same answers to three or more of these questions. In the Dissimilar condition, 
participants are told that they would be matched with a partner who gave the same answers to 
two or fewer of these questions. Participants were then asked to report how similar they 
perceived their partner to be to them, on a scale from 0% to 100%.  ! Big Five personality questionnaire. After participants read the role-playing scenario and 
made their decision, they were asked to fill out a standard 50-question survey that measured the 
Big Five personality traits (Goldberg, 1999).  
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 Knowledge-level comprehension questions. Finally, the knowledge-level comprehension 
questions were administered on a separate page; when answering them, participants were unable 
to refer back to the initial instructions.  
Results and Discussion 
 Figure 1.5 shows that the Similarity manipulation made no systematic difference. 
Although ratings of perceived similarity were higher in the Similar condition (t(548) = 13.87, p < 
.001), these perceptions of similarity had no effect on the participants’ decisions (Wald χ2(1, N = 
550) = 0.01, p = .944). We thus collapse across similarity in all other analyses.  
 
Figure 1.5 Percentage of participants who tried to work together in Experiment 3, organized by 
knowledge condition and similarity/dissimilarity condition. Error bars represent standard error. 
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Knowledge level had the same effect as in the first two experiments: More people tried to 
work together with common knowledge than with tertiary knowledge, χ2(1, N = 270) = 22.28, p 
< .001, ϕ = .29, and more tried to work together with secondary than with private knowledge, 
χ2(1, N = 280) = 16.87, p < .001, ϕ = .25, but there was no difference between secondary and 
tertiary knowledge,  χ2(1, N = 284) = 0.72, p = .397, ϕ = .05. 
 Representations of shared and common knowledge. The confusion matrix for the 
questions about levels of knowledge is shown in Table 1.3. Participants made significantly more 
errors with tertiary knowledge than with any of other level of knowledge (planned comparisons: 
private-tertiary, χ2(1, N = 266) = 33.76, p < .001, ϕ = .36; secondary-tertiary, χ2(1, N = 284) = 
27.91, p < .001, ϕ = .31; common-tertiary, χ2(1, N = 270) = 13.93, p < .001, ϕ = .23), and these 
errors consisted overwhelmingly of misremembering it as secondary knowledge (an error made 
by 23% of the participants in this condition). Error rates with common knowledge and with 
secondary knowledge were not significantly different (χ2(1, N = 284) = 2.43, p = .119, ϕ = .09). 
None of the other off-diagonal confusions was as high as the one for mistaking tertiary for 
secondary knowledge. The next highest was 4% (mistaking tertiary knowledge for common 
knowledge), which was significantly different from the 23% rate for mistaking tertiary for 
secondary knowledge (p < .001).  
 
Table 1.3 Proportion of participants reporting different levels of knowledge in each condition in 
Experiment 3 
Condition Reported level of knowledge Proportion Correct Private Secondary Tertiary Common Unclassifiablea 
Private .931 .008 .008 .008 .046 .931 
Secondary .020 .899 .013 .007 .060 .899 
Tertiary 0 .230b .637 .044 .089 .637 
Common .007 0 .015 .837 .141 .837 
Note. Participants’ perceived knowledge level by (actual) knowledge condition. Participants’ 
perceived knowledge level was assessed using comprehension questions. Accurate judgments are 
those on the diagonal, and are given again in the last column. 
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aUnclassifiable errors correspond to patterns of errors that were logically inconsistent (e.g., 
reporting that they had tertiary knowledge, but not private knowledge), incomplete, or in which 
participants reported the correct level of knowledge but chose “can’t tell” rather than “yes” for 
some level of knowledge that they did have. 
bAccording to a sign test, tertiary knowledge was mistaken for secondary knowledge more 
frequently than for common knowledge, p < .001. 
 
These results show that higher levels of knowledge are increasingly difficult to represent, 
as suggested by the theory of mind literature, but only when the knowledge is merely shared; the 
highest level of all, common knowledge, is almost as easy to represent as the lowest level of 
shared knowledge. The confusion matrix thus suggests that shared and common knowledge have 
distinct cognitive representations, but that quantitatively different levels of shared knowledge do 
not.  
 Altruistic motives. Figure 1.6 shows that participants in the Shared knowledge 
conditions who tried to work together scored higher in Agreeableness than those who decided to 
work alone, a difference not observed in the Private or Common knowledge conditions. Logistic 
regression, controlling for the main effect of knowledge condition, revealed a significant 
Knowledge × Agreeableness interaction in coordination attempts, Wald χ2(3, N = 550) = 8.18, p 
= .043. Post-hoc t-tests with Agreeableness as the dependent variable and Decision (work alone 
vs. together) as an independent variable confirmed that the people who decided to work together 
with secondary and tertiary knowledge were significantly more agreeable (t(147) = 2.25, p = 
.013, and t(133) = 1.89, p = .030, respectively), but people who decided to work together with 
private or common knowledge were not (p > .60). These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that with shared knowledge, people may choose to coordinate with others out of a 
sense of altruism (perhaps as a signal to encourage coordination in possible future opportunities). 
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In contrast, Agreeableness did not affect behavior in the common knowledge condition, 
suggesting that the influence of common knowledge is not driven by reputational concerns.  
 
Figure 1.6 Average Agreeableness scale score for participants who tried to work together vs. 
participants who decided to work alone by knowledge condition in Experiment 3. The figure 
shows the abbreviated range of 3.5 – 4.2 (full range is 1 – 5). Error bars represent standard error. 
 
 Risk-seeking. Figure 1.7 shows a similar pattern for the trait of Openness to Experience 
(Wald χ2(3, N = 550) = 13.64, p = .003). Coordinators were more Open than non-coordinators 
when they made their decision with secondary knowledge (t(147) = 3.30, p < .001), and when 
they made it with tertiary knowledge (t(133) = 1.82, p = .036), but not when they made the 
decision with private or common knowledge (p > .80). These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that people recognize that, as game theory predicts, attempting to coordinate with 
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shared knowledge is risky, but attempting to coordinate with common knowledge is not; those 
who seek risks for gains may thus gamble in conditions of shared knowledge.  
 
Figure 1.7 Average Openness scale score for participants who tried to work together vs. 
participants who decided to work alone by knowledge condition in Experiment 3. The figure 
shows the abbreviated range of 3.5 – 4.2 (full range is 1 – 5). Error bars represent standard error. 
 
No differences were found for the other three personality factors (Extraversion, 
Conscientiousness, or Neuroticism); all ps > .2.  
Experiment 4 
This experiment was designed to explore how the context in which a coordination 
problem is framed might affect rates of coordination, and to assess participants’ expectations of 
their partner’s decision. Participants engaged in a two-person interaction that was isomorphic to 
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the $1 payoff condition from Experiment 1, but the scenario literally described a stag hunt 
involving coordination between hunters.  
In this scenario one person was assigned to be an archer, and the other a tracker. They 
each read that they could always hunt rabbits on their own for a certain payoff of $1, or 
sometimes hunt deer together to earn $1.10. As in the butcher-baker scenario, they were told they 
could receive private information from messengers or a public signal, any of which indicated 
when they could earn more by working together. Replacing the loudspeaker we used in the 
butcher-baker scenario was a signal fire that could be lit on a hill they could both see and which 
indicated the presence of deer.  Information about participants’ level of knowledge was given to 
them as part of the story rather than in the private and public knowledge boxes that were used in 
the previous three experiments. 
After making their decision, participants were also asked to report what they believed 
their partner decided to do, in order to test whether participants’ decisions were contingent on 
such guesses, as the logic of a Stag Hunt game suggests is rational. All other aspects of the 
experiment were the same as in the $1 condition of Experiment 1. 
Method 
 Participants. 400 participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (100 per 
knowledge condition) from the United States to complete a short study for a small payment. 
After excluding participants that missed comprehension questions about the game’s payoff 
structure, the final sample consisted of 348 participants (40% female, Mage = 34.8, SDage = 11.8). 
 Design and procedure. One participant was assigned to the role of archer, the other to 
the role of tracker. Participants were told they could either hunt rabbits on their own for a certain 
payoff of $1 or try to hunt deer together for a payoff of $1.10, which they would only receive if 
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their partner made the same choice (these are the same payoffs presented in Figure 1.1). In the 
private, secondary, and tertiary knowledge conditions a messenger delivered the information 
about the deer being present in the neighboring valley. In the common knowledge condition, 
participants read that (from the archer’s perspective): “You see smoke from the fire pit on the hill 
that both you and the Tracker can see, which signals to both of you that there are deer in the 
neighboring valley (so you could potentially earn $1.10 if both you and the Tracker hunt deer). 
So, the Tracker knows that there are deer today, and knows that you know that there are deer 
today. The Tracker also knows that you know that he knows that there are deer today, and vice 
versa.” 
 All subsequent procedures were the same as Experiment 1 (with appropriate rewording), 
with the addition of a question asking them what they thought their partner decided to do, 
presented after they made their decision. 
Results and Discussion 
 As in the previous three experiments, more participants decided to try to work together in 
the common knowledge condition (60%) than in the secondary (33%) or tertiary knowledge 
conditions (29%) (χ2(1, N = 173) = 12.72, p < .001, ϕ = .27; χ2(1, N = 170) = 16.09, p < .001, ϕ = 
.31, respectively). Fewer participants decided to try to work together in the private knowledge 
condition (16%) than in the secondary knowledge condition (χ2(1, N = 178) = 7.35, p = .007, ϕ = 
.20), and there was no significant difference between the number of participants who tried to 
work together with secondary knowledge than with tertiary knowledge (χ2(1, N = 173) = .253, p 
= .615, ϕ = .04).  
 The logic of a Stag Hunt dictates that one should do what one expects one’s partner to do 
(a rule that we assumed participants obeyed in Experiments 1-3 but without direct evidence).  
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Indeed, the correlation between participants’ decisions and what they reported they thought their 
partner would do was r(346) = .80, p < .001. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that a number of 
previous studies have shown that Mechanical Turk participants believe that they are interacting 
with a partner as much as participants believe this in the lab, and many classic experiments that 
critically depend on participant interaction have been replicated on Mechanical Turk (see Amir, 
et al., 2012; Horton, et al., 2011; Rand, et al., 2012; Summerville & Chartier, 2013; Suri & 
Watts, 2011). 
In sum, the effect of knowledge condition observed in Experiments 1-3 generalized to a 
different fictional context, and fittingly, the one in which the logic of coordination was 
historically first elucidated. Moreover, we now have evidence that the key factor predicted to 
mediate between the knowledge level cued by the environment and people’s decision to 
coordinate—namely the guess that their coordination partner intends to coordinate as well—
indeed is critical to that decision.  
General Discussion 
Humans have lived in large groups throughout their evolutionary history, providing many 
opportunities for mutually beneficial coordination. Game-theoretic models show that common 
knowledge has a privileged role in helping individuals solve coordination problems. Taken 
together, these observations suggest that humans evolved cognitive mechanisms for recognizing 
common knowledge and distinguishing it from shared knowledge. Our results support this 
hypothesis. In all four experiments, and with every combination of payoffs, participants were 
more likely to attempt risky coordination with common knowledge than with shared knowledge. 
Moreover, coordination attempts with common knowledge did not closely track the cost-benefit 
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ratio across payoff conditions, indicating that behavior was driven less by estimated probabilities 
of coordination than by a categorical recognition of a state of common knowledge.  
In contrast to the marked distinctions participants made between common, shared, and 
private knowledge, they made little distinction between different levels of shared knowledge. 
This is notable because the levels of shared knowledge tested here, secondary and tertiary, span 
almost the entire range of shared knowledge that people can readily represent, falling just one 
level short of the four-level maximum observed under favorable conditions by Kinderman et al. 
(1998). The similar rates of coordination attempts with different levels of shared knowledge is 
echoed by the pattern of confusions in knowing which state of knowledge was present: People 
confused tertiary with secondary knowledge, but rarely confused common knowledge with 
shared knowledge or with private knowledge, nor shared knowledge with private knowledge. 
This is further reinforced by the finding that people who were higher on the personality traits of 
Agreeableness or Openness were more likely to attempt risky coordination in both shared 
knowledge conditions, and only in these shared knowledge conditions. 
The cognitive difference between private and shared knowledge has long been 
established in the literature on theory of mind (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Saxe & Young, 
2013). The present results suggest that there is also a fundamental difference between shared 
knowledge and common knowledge. In contrast to their sensitivity to their partner’s knowledge 
state, participants were largely insensitive to the game’s payoff structure, responding to changes 
in expected returns only in an extreme case when successful coordination required three other 
people to make the same choice.  
A puzzle in the results was why a fair number of participants chose to coordinate with 
shared knowledge. Recall that a participant with secondary knowledge was always matched with 
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a partner with only private knowledge (they were told that their partner knew the profit for 
working together, but that their partner was unaware that they also knew this profit). Hence, to 
coordinate with their partner, a participant should act in the same way that they would act with 
private knowledge. But overall, our participants defied this logic, with more of them opting to 
work together with secondary knowledge than with private knowledge, providing further support 
for the claim that participants used the different knowledge states heuristically, rather than 
rationally calculating their best move.  
If they were not playing their best move in cost-benefit terms, why would people risk a 
certain payout for an uncertain small gain? The personality results indicate that participants may 
have chosen to try to work together to signal their cooperative character (Agreeableness), or 
because of a risk-seeking disposition (Openness). Participants did not leverage similarity in 
making their decisions, but the possibility remains that this manipulation was too cursory to be 
effective. The rewards for working alone and working together were abstract monetary payoffs, 
which differ only in magnitude and not in semantic content. However, in many real world 
situations the nature of the similarity between people is highly relevant to the kind of 
coordination they are considering, and perceived similarity has been shown to facilitate 
coordination when coordinating requires matching on some kind of semantic content (Abele et 
al., 2013). Two roommates, for example, who will have to endure or enjoy each other’s music, 
ought to find similarity in musical tastes more relevant to the decision to live together than 
similarity in personality or politics.  
The pattern of participant payouts provides clues as to why certain aspects of 
participants’ behavior in these experiments were suboptimal. In an arbitrary social situation 
(such as the artificial scenario of interacting with strangers on the Internet in a contrived game), 
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it is extraordinarily hard to predict whether coordination will be profitable, because it depends 
critically on small and unpredictable differences in the decisions of the other participants. In the 
case of the four-person game above (Experiment 3), coordination turned out to be the least 
profitable strategy, even when a majority of participants chose to coordinate, because even a 
relatively small number of non-coordinators was enough to scuttle coordination and its rewards. 
With people unable to predict at exactly which combination of probabilities and payoffs in a 
given situation this tipping point lies, they may focus predominantly on information that 
indicates other people’s state of knowledge. Actors coordinate when they have evidence for 
common knowledge, and refrain from coordinating when they do not. For this heuristic to be 
advantageous in real life, people must have high quality information about common knowledge 
in ecologically typical environments, and about other people’s sensitivity to the same 
information.  
Broader Implications: Common knowledge in Social Life 
  The finding that people use common knowledge in their decisions to coordinate their 
behavior, the evidence that common knowledge is a distinct cognitive category, and the 
suggestion that everyday social life provides reliable cues to common knowledge in 
opportunities for coordination, all imply that common knowledge has a strong presence in human 
life and in the phenomena studied by social psychology. This makes it surprising that the 
psychology of common knowledge has apparently had so little visibility in psychology, and 
raises the question of whether it is similarly invisible in everyday life, which would be puzzling. 
If coordination is as important to social life as altruism, and if common knowledge is as 
indispensable to coordination as reciprocity is to altruism, shouldn’t we expect our language and 
our lives to be permeated with ideas of common knowledge?  
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 We suggest that this is indeed the case, even if it has not been fully appreciated. Just as 
the logic of reciprocity makes us obsessed with concerns such as debt, favor, bargain, obligation, 
and so on, we suggest that the logic of common knowledge makes us obsessed with concerns 
such as publicity, privacy, confidentiality, conventional wisdom, fame, celebrity, hypocrisy, 
taboo, tact, euphemism, piety, mock outrage, political correctness, and “Washington gaffes” 
(when a politician says something that is true). In other words, both psychology and everyday 
social life have been concerned with the manifestations of common knowledge, even if 
psychologists have not hitherto treated them as exemplars of a single principle.  
 We conclude by suggesting that an acknowledgement of the role of common knowledge 
in enabling coordination can unify and explain a variety of seemingly unrelated and puzzling 
phenomena. In particular, much of social life is affected by common-knowledge generators, and 
much of language and cognition is sensitive to the state of common knowledge.  
 The most obvious common-knowledge generator is direct speech. When one person says 
something to another in “plain language” or “in so many words,” the content of the proposition is 
common knowledge. Lee and Pinker (2010) showed that when an experimental participant read a 
vignette in which one person issues an overt threat, bribe, or sexual come-on to another, the 
participant assumed that each party knows that the other knows that he knows (etc.) the relevant 
intention, whereas when the same proposition is proffered in an innuendo, even an obvious one, 
the participant assumes only that the parties know the content of the proposition as private 
knowledge (e.g., “Michael offered a bribe”), not at higher-order levels (e.g., “Michael knows that 
the officer knows that he offered a bribe”).   
The generation of common knowledge may be the function of other deliberate and salient 
communicative acts. One such example is joint attention (Scaife & Bruner, 1975; Tomasello, 
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1995), in which two people look back and forth at an object and at each other. Joint attention is 
thought to facilitate the acquisition of words, a classic example of a coordination equilibrium 
(see Lewis, 1969), and children seem to assume that the meaning of a novel word is common 
knowledge, but they do not make this assumption about novel facts (Diesendruck & Markson, 
2001).  
Another class of common-knowledge generators consists of performatives (Austin, 1962; 
Searle, 1989) and the associated phenomenon of public ceremonies, in which the public 
utterance of a proposition (e.g., “I now pronounce you man and wife”) ratifies a new 
coordination equilibrium such as a marriage, law, or court decision. Much of our moral 
psychology, including moral debate and condemnation, generates common knowledge of 
prohibited actions, which allows people to coordinate aggression toward wrongdoers (DeScioli 
& Kurzban, 2013), and may be the logic underlying the well-documented omission bias in moral 
psychology (DeScioli, Bruening, & Kurzban, 2011). And, as we mentioned in the Introduction, 
challenges to power that require coordination among many actors are often effected by public 
protests, and increasingly their electronic equivalents.  
 Common knowledge can also be conveyed nonverbally. Indeed, we propose that the 
nonverbal signals which accompany self-conscious emotions evolved with their peculiar 
anatomy and physiological configurations (Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008) precisely because those 
configurations are simultaneously salient to the expresser and the perceiver (see Provine, 1996, 
2012, for discussion). The perceiver knows not only the intended mental state of the expresser 
but knows that the expresser knows it, that the expresser knows that the perceiver knows it, and 
so on. Among these nonverbal common-knowledge generators may be the following.  
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• Eye contact is a potent social signal of threats and sexual come-ons precisely because 
both parties commonly know that they are acknowledging each other’s acknowledgment. 
• Blushing is felt as a somatosensory sensation by the blusher at the same time as it is 
displayed as a change in skin color to the perceiver. The acute discomfort in blushing 
resides largely in the knowledge that the blusher knows he or she is blushing, knows that 
an onlooker knows it, that the onlooker knows that the blusher knows that they know, and 
so on.  
• Crying has the same inside-outside salience: A distraught person looking at onlookers 
through tears cannot avoid the knowledge that others know his tearful state, know that he 
knows, and so on.  
• Laughter, with its disruption of the respiration rhythms necessary for speech and its 
unignorable noise, is also mutually salient to expresser and perceiver.  
If this analysis is correct, it predicts that the common knowledge generated by each of 
these displays is necessary to attain a mutually beneficial equilibrium in a coordination game. 
(Although such knowledge may be less certain in real-world environments than in the 
experiments presented here, recall from the Introduction that coordination can be effected by the 
weaker concept of common p-belief, which generalizes perfectly certain common knowledge to 
more realistic environments with less certainty.) Pinker (2007), Pinker, Nowak, & Lee (2008), 
and Lee & Pinker (2010) suggest that one such relevant game is the joint adoption of a 
Relational Model that consensually governs their interactions, such as communal sharing, 
authority ranking, equality matching, or market pricing (Fiske 1992, 2004). For example, two 
people can prosper if they agree to be friends and share things indiscriminately, or if they agree 
to transact business and one sells something to the other, but not if one believes they are friends 
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and helps himself to a possession that the other is in the business of selling. In the case of 
expressions of self-conscious emotions, the game may consist of two parties agreeing that one of 
them has committed an unintended or regretted harmful act, or is in a vulnerable state, and thus 
that the second one needn’t punish or ostracize him. This equilibrium leaves both of them better 
off than they would be if the second incurred the cost of punishing or ostracizing the first for a 
harm he would never repeat anyway (McCullough, 2008). If this theory of nonverbal 
communication is correct, then expressions that are less likely to generate common knowledge 
(such as facial expressions which a person can express with little awareness he is expressing it) 
should not be yoked to an identifiable coordination game.  
Since coordination and common knowledge by definition involve multiple parties, we 
should expect that they manifest themselves not just in small-scale two- or three-person  
interactions but also within larger groups. That is, the role of common knowledge in solving 
coordination problems should manifest itself in a number of social-psychological phenomena. 
Here we can only list the rich possibilities for uniting diverse large-scale societal phenomena as 
manifestations of coordination problems that involve common knowledge:  
• transactive memory (Wegner, 1995; Wegner, Erber, & Raymond, 1991)—which 
may have interesting parallels with coordinating distributed storage in networked 
databases (Alberucci & Jäger, 2005; Halpern & Moses, 1990); 
• creating and popping market bubbles (Dalkiran et al., 2012; Zuckerman, 2010); 
• inaction brought on by diffusion of responsibility (Buchan, Croson, & Dawes, 
2002); 
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• creating and maintaining social norms (Cronk & Leech, 2013), including the sub-
optimal norms that result from pluralistic ignorance (Centola, Willer, & Macy, 
2005; Willer, Kuwabara, & Macy, 2009); 
• the need to define hierarchical roles of leaders and followers when common 
knowledge is not attainable (Van Vugt, 2006); 
• negotiation and bargaining (Ayres & Nalebuff, 1996; Schelling, 1960); 
• international relations and diplomacy and so-called “red lines” (Byman, 2013; 
Hoffman & Yoeli, 2013); 
• the subjective perception of currency valuation (Friedman, 1991); 
• arbitrary groups, as studied by Social Identity Theorists (Ockenfels & Werner, 
2014; Yamagishi, Mifune, Liu, & Pauling, 2008); 
• arbitrary rules of etiquette (Schelling, 1960); 
• identifiable signals of conspicuous consumption (Veblen, 1899/2007); 
• and many other kinds of seemingly arbitrary social constructions (Searle, 1995).  
Finally, if common knowledge is a pervasive concern of social life, then it should leave a 
mark on language in the form of a conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Pinker, 2007): 
a family of idioms organized around a central image, such as ARGUMENT IS WAR or LOVE IS A 
JOURNEY. In the case of common knowledge, the central image alludes to the quintessential 
common-knowledge generator: COMMON KNOWLEDGE IS A CONSPICUOUS OBJECT OR SOUND. 
Thus, we have a family of expressions which invoke a salient object or event to assert that some 
proposition or speech act is common knowledge (and hence compels acknowledgment and action 
by two or more parties), or the converse, that even if some proposition is known by everyone it 
should strategically be kept out of common knowledge: 
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The emperor’s new clothes. 
The elephant in the room. 
It’s out there; you can’t take it back.  
It’s on the record; to go on record. 
The bell can’t be unrung (also: Some things once said cannot be unsaid). 
That's a pretty big matzo ball hanging out there [when one person says “I love you” 
and the other doesn’t reciprocate; from the television show Seinfeld] 
A bald lie; a barefaced lie [compare: a veiled threat; a fig leaf] 
To save face; to lose face. 
That insult was in his face; he couldn’t ignore it.  
It’s as plain as the nose on your face.  
 In recent decades, psychologists have recognized that cooperation is one of the hallmarks 
of the human species, and that its game-theoretic demands have shaped our emotions, our 
morality, our social relationships, and our language. Much has been learned about these domains 
of psychology from a focus on the problem of altruistic cooperation and the mechanisms of 
reciprocity. We hope that comparable insights are waiting to be discovered by psychologists as 
they investigate the problem of mutualistic cooperation, and as the mechanisms of common 
knowledge are—as we say—put out there. 
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Abstract 
Transitioning from one type of relationship to another (e.g., from friends to lovers; co-
workers to friends) can be awkward if people don’t have aligned relationship goals. The recently 
proposed strategic speaker theory (Lee & Pinker, 2010), posits that indirect speech offers an 
optimal way to make this transition, by allowing speakers to assess another person’s interests, 
while minimizing damage to an existing relationship. This experiment tests two predictions of 
the theory: (1) Affective reactions track the social costs and benefits of indirect and direct 
propositions, and (2) Indirect speech helps prevent rumors from spreading to third parties. Pairs 
of recently acquainted male and female participants acted out two scenarios, one involving a 
sexual proposition, the other a bribe proposition. The propositions were made either directly or 
indirectly, while participants’ cardiovascular responses were measured to assess affective 
responses. Results largely support the predictions. Participants’ responses to direct and indirect 
propositions were different in both scenarios, and were moderated by variables that uniquely 
affect the costs and benefits of the two scenarios (gender in the sexual proposition scenario; 
proposer or receiver in the bribe scenario). Participants’ self-reported responses also showed that 
while they understood the intended meaning of the indirect sexual proposition, they would not 
pass it on unambiguously to a friend. These findings provide the first evidence that affective 
reactions track the costs and benefits of direct and indirect speech, and that indirect speech helps 
prevent rumors. 
!61!
Introduction  
When someone has a crush on a friend, but isn’t sure if their friend feels the same way, 
they frequently receive the advice to just tell them. Yet, this advice is ignored almost as 
frequently as it is given, because baldly stating one’s feelings can be terrifying, and people 
rightly worry that doing so could destroy their friendship. Instead, people generally try to figure 
out a way to communicate their desire indirectly, and even using a completely transparent 
innuendo can feel much less threatening. Furthermore, if a veiled offer to take the relationship to 
the next level is rejected, the two may remain friends the next day, even if the intended message 
couldn’t possibly have been misunderstood, yet the friendship may be unsalvageable if the offer 
was made directly.  
Why can it be so terrifying to state one’s desires directly? How does indirect speech 
make this less scary? And, why might a direct proposition destroy a friendship, when a 
completely transparent innuendo would not? While we all share the intuition that indirect 
propositions often feel much safer than direct ones, it is not immediately clear why this should be 
the case. A common folk explanation focuses on the fact that indirect propositions do not create 
100% certainty, yet this merely begs the question, because it fails to explain how an indirect 
proposition that creates 99% certainty can lead to dramatically different outcomes than a direct 
one. Why don’t the consequences scale with the level of certainty? Why is there such a dramatic 
discontinuity between indirect and direct propositions?  
Theoretical Background: Indirect Speech, Cooperation, and Politeness 
 In everyday conversation, people speak indirectly all the time, a tendency that is so 
natural and intuitive that it often goes unnoticed until one is forced to be direct, precise, and 
unambiguous, such as in legal settings, or when programming a computer. At least since Grice 
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(1975), explanations for how people understand indirect speech generally start with the 
assumption that conversational partners cooperate to achieve a shared goal of communication 
(see also, Clark, 1996). From this cooperative principle, Grice derived four conversational 
maxims: Listeners assume that speakers should be (1) succinct, (2) truthful, (3) relevant, and (4) 
clear. Grice argued that these assumptions help listeners infer the meaning of an indirect 
utterance, by providing them with a guide for how to fill in any missing information when a 
speaker violates one of the maxims. 
While Grice explained how listeners might understand indirect speech, he offered no 
explanation for why people might speak indirectly in the first place. Politeness theory, proposed 
by Brown & Levinson (1987), aimed to fill this gap, by positing that when imposing on others, 
people violate the maxims to add layers of politeness to their communicative acts. Politeness 
theory integrates Grice’s insights with those of Erving Goffman (1955, 1959), who argued that 
much of human social behavior can be understood as efforts to establish and maintain face (i.e. 
prestige and autonomy, from the idiom to save face). Brown and Levinson argued that people 
often use indirect speech to help both conversational partners maintain face, such as when a 
speaker makes a veiled request (e.g., “It would be awesome if you were around to help me move 
this weekend”) rather than stating their request directly (e.g., “Please help me move this 
weekend”). 
Research has borne out many of the predictions of politeness theory, but there are both 
empirical and theoretical reasons to doubt that politeness is the only reason people use indirect 
speech to navigate their relationships. Empirically, some of the predictions of politeness theory 
have been contradicted (Holtgraves & Yang, 1990; Lee & Pinker, 2010). For example, no one 
would consider a veiled threat polite (e.g., “Nice shop you’ve got here; sure would be a shame if 
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something happened to it”), nor would anyone interpret a passive aggressive jab as an effort to 
save the listener’s face (e.g., “I guess I’ll just clean the bathroom again then…like always”). 
Theoretically, it is dubious that conversational partners are always engaged in a purely 
cooperative relationship, as biological signaling theory suggests that communicating organisms 
often have conflicting interests (Maynard-Smith & Harper, 2003; Dawkins & Krebs, 1978). In 
the examples given above, the speaker’s interests clearly diverge from those of the listener. 
Indeed, the kinds of indirect speech acts that don’t conform to the predictions of 
politeness theory generally occur in situations where conversational partners have potential 
conflicts of interest (Lee & Pinker, 2010). A speaker who delivers a veiled bribe for example, is 
often uncertain whether the other person shares their interest in making such an illicit 
transaction. The same is true when one conveys a sexual proposition through innuendo: The 
person being propositioned may not share the speaker’s desire for a sexual relationship.  
The Strategic Speaker Theory: Managing Uncertainty and Conflicts of Interest  
Both theory and research suggest that even in the most cooperative relationships, 
people’s interests are never perfectly aligned (Richardson, 2014; Trivers, 1985). For example, 
married couples often share the cooperative goal of raising their children, but they may 
frequently disagree on how much each should contribute towards this goal. People establish and 
maintain relationships by identifying and focusing on shared interests, while avoiding or 
managing any conflicts of interest, which can destroy a relationship if they become 
insurmountable (Argyle & Furnham, 1983; Helgeson, Shaver, & Dyer, 1987; McPherson, Smith-
Lovin, & Cook, 2001; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973). This task is complicated by the fact 
that other people’s mental states—their interests, motivations, goals, beliefs, etc.—are not 
directly observable, which can make it difficult to assess how other’s interests overlap or conflict 
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with one’s own (Baron-Cohen, 1997; Gilbert, 1998; Whiten & Byrne, 1997). One way to assess 
someone else’s interests is by talking with them; however, this may expose a previously 
unrecognized conflict of interest. To understand how this might pose a dilemma, imagine two 
flirtatious friends who have never been romantically involved. If one person wants to shift from 
being friends to lovers, they face a catch-22: They may have to reveal their desire to assess how 
their friend feels, but doing so risks revealing a conflict of interest if their friend doesn’t feel the 
same way, which could potentially ruin the friendship. 
The recently proposed strategic speaker theory (hereafter, SST), posits that managing 
these two concerns depends on different kinds of knowledge, and that by using indirect speech, 
speakers can exploit this difference to assess the interests of their conversational partner, while 
minimizing damage to any existing relationship (Pinker, 2007; Pinker, Nowak & Lee, 2008; Lee 
& Pinker, 2010). Assessing another person’s interests only requires private knowledge, as 
demonstrated by the fact that this can easily be done without the other person knowing, such as 
by surreptitiously overhearing them talking with someone else. In contrast, the theory posits that 
damaging a relationship often requires common knowledge, which is defined as an infinite 
recursion of shared beliefs, such that A knows X, A knows that B knows X, A knows that B 
knows that A knows X, and knows that B knows that they know that B knows X, ad infinitum. 
Previous research has confirmed that indirect speech can create private knowledge of a 
proposition without making it common knowledge, unlike direct speech, which makes a 
proposition both privately and commonly known (Lee & Pinker, 2010). To understand how this 
property of indirect speech might help a speaker navigate their dual concerns requires a brief 
delve into the game theory of coordination games. 
Common Knowledge and Coordination 
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In a coordination game, two or more people can benefit by coordinating their behavior, 
but there is more than one way to do so, and everyone incurs a cost if they fail to coordinate. For 
example, everyone benefits by driving on the same side of the road, but this can be either the left 
side or the right side; likewise, dissidents can benefit through collective action, but their goals 
may be pursued in a number of different ways. In both cases, there can be steep penalties for 
coordination failure—a car accident in the first case, persecution or wasted effort in the second.  
When trying to coordinate with someone else, an individual should do whatever his or 
her partner does, which can pose a problem, because each person’s best option depends on what 
they expect the other person to do. Recognizing this mutual dependency, an individual should 
only expect their partner to choose some option if they think their partner expects them to, and 
only if they expect their partner to expect them to expect this, and so on. This infinite recursion 
of expectations is the reason why an infinite recursion of shared beliefs (i.e., common 
knowledge) is often needed to coordinate (Chwe, 2001; Lewis, 1969; Schelling, 1960). Recent 
research has shown that people are at least implicitly cognizant of this requirement, and that they 
represent common knowledge as distinct from lower, finite levels of shared beliefs (Thomas et 
al., 2014). 
Game theorists have demonstrated that common knowledge is both necessary and 
sufficient to shift from one coordination option to another (Dalkiran et al., 2012; Morris, 2002; 
Rubinstein, 1989)6. For example, if two friends meet up at the same time and place every week, 
they can only switch locations if they establish common knowledge that they will do so, because 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6!Technically,!switching!between!coordination!options!can!be!achieved!with!the!weaker!state!of!common&p/belief,!in!which!individuals’!knowledge!need!not!be!100%!certain!(Dalkiran!et!al.,!2012;!Monderer!&!Samet,!1989).!However,!the!same!dynamics!apply,!and!here!we!use!the!term!common&knowledge!broadly,!to!also!include!“sufficiently!high!common!pRbelief”.!!!
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neither one wants to end up at the new location while the other is at the old location. More 
importantly for indirect speech, making a conflict of interest common knowledge can lead to 
coordination failure, or force people to coordinate on some option that none of them wants 
(Dalkirin et al., 2012). Continuing with our example, two friends may not be able to meet up if it 
becomes common knowledge that one person would like to change the time or place while the 
other wouldn’t, and they fail to establish a final commonly-known agreement on one of the two 
options. 
To understand this dynamic, imagine two friends, Emily and Kate, who get together 
every Wednesday at a local café, and one Wednesday Emily ends up on the other side of town 
shortly before their regularly scheduled time. Emily calls to see if Kate can meet at a café closer 
to her instead, but Kate says she’d rather not have to drive across town. Then, before they can 
resolve the issue, Emily’s cell phone dies. Because they both expressed a different preference, 
but failed to come to an agreement on where to meet before the phone died, neither can be sure 
where they should go. Furthermore, if the worst outcome would be sitting at a café alone, both 
may decide to just scrap this week’s meet-up. By exposing their conflict of interest over where to 
meet, Emily disrupted their well-coordinated tradition, and because they failed to reestablish 
common knowledge of where to meet, they may both abandon this week’s meeting entirely 
rather than risk wasting their time. Although both might prefer meeting at either location to not 
meeting at all, each may abandon the meeting simply because they expect the other one to do so, 
or expect the other one to expect them to do so, and so on. 
Relationships as Coordination Games 
The SST models relationships as a kind of coordination game because people can have 
many different types of relationships (e.g., friends, lovers, co-workers, or acquaintances), and 
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each relationship type is governed by distinct expectations and norms (Fiske, 1992; Haslam, 
2004). While two people can often benefit by coordinating on one type of relationship or 
another, if they can’t agree on what the prevailing relationship should be, their best option may 
be to have no relationship at all. For example, an individual who commits a lot of time, energy, 
and resources in trying to establish a romantic relationship with a friend who isn’t interested, 
may be better off abandoning the relationship entirely. Conversely, the benefits of maintaining a 
friendship with someone whose love is unrequited may not be worth the constant harassment and 
annoyance that often typify such asymmetrical relationships. Furthermore, if someone else 
desires to opt out of having any kind of relationship, typically one’s best option is to do the same, 
because investing in a one-sided relationship is worse than abandoning it altogether. 
Because each person is better off abandoning a relationship if they expect the other 
person to, mutually opting out of any relationship is also a kind of coordination. Just as Emily 
and Kate had to decide not only between going to the normal café or the new café, but also 
abandoning the effort entirely, people often must decide not only among the various types of 
relationships they could engage in, but also have the option to avoid pursuing any kind of 
relationship at all. And, since coordination depends on mutual expectations, this can lead to a 
paradoxical situation in which two people abandon their relationship simply because each one 
expects the other one to, even if neither wants to. This dynamic is perhaps most obvious in 
teenage dating, when for example, a girl dumps her boyfriend, not because she wants to, but 
because she thinks her boyfriend is about to break up with her. Similarly, two people who both 
want to remain friends may end up failing to do so, simply because each expects the other to 
jump ship, and neither wants to be the last one to do so. 
The Strategy of Indirect Speech 
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 If relationship negotiation follows this logic of coordination, indirect speech could 
provide speakers with an optimal strategy to simultaneously assess whether their conversational 
partner shares their interests, while hedging against ruining the relationship if they do not. If two 
friends go out one night, and one invites the other up for coffee at 2am, this creates an 
opportunity to transition from friends to lovers if the other person is interested, but can also 
allow them to remain friends the next day if the offer is rejected. In either case, this interaction 
gives both people private knowledge of the other’s interests—people rarely drink coffee at 
2am—but it does not make a conflict of interest common knowledge if the offer is rejected (Lee 
& Pinker, 2010). If instead the speaker made the proposition directly (e.g., “Would you like to 
come up and have sex?”), and it was rejected, this would make it commonly known between 
both people that one wants to be lovers while the other does not. By making this common 
knowledge, a direct proposition may make the friendship unsalvageable, even if both still wish to 
remain friends, since either or both may bail on the friendship solely because they expect the 
other person to, or think that the other person expects them to, and so on. By preventing common 
knowledge of disparate interests, an indirect proposition can allow the two to remain friends if 
they both still wish to. 
 These insights are based on formal mathematical models, in which abstract rational 
agents calculate their best move based on explicit numerical payoffs, but the models are agnostic 
as to how these payoffs are instantiated. Translating the models to real human behavior thus 
requires some psychological mechanism that captures the payoffs in some way. People’s social 
behavior is generally driven not by conscious calculations of precisely enumerated payoffs, but 
rather by emotions and motivations that evolved to track the perceived costs and benefits of 
different outcomes (albeit, imperfectly). We establish beneficial relationships because this makes 
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us feel good, and avoid damaging valuable existing relationships because doing so makes us feel 
bad (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The more valuable a relationship is, or can be, the better we 
feel creating it and the worse we feel if it is destroyed. The SST hypothesizes that indirect and 
direct propositions are associated with different affective states that track the costs and benefits 
of different potential outcomes. 
Indirect Speech, Third Parties, and Rumors 
The SST further proposes that indirect speech can help speakers prevent rumors from 
spreading to third parties about their interests and intentions. Indirect propositions often require 
context and non-linguistic cues to interpret the intended message. An invitation for coffee at 2am 
generally conveys something very different than an invitation for coffee mid-afternoon, and an 
otherwise innocent request can take on an entirely different meaning when combined with the 
right tone of voice or body language (a phenomenon often exploited by comedians). Just as 
retelling a hilarious joke verbatim may not have the same effect without the appropriate delivery, 
it can be difficult to share what was conveyed through an indirect proposition if one cannot 
recreate the original context in which it occurred. 
The SST suggests that this is because the discrete nature of words, phonemes, and syntax 
make direct speech a digital medium of communication, while many of the contextual and non-
linguistic cues needed to interpret indirect propositions are analog (Lee & Pinker, 2010; Pinker, 
Nowak, & Lee, 2008). Digital information can generally be reproduced with much higher fidelity 
than analog information because small variations in signal quality can be corrected at each 
reproduction, slowing the inevitable creep of entropy in the signal each time it is reproduced 
(Tocci, Widmer, & Moss, 2007). This is why music that is stored digitally (e.g., on a CD or as an 
mp3) can be copied indefinitely with minimal loss of quality, but serial copies degrade rapidly if 
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the music is stored in an analog format (e.g. a cassette tape or record). Similarly, the analog 
features required to interpret indirect propositions may make them difficult to pass on to third 
parties, or for third parties to pass on to fourth parties, and so on. As Pinker, Nowak, and Lee 
(2008) state, “Overt propositions, in contrast [to indirect propositions], may be perceived as 
context-free—their intent can be interpreted by eavesdroppers—and lossless—their intent can be 
transmitted perfectly along chains of gossipers (in the same way that other digital media, such as 
files of music or images, can be transmitted losslessly)” (p. 837, italics in the original). 
Strategic Indirect Speech is Difficult to Study in the Lab 
 The very nature of strategic indirect speech makes it difficult to study in the laboratory, 
because risky propositions are typically delivered in private or secluded settings, and people are 
generally loath to make them directly. Indeed, we have previously struggled to elicit direct 
propositions from participants in the lab (see Footnote 6 in Lee & Pinker, 2010). Moreover, 
measuring affective responses to acts that have plausible deniability, are embarrassing, or may 
tarnish positive self-representations adds further obstacles to understanding how people respond 
to using and receiving propositions that vary in directness. To bring the phenomenon into the lab, 
we had participants act out two scripted role-playing scenarios involving common situations that 
could plausibly elicit a risky proposition (one involved a sexual proposition, the other a bribe 
proposition).!To measure affective responses to indirect and direct propositions,!we employed 
psychophysiological methods to capture online changes in cardiovascular reactivity. These 
measures allow for continuous, dynamic, and online assessment of affective states, without 
interrupting the interaction, or relying on self-reports.  
Specifically, we employed a set of cardiovascular measures that have been consistently 
linked to the well-established affective states of challenge and threat (Blascovich & Mendes, 
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2010; Mendes & Park, 2014). Both of these affective states occur in the context of motivated 
performance situations—defined as self- or goal-relevant, active tasks that require instrumental 
cognitive responses—but are differentiated by how people assess and react to the situation, and 
have distinct profiles of cardiovascular responses. Challenge states can be conceived of as “good 
stress”, as they occur when individuals appraise their available resources to exceed the demands 
of the task, and they are characterized by an approach motivation, typically better cognitive 
performance, and greater efficiency in physiological mobilization (i.e., increased blood flow to 
the periphery and brain). Threat states can be conceived of as “bad stress”, as they occur when 
individuals perceive the demands of the task to exceed their available resources, and they are 
characterized by an avoidance motivation, poorer cognitive performance (though better danger 
detection), and more maladaptive physiological responses (i.e., increased vasoconstriction and 
less overall blood flow). Both states involve an increase in sympathetic nervous system activity, 
which is indicated by an increase in ventricle contractility (VC, the force of the left ventricle 
contraction). However, challenge states are characterized by an increase in cardiac output (CO, 
amount of blood pumped out by the heart per minute), and a decrease in total peripheral 
resistance (TPR, a measure of overall vasodilation), whereas threat states are characterized by 
little or no increase in CO, and an increase in TPR (Mendes, 2009; Mendes & Park, 2014). 
The challenge and threat framework is useful for our purposes here, because these 
cardiovascular reactivity profiles are well established, and the framework can be recast in terms 
of perceived costs and benefits to map onto the SST framework7. If an individual faces an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!7!While!there!is!a!strong!correspondence!between!affective!states!and!perceived!costs!and!benefits,!we!note!that!this!mapping!is!imperfect!for!a!few!reasons.!Intangible!costs!and!benefits!can!never!be!assessed!perfectly!or!precisely,!may!occur!below!conscious!awareness,!and!other!psychological!factors!may!impact!how!these!assessments!are!
!72!
interpersonal task they don’t think they can manage—the prototypical situation in which threat 
states manifest—the perceived costs of engaging in the task outweigh the benefits. In contrast, 
when an individual faces an interpersonal task they do think they can manage—the prototypical 
situation in which challenge states manifest—the perceived benefits outweigh the costs. Thus, in 
the context of this experiment, threat states can be interpreted as indirect evidence that 
participants perceived the costs of a proposition to outweigh its benefits, and challenge states as 
indirect evidence that participants perceived the benefits to outweigh the costs. 
The Present Research 
In this experiment, pairs of male and female participants interacted in two role-playing 
scenarios, in which they both read lines from a script, while we measured their physiological 
reactions to different kinds of propositions. In the date scenario, participants acted out a date, 
which ends at the front door of one of their houses. One participant was randomly assigned to 
make a direct sexual proposition, make an indirect sexual proposition, or ask whether their 
partner would like to go out again sometime. In the restaurant scenario, one participant played 
the role of a patron trying to get a table at a fully booked restaurant, and the other participant 
played the role of the maitre d’. After a conversation in which the maitre d’ informed the patron 
that there were no available tables, the patron was randomly assigned to make a direct bribe 
proposition to get a table, make an indirect bribe proposition, or ask if the maitre d’ could 
recommend another restaurant. These scenarios were chosen because they provide familiar 
situations in which people commonly make such risky propositions, and often make them 
indirectly (see, Feiler, 2000, for a fanciful recounting of trying to bribe maitre d’s). 
Affective Reactions !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!translated!into!affect,!such!as!personality!variables,!past!experience,!or!residual!or!incidental!affect!(see!Blascovich,!Mendes, Tomaka, Salomon, & Seery,!2003).!!
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The SST proposes that indirect speech offers speakers an opportunity to shift to a new 
desired relationship, while avoiding potential damage to an existing relationship, and that 
affective reactions to different kinds of propositions should track perceived costs and benefits. 
Combining this with the challenge and threat framework predicts that participants should show 
threat responses when they perceive the costs of a proposition to outweigh its potential benefits, 
and show challenge responses when they perceive the benefits of a proposition to outweigh its 
costs. We thus hypothesized that direct propositions should generally lead to threat responses 
(increases in VC and TPR, with no increase in CO), while indirect propositions should generally 
lead to challenge responses (increases in VC and CO, and decreases in TPR). We note however, 
that the theory predicts that direct propositions may sometimes be preferred—and thus lead to a 
challenge state—when the potential costs of making a direct proposition are lower than the 
potential costs of being misunderstood (e.g., if all cops are known to be corrupt, offering a bribe 
directly is better than risking a possible misunderstanding; see Figure 1 in Lee & Pinker, 2010). 
This general hypothesis thus assumes that participants perceive the costs of direct propositions to 
outweigh their benefits in the scenarios they acted out. Adding further complexity to this general 
prediction, we also predicted that participants’ physiological reactions would track contextual 
and demographic variables that uniquely affect the relative costs and benefits in the two 
scenarios.  
Insights from evolutionary biology and research on human sexuality have shown how the 
potential benefits and costs from a casual sexual encounter tend to be different for males and 
females, at least on average (Buss, 1994; Clark & Hatfield, 1989; Li & Kenrick, 2006; Rusbult, 
Martz, & Agnew, 1998; Symons, 1979). Males are frequently highly motivated to seek out 
casual sexual encounters, which generally present them with a large potential reproductive 
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benefit that outweighs potential costs. However, the cost-benefit calculus for females is much 
more variable and complex, with the costs typically outweighing the benefits, in terms of 
reproductive output, their motivation to pursue them, and the potential reputational costs they 
might incur. This asymmetry predicts that males and females will exhibit different responses to 
the sexual propositions. Specifically, females will exhibit stronger threat responses than males to 
the direct proposition, while males will be more likely to exhibit challenge responses, especially 
to the indirect proposition.  
In contrast, when offering a bribe to a maitre d’, the costs and benefits are generally the 
same for males and females. However, the costs and benefits are different for a patron who offers 
a bribe and a maitre d’ who receives the proposition, especially if the maitre d’ does not accept 
the bribe (as was the case here—the bribe was neither accepted nor rejected). This asymmetry 
predicts that participants should respond differently to the bribe proposition when they are the 
patron, than when they are the maitre d’. We thus predicted that patrons would have stronger 
threat responses than the maitre d’ in the direct proposition condition.  
To summarize, the SST predicts that participants will exhibit different affective responses 
to direct and indirect propositions, and that these responses will track the perceived costs and 
benefits, such that direct propositions should generally be more threatening than indirect ones. 
Sex should moderate these effects in the date scenario, but not the restaurant scenario, such that 
females will have stronger threat responses to the direct sexual proposition, while males will be 
more likely to have challenge responses, especially to the indirect proposition. Whether a 
participant makes the proposition or receives it should moderate their physiological responses in 
the restaurant scenario, such that participants who make the direct bribe proposition (patrons) 
will show stronger threat responses than participants who receive it (maitre d’s). 
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Preventing Rumors 
To test whether indirect speech also helps speakers prevent rumors from spreading to 
third parties, participants answered a series of questions about the date scenario to assess their 
perceptions of what was asked, what the speaker intended, and what they would report about the 
date to a friend. The SST theory predicts that while participants would understand the intended 
proposition regardless of whether it was made directly or indirectly, they would only report it 
directly and unambiguously to their friend when it was made directly. 
Method 
Participants  
One hundred and eleven dyads (N = 222), each consisting of a male and a female, were 
recruited from Harvard University’s subject pool (n = 144) or the San Francisco Bay Area (n = 
68). The majority of participants were undergraduates at Harvard or other institutions in Boston 
or San Francisco (Mage = 22.2, SDage = 3.7). Participants received either $25, or course credit for 
their participation. Ten participants were excluded a priori from analyses because of problems 
noted at the time of data collection, such as florid psychopathological symptoms or experimenter 
error, yielding a final sample of N = 212.  
Procedure  
Participants were brought into separate rooms, where they gave informed consent, 
completed a brief questionnaire on their subjective social status (see Adler, Epel, Castellazzo & 
Ickovics, 2000) and current affect (assessed using the PANAS, see Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 
1988), gave a saliva sample, had sensors attached to measure their cardiovascular responses, and 
then sat and relaxed for five minutes while baseline cardiovascular measures were recorded. 
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They were then brought into a room together, given a set of questions to discuss for five minutes 
to get to know each other8, and then sat in silence for a two-minute resting period.  
Participants then engaged in two back-to-back experimental interactions. In each of these 
seven-minute interactions, participants first role-played a scripted scenario for about three and a 
half minutes, and then played a cooperative game (based on the board game Taboo) for the 
remaining time. The game provides a cooperative and active task that allowed us to continue 
measuring participants’ cardiovascular responses evoked by the role-playing scenarios (see 
Mendes, et al., 2007; Mendes et al., 2008).  
In order to maintain experimental control over the timing of participants’ reactions to 
events in the role-playing scenarios, the scripts were read from booklets with each line on a 
separate page, so participants couldn’t read ahead. After each of these seven-minute interactions, 
participants sat in silence for a two-minute resting period.  
Each participant dyad was assigned to one of three speech conditions in the scenarios, 
involving either: (1) a direct proposition, (2) an indirect proposition, or (3) a neutral control 
question. In the date scenario, participants acted out a dinner date that was going well, which 
then ended at the front door of one of their houses, providing a natural context for a sexual 
proposition. In the direct condition, one participant then asked, “Would you like to come up and 
sleep with me?” In the indirect condition, they asked, “Would you like to come up for a drink?” 
And, in the neutral control condition, they asked, “Would you like to go out again next 
Thursday?” In the restaurant scenario, one participant played the role of a patron trying to get a 
table at a fully booked restaurant, while the other played the role of the maitre d’, a context in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!8!These were drawn from the Fast Friends Procedure, and included questions such as, “Would 
you like to be famous? In what way?” (see, 
http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~rascl/tools/secondFastFriendsQuestions.html)!
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which a patron could plausibly offer the maitre d’ a bribe to be seated right away. In the direct 
condition the patron then flashed a $50 bill that was supplied in between the pages of the script 
in order to make the propositions coherent, and asked, “If I give you $50 will you seat us right 
away?” In the indirect condition the patron flashed the $50 bill and asked, “Do you think there 
might be a cancellation?” And, in the neutral condition, the patron asked, “Could you 
recommend another restaurant?” 
After the indirect and direct propositions in both scenarios, the scripts included a few 
additional lines that provided a tacit acknowledgment of the proposition that was just made (e.g., 
“uuuum…I have a long day tomorrow…” after the sexual proposition; “I’m not really allowed to 
do that…” after the bribe proposition), but left it unresolved, so that the proposition was neither 
accepted nor rejected. These lines were identical in the indirect and direct conditions; however, 
they were different in the neutral conditions, which was necessary to make the dialogue coherent 
(e.g., it wouldn’t make sense for a maitre d’ to discuss a bribe after someone asks them to 
recommend another restaurant). 
The sex of the participant who made the proposition, the speech condition for each 
scenario, and the scenario order were all randomly assigned in a 2 × 3 × 2 mixed design with 
speech condition as a within-subjects variable, which was counter-balanced. 
Participants were then brought back into separate rooms, all sensors were removed, and 
they completed another questionnaire. This questionnaire again asked them to report their social 
status and current affect, as well as whether either of the scenarios made them uncomfortable (to 
assess whether they perceived the costs to outweigh the benefits in either scenario). Participants 
were then asked to report what was asked at the end of the date (a manipulation check), and what 
they thought the propositioner would have wanted and what would have likely happened if they 
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agreed to the request (used to assess how they interpreted the intended message). Then all 
participants were asked to imagine that, over lunch the next day, their best friend inquires how 
their date went, and to write down what they would tell their friend in a brief paragraph. These 
items focused solely on the date scenario because sexual propositions, interests, and behavior are 
very common topics of gossip, unlike bribes.  
After participants completed the questionnaire, they were paid and debriefed. 
Cardiovascular Measures 
Cardiovascular measures were recorded noninvasively according to established 
guidelines (Sherwood et al., 1990). We measured electrocardiography (ECG100C) and 
impedance cardiography (HIC 2000) and integrated the signals with an MP150 system (BIOPAC 
Systems Inc, Goleta, CA). Sensors to measure ECG were applied in a standard lead II 
configuration and impedance cardiography was obtained using four mylar bands that completely 
encircled the neck and chest area. A 1 mA AC current at 100kHz was passed through the outer 
bands, and Z0 and dZ/dt were recorded from the inner bands. All signals were filtered online and 
collected at 1000Hz.  
We used IMP (3.0) modules from Mindware Technologies (Gahanna, OH) to edit and 
score the physiological parameters of interest, specifically cardiac output (CO) and pre-ejection 
period (PEP). PEP, a chronotropic measure of the strength of the contractile force of the heart, 
provides a sensitive index of sympathetic control of the heart (Brownley, Hurwitz, & 
Schneiderman, 2000). PEP values were multiplied by -1 to yield ventricle contractility (VC). 
Impedance data were ensemble averaged with 1-minute epochs and each waveform was verified 
and edited as needed. Visual inspection of the waveforms focused on detecting ectopic beats and 
accurate Q, R, S placement in the ECG trace, and accurate detection of the B-, X-, and Z-points 
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(aortic valve opening, aortic valve closing, and dZ/dt max, respectively) on the dZ/dt waveform. 
We did not rely on available B-detection algorithms (e.g., Lozano et al., 2007), but rather only 
accepted waveforms in which we could visually confirm a B-point.  
We also attempted to collect blood pressure responses given the previous data on TPR 
differences between challenge and threat states. Unfortunately, the diastolic blood pressure 
(DBP) data obtained was unreliable, as there was large variability across consecutive time points, 
and many invalid values that were physiological implausible. These problems with obtaining 
DBP responses during the social interaction were likely due to excessive movement and 
fidgeting during the script reading; when participants move their arms or wrists, blood pressure 
responses can produce highly variable estimates of questionable validity (see Berntson, Quigley, 
& Lozano, 2007; Mendes, 2009). Because of these problems we could not calculate TPR, which 
requires valid measurements of both systolic blood pressure (SBP) and DBP (see, Mendes, 
2009). However, we were able to salvage SBP data, which was cleaner than the DBP data.  
Based on our hypotheses and the valid data collected, we focused on reactivity (i.e., 
changes from baseline to stress task) of three autonomic nervous system parameters: CO, VC, 
and SBP. We calculated reactivity scores by subtracting the last minute of the baseline period 
from the critical minute of the task period—the minute just after the proposition was delivered 
by the proposer. We used the last minute of the baseline period because that is typically the time 
when autonomic parameters are at their most quiescent state and the subsequent minute 
following the proposition as the proximal response window once the proposition was made (see 
Mendes, 2009 for details). 
Results 
Self-report Data 
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Positive and negative affect. Two positive affect scale scores and two negative affect 
scale scores were calculated for every participant, based on their responses to the two PANAS 
questionnaires given before and after the experimental interactions (see Watson, Clark & 
Tellegen, 1988). Difference scores were then calculated by subtracting each participant’s pre-
interaction scale scores from their corresponding post-interaction scale scores. Two 3 × 2 × 2 
ANOVAs (Speech Condition × Sex × Role) were run to analyze whether any of these variables 
from either scenario affected the two difference scores. No significant results were found for the 
date scenario, with all ps > .089, and all ps > .262 for any term in the equation that included the 
critical variable of speech condition; nor were any significant results found for the restaurant 
scenario, with all ps > .138, and all ps > .375 for any term that included speech condition. 
Discomfort in the two scenarios. In reply to a free-response question that asked whether 
either of the scenarios made them uncomfortable, 21% of participants reported that the date 
scenario did, while only 3% said the restaurant scenario did, a difference that a Wilcoxon 
Signed-ranks test showed was highly significant, Z = 5.11, p < .001, r = .35. Furthermore, while 
the restaurant scenario was reported as uncomfortable by an equivalently low percentage of 
participants in the neutral (3%), indirect (3%), and direct (4%) conditions, χ2(2, N = 2079) = .31, 
p = .861, ϕ = .04, more participants reported that the date made them uncomfortable when they 
were in the direct condition (27%), than in the indirect (21%) or neutral conditions (15%). 
Although this difference was not statistically significant, χ2(2, N = 209) = 3.30, p = .192, ϕ = .13, 
this statistic collapses across males, who showed no significant difference across conditions, 
χ2(2, N = 102) = 2.27, p = .322, ϕ = .15, and females, who did, χ2(2, N = 107) = 6.05, p = .049, ϕ 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!9!While!all!participants!engaged!in!both!the!date!and!restaurant!scenarios,!and!received!the!same!questionnaire,!the!numbers!of!participants!reported!in!the!analyses!in!this!section!are!not!perfectly!aligned!with!recruitment!numbers!because!of!a!few!missing!data!points.!
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= .24. A higher percentage of females reported that they were uncomfortable with the direct 
sexual proposition (41%)10, than both the indirect (19%), χ2(1, N = 75) = 4.43, p = .035, ϕ = .24, 
and neutral propositions (18%), χ2(1, N = 69) = 3.85, p = .050, ϕ = .24. Furthermore, a higher 
percentage of females (41%) than males (14%) reported that the direct sexual proposition made 
them uncomfortable, χ2(1, N = 74) = 6.85, p = .009, ϕ = .30, which was not the case in either the 
neutral or indirect conditions (both ps > .40). To summarize, a higher percentage of females 
reported being uncomfortable with the direct sexual proposition than any group from any speech 
condition of either scenario.  
Perceptions of the date propositions and spreading rumors. An experimenter and 
another outside rater, both blind to condition, coded participants’ responses to the three free-
response questions about the date proposition, to assess whether participants made any reference 
to sex, and if so, whether this reference was direct (e.g., “he asked me to sleep with him”), or 
indirect (e.g., “he invited me up to his place”). The criterion used to determine whether a 
reference was direct or indirect was whether or not any obvious implied reference to sex could 
plausibly be canceled by some follow-up statement (e.g., “he invited me up to his place” can be 
canceled by “…but only to help him get his door unlocked”; whereas, “he asked me to sleep with 
him” cannot credibly be canceled by “…but only platonically, because he gets cold at night”) 
(see, Horn, 2004). Inter-rater reliability was very high for all three questions, α = .972, α = .905, 
and α = .904, respectively; the experimenter’s ratings were used in all analyses because means 
cannot be computed to reconcile different ratings for such categorical data. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!10!We!did!not!have!enough!statistical!power!to!compare!rates!of!discomfort!reported!by!females!who!made!the!direct!sexual!proposition!(n!=!19)!and!females!who!received!it!(n!=!18),!but!we!note!that!47%!of!female!proposers!reported!it!as!uncomfortable,!while!only!33%!of!female!receivers!did!so.!
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In response to the question about what was asked at the end of the date, the vast majority 
of participants reported a direct sexual proposition in the direct condition (87%), an indirect 
sexual proposition in the indirect condition (87%), and no sexual proposition in the neutral 
condition (92%) (see Figure 2.1). These percentages were not significantly different, χ2(2, N = 
220) = 1.28, p = .528, ϕ = .08, showing that participants understood the literal denotations of 
each of the three propositions about equally well.  
 
Figure 2.1 Percentage of participants who reported no sexual proposition (“None”), an indirect 
sexual proposition, or a direct sexual proposition in each date condition, in response to a question 
about what was asked at the end of the date scenario. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
In response to the question about what the proposer wanted, 54% of the participants in 
the indirect condition made a direct reference to sex, 26% made an indirect reference to sex, and 
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only 20% made no reference to sex (see Figure 2.2). This pattern of responses was significantly 
more similar to the pattern in the direct condition (79%, 8%, and 13%, respectively), χ2(2, N = 
145) = 11.81, p = .003, ϕ = .29, than to the pattern in the neutral condition (11%, 12%, and 77%, 
respectively), χ2(2, N = 144) = 48.41, p < .001, ϕ = .58, as shown by a Fisher Z-transformation 
comparing these two effect sizes, Z = 3.06, p = .002. Moreover, the percentage of participants 
who made some kind of reference to sex, either directly or indirectly, was not significantly 
different between the indirect (80%) and direct (87%) conditions, χ2(1, N = 145) = 1.33, p = .248, 
ϕ = .10, suggesting that participants generally understood the implied meaning of the indirect 
sexual proposition as well as they understood the meaning of the direct proposition. 
 
Figure 2.2 Percentage of participants who made no reference to sex (“None”), made an indirect 
reference to sex, or made a direct reference to sex in each date condition, in response to a 
question about what the proposer wanted. Error bars represent standard error. 
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However, when asked to write down what they would tell their best friend the next day 
about the date, only 8% of participants in the indirect condition made any direct, unambiguous 
reference to sex (see Figure 2.3). This was comparable to the 6% who inexplicably did so in the 
neutral condition, χ2(1, N = 135) = 0.31, p = .580, ϕ = .05, and significantly less than the 53% 
who did so in the direct condition, χ2(1, N = 137) = 31.28, p < .001, ϕ = .48. Perhaps more 
importantly, this 8% was substantially less than the 54% of participants in the indirect condition 
who made a direct reference to sex in response to the previous question about intent, Wilcoxon 
Signed-ranks, Z = 5.12, p < .001, r = .65. It’s worth noting that this was also true of participants 
in the direct condition, (53% vs. 79%, respectively), Z = 2.92, p = .003, r = .34; however, a 
comparison of these two effect sizes using a Fisher Z-transformation revealed that this difference 
was significantly less than in the indirect condition, Z = 2.40, p = .018. Lastly, more participants 
made an indirect reference to sex in the indirect condition (62%) than in either the neutral 
condition (13%), χ2(1, N = 135) = 35.79, p < .001, ϕ = .51, or direct condition (20%), χ2(1, N = 
137) = 16.88, p < .001, ϕ = .35, but such references were by definition vague or ambiguous (e.g., 
“then he asked me if I wanted to come over to his place”). 
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Figure 2.3 Percentage of participants who made no reference to sex (“None”), made an indirect 
reference to sex, or made a direct reference to sex in each date condition, when asked to write 
down what they would tell their best friend about the date. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
 
Cardiovascular Response Measures 
Before analyzing any of the cardiovascular reactivity measures, we checked whether the 
order of the two scenarios interacted with any of the other independent variables in either 
scenario, which would have made any analyses problematic. This was done for each of the three 
physiological measures by first running a 3 × 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA that included all three 
independent variables of interest—speech condition, role, and sex—as well as order of scenarios. 
No significant order effects were found, so order was ignored in all subsequent analyses. 
Social status. Social status was assessed in two ways, both through a direct self-report 
measure, and by assaying testosterone levels from saliva samples given at the beginning of the 
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experiment. Both variables were first centered by subtracting the mean of all scores from each 
individual participant’s score, and then contrasts were run to assess whether either status variable 
interacted with VC responses in either of the two scenarios (VC is sensitive to general 
intensity/arousal, so only VC responses were analyzed to minimize the number of comparisons 
run). Subjective social status was centered based on all participant responses; however, 
testosterone levels were centered for males and females separately, and contrasts were run for 
each sex separately, because mean testosterone levels differ substantially between males and 
females (Mazur & Booth, 1998). Neither subjective social status (all ps > .127), nor testosterone 
levels (all ps > .143) showed any significant interactions with VC reactivity in either scenario, 
and were thus ignored in further analyses. 
 Date scenario. A 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVA (Speech Condition × Sex × Role) revealed a main 
effect of speech condition on VC reactivity, F(2, 174) = 3.19, p = .044, which was qualified by 
an interaction between sex and speech condition, F(2, 174) = 3.13, p = .046 (see Figure 2.4). 
There were no other significant effects.  
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Figure 2.4 Increases in ventricle contractility in the date scenario, organized by sex and speech 
condition. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
 
This interaction was decomposed with two simple effects tests comparing the effect of the 
different speech conditions for males and females. Males showed a marginally significant effect 
of speech condition on VC, F(2, 180) = 2.39, p = .095. Follow-up pair-wise comparisons 
revealed that VC increases were significantly greater for males in the indirect condition than in 
the neutral condition (p = .035), but not in the direct condition (p = .232), and there was no 
significant difference between the indirect and direct conditions (p = .302). Females showed a 
significant effect of speech condition on VC, F(2, 180) = 3.53, p = .031. Follow-up pair-wise 
comparisons revealed that VC increases were significantly greater in the direct condition than in 
both the neutral (p = .024) and indirect conditions (p = .020); there was no significant difference 
between the neutral and indirect conditions (p = .858). In sum, males had the greatest increase in 
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ventricle contractility (VC) in the indirect condition, and lowest in the neutral condition, while 
females showed elevated VC only in the direct condition (see Figure 2.4). 
A 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVA (Speech Condition × Sex × Role) revealed no main effect of speech 
condition on SBP, F(2, 155) = 1.23, p = .295, but did reveal an interaction between speech 
condition and sex, F(2, 155) = 3.83, p = .024. This two-way interaction was further qualified by 
a three-way interaction between speech condition, sex, and role, F(2, 155) = 3.10, p =.048 (see 
Figure 2.5). There were no other significant effects. To better understand the three-way 
interaction, a 3 × 2 ANOVA (Speech Condition × Sex) was run for each of the two roles. Neither 
of these tests revealed any main effects; however, proposers showed a significant Speech 
Condition × Sex interaction, F(2, 77) = 4.81, p = .011, while receivers did not, F(2, 78) = .08, p 
= .927. The two-way interaction in the proposer condition was then further decomposed using 
simple effects tests that compared the effects of each sexual proposition on male and female 
proposers separately. These tests revealed a main effect of speech condition for female 
proposers, F(2, 77) = 4.77, p = .011, but not for male proposers, F(2, 77) = .99, p = .376. Follow-
up pairwise comparisons revealed that female proposers had a greater SBP increase in the direct 
condition than the neutral condition (p = .016), but not than the indirect condition (p = .252), and 
there was no significant difference between the indirect and neutral conditions (p = .176). To 
summarize, as receivers of the proposition, neither sex showed any significant difference in SBP 
responses across the three speech conditions (see Figure 2.5a); however, female proposers had a 
significantly greater increase in SBP in the direct condition, while male proposers showed no 
significant difference across the three speech conditions (see Figure 2.5b). 
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Figure 2.5 Increases in systolic blood pressure in the date scenario, organized by sex and speech 
condition, and in separate figures for receivers (2.5a, on the left) and proposers (2.5b, on the 
right). Error bars represent standard error. 
 
No significant effects were found for CO in the date scenario. 
 Restaurant scenario. A 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVA (Speech Condition × Sex × Role) revealed a 
main effect of speech condition on VC, F(2, 168) = 3.75, p = .026 (see Figure 2.6). There were 
no other significant effects. Post hoc tests showed significantly greater VC in the direct condition 
than in either the neutral (p = .026), or indirect conditions (p = .013), and no significant 
difference between the indirect and neutral conditions (p = .823). Participants exhibited greater 
sympathetic activation to the direct bribe proposition, than to either of the other two propositions. 
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Figure 2.6 Increases in ventricle contractility by speech condition in the restaurant scenario. 
Error bars represent standard error. ! !A 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVA (Speech Condition × Sex × Role) revealed no main effects on CO, 
but did reveal a Speech Condition × Role interaction, F(2, 166) = 3.88, p = .023 (see Figure 2.7). 
There were no other significant effects.  
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Figure 2.7 Increases in cardiac output in the restaurant scenario, organized by speech condition 
and role. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
This interaction was decomposed with simple effects tests comparing speech conditions 
for proposers, whose CO differed across conditions, F(2, 85) = 4.49, p = .014, and receivers, 
whose CO did not, F(2, 87) = 0.92, p = .402. Follow-up pair-wise comparisons revealed that 
proposers’ CO increased more in the direct condition than in the indirect (p = .014) and neutral 
conditions (p = .011), with no difference between the indirect and neutral conditions (p = .933). 
In sum, participants that offered the bribe (patrons) showed increases in CO only in the direct 
condition, while participants who received the bribe (maitre d’s) did not show increased CO in 
any condition (see Figure 2.7). 
No significant effects were found for SBP in the restaurant scenario. 
Discussion 
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This study provides the first evidence that indirect and direct propositions lead to 
different affective states, as hypothesized by the strategic speaker theory (SST), and the results 
suggest that affective reactions track costs and benefits in a manner consistent with the SST. 
However interpreting the story these data tell is complex, because even though the overall 
pattern of results was broadly consistent with the theory, the specific affective states resulting 
from the two types of propositions did not conform to our specific predictions. Consistent with 
the theory, participants’ cardiovascular reactivity profiles to direct and indirect propositions were 
different in both scenarios. Furthermore, male and female response profiles were different in the 
date scenario, while proposers and receivers exhibited different response profiles in the 
restaurant scenario, as predicted by how each of these variables uniquely affects the costs and 
benefits of each scenario. However, direct and indirect propositions did not consistently lead to 
threat and challenge states, respectively, as we had predicted. Despite this, we nonetheless think 
that the overall pattern of results supports the SST. 
In the date scenario, females’ cardiovascular profiles were consistent with a threat 
response (increased VC and SBP) when they made the direct sexual proposition; no difference 
was found between their responses in the indirect and neutral conditions. Males’ cardiovascular 
responses to both sexual propositions, both as proposers and receivers, were consistent with a 
challenge response (increased VC, no increase in SBP), with the strongest response (greatest 
increase in VC) in the indirect condition. In the restaurant scenario, participants who made the 
direct bribe proposition (patrons) exhibited cardiovascular profiles consistent with a challenge 
response (increased VC and CO). Participants who received the direct bribe offer (maitre d’s) 
showed cardiovascular profiles consistent with weaker challenge responses, as indicated by the 
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significant difference in CO responses between patrons and maitre d’s. No differences were 
found between the indirect and neutral conditions for either patrons or maitre d’s.  
Despite these differences in cardiovascular responses observed across speech conditions 
in both scenarios, no differences were found in self-reported positive or negative affect, 
affirming the supposition that the affective concomitants of indirect and direct speech are 
difficult to assess in the lab. 
The general prediction that direct propositions would elicit threat responses and indirect 
propositions would elicit challenge responses did not bear out. However, the rates of reported 
discomfort across conditions suggest that this was because participants did not consistently 
perceive the costs of the direct propositions to outweigh the benefits. More than six times as 
many participants reported that the date scenario made them uncomfortable than the restaurant 
scenario, and rates of reported discomfort did not differ across speech conditions in the 
restaurant scenario. Females in the direct sexual proposition condition showed the highest rates 
of reported discomfort of any group, while males’ rates of reported discomfort were not 
significantly different across the date conditions. These results mirror the cardiovascular results, 
as the only group that exhibited threat responses—females who made the direct sexual 
proposition—was also more likely than any other group to report that the interaction made them 
uncomfortable. This suggests that participants did not generally perceive the costs of the direct 
bribe proposition to outweigh its benefits, nor did males generally perceive the costs of the direct 
sexual proposition to outweigh its potential benefits. Thus, even though some of the 
cardiovascular results were inconsistent with the specific affective states we predicted, they 
nonetheless seem to be consistent with the SST—which predicts that people should make direct 
propositions when they perceive the benefits to outweigh the costs, because indirect propositions 
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may be misunderstood (see Lee & Pinker, 2010)—and may simply be the result of weaknesses in 
our experimental design.  
A number of limitations make these interpretations far from conclusive. First, the 
cardiovascular results did not provide complete challenge and threat profiles, which makes it 
difficult to precisely and confidently infer affective states. The cardiovascular profiles were 
incomplete both because participant movement precluded reliable TPR estimates, and because 
neither scenario produced significant differences for all three cardiovascular measures associated 
with challenge and threat responses (VC, CO, and TPR, approximated here with SBP). Second, 
the metric used to interpret how participants perceived costs and benefits—reported 
discomfort—was indirect and imprecise, and the interpretations of the cardiovascular results 
based on this metric were necessarily post hoc. Third, some of the cardiovascular results were 
only marginally or barely statistically significant, and the statistical analyses required a number 
of different comparisons. 
Despite these limitations however, we find the above interpretations convincing because 
the overall pattern of results largely align with clear predictions from the SST. First, participants’ 
cardiovascular responses were different in the direct and indirect conditions in both scenarios, 
even though the response profiles were not exactly as predicted in terms of challenge and threat. 
Second, sex was the main moderating variable in the date scenario, and role was the only 
moderating variable in the restaurant scenario, a pattern clearly predicted a priori by how each of 
these two variables uniquely affects the costs and benefits specific to each scenario. Third, even 
though the alignment of reported discomfort with cardiovascular responses only allowed for a 
post hoc interpretation of unexpected results, it seems unlikely that such an alignment would 
have occurred solely by chance. Fourth, the contrived, scripted interactions used here provide a 
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conservative and weak test of how people might react to such situations in natural environments 
with real social consequences (see Feiler, 2000, for an account of how trying to bribe a maitre d’ 
can be much more uncomfortable than the rates reported here would suggest). The divergence 
between participants’ self-reported affect and affective responses inferred from cardiovascular 
responses, suggests that such an artificial, contrived set up was nonetheless justified, because it 
allowed us to bring the phenomenon into the lab. As such, these interpretations seem both 
warranted and valid, but clearly more research is needed to further substantiate the affective 
predictions of the SST. 
The results also supported the prediction that indirect speech can be used to prevent 
rumors. Participants clearly reported what was said in the different date scenario conditions, and 
demonstrated that they generally understood the intended meaning of the indirect sexual 
proposition, yet they only reported that they would tell their best friend about the sexual 
proposition in an unequivocal way when it was expressed directly. Even though participants who 
role-played the indirect sexual proposition were most likely to make an indirect reference to sex 
when recounting the date to their friend, these reports were often ambiguous and unclear (e.g., 
“then he asked me if I wanted to come over to his place”). Furthermore, the difference between 
the majority of participants who directly reported the intended meaning of the indirect sexual 
proposition to us, and the small percentage who said they would directly report it to their friend, 
suggests that such gossip would be substantially less clear and unambiguous than participants’ 
own understanding of what was communicated. This conclusion depends on two assumptions: 
(1) People actually report indirect propositions indirectly to third parties in real world situations, 
as observed here; and, (2) Recipients of such indirect reports are less than certain about the 
speaker’s intended meaning. Further research is needed to substantiate these assumptions. 
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General Discussion and Conclusion 
By adding to the sparse extant evidence for the SST, this study helps establish an 
empirical foundation for a more comprehensive understanding of indirect speech, which extends 
beyond previous explanations predicated on purely cooperative interactions. We suggest 
however, that the implications of this research are much broader than just explaining why people 
use one form of speech or another. Two core insights of the SST—that relationship negotiation is 
a kind of coordination game, and that this endows common knowledge with a uniquely important 
role in navigating relationships—apply to many different kinds of social interactions, not just 
those between conversational partners. By providing evidence for some of the SST’s predictions 
about how people respond to different kinds of propositions, this study also provides indirect 
evidence for these much broader insights, which may help explain many other aspects of human 
social life.  
Coordination can be facilitated by many different kinds of communication, knowledge 
can be gleaned from many diverse types of information, and human social life provides 
numerous contexts in which the outcome of some action or event that everyone privately knows 
about can be dramatically different than if it becomes common knowledge. The well-
documented omission bias in moral cognition provides one illustrative example. Moral 
transgressions are punished more harshly and judged as more wrong, when they result from an 
action (a commission) than from a failure to act (an omission), even when the intent and outcome 
are the same (e.g., poisoning someone is judged less harshly than withholding a readily available 
antidote, Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). One recent explanation of this phenomenon 
suggests that this is because omissions leave no physical evidence, which precludes common 
knowledge of the transgression (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013). Consistent with this explanation, 
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when omissions leave behind some kind of evidence that can be made common knowledge, they 
are judged and punished just as harshly as commissions (DeScioli, Bruening, & Kurzban, 2011). 
Similarly, people judge unethical propositions as less morally wrong when they are delivered 
indirectly than directly, and unethical behaviors described with transparent euphemisms are 
judged as less morally wrong and less deserving of punishment than direct descriptions of the 
same behaviors (Chakroff, Thomas, Haque, & Young, 2014). Integrating these two parallel lines 
of research suggests that the coordination dynamics invoked by the SST may also explain the 
difference between moral judgments and punishment of omissions and commissions: Omissions 
are akin to indirect propositions, while commissions are akin to direct propositions. 
The omission bias offers a convenient example because such parallel lines of research 
already exist, but we suggest that a number of other social phenomena may also be explained by 
the dynamics outlined in the SST. For example, Ari Adut (2008) has offered a similar 
explanation for the sociological phenomenon of scandals, and has marshaled an impressive body 
of evidence to show that scandals often occur when something that was previously known and 
discussed by many people in private, suddenly becomes public common knowledge. Rather than 
working through the details of many more similar examples that seem to share these dynamics, 
here we simply list some of the many possibilities (see Lee & Pinker, 2010, and Thomas, et al., 
2014 for further elaboration): taboo, conventional wisdom, diffusion of responsibility, etiquette, 
celebrity, tact, fame, hypocrisy, mock outrage, arbitrary social conventions, pluralistic ignorance, 
political correctness, double speak, currency valuation, negotiation and bargaining, the creation 
and popping of market bubbles, and international relations and diplomacy. We hope that future 
research can explore, clarify, and substantiate whether these seemingly diverse phenomena might 
be explained by similar strategic dynamics. 
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Abstract 
People’s social transgressions elicit the negative self-conscious emotions of 
embarrassment, shame, and guilt. Previous research shows that the presence of an audience 
intensifies these emotions. However, they seem to be even more intense when the actor 
acknowledges their transgression with the audience. This difference between a person’s 
transgression being acknowledged and being observed parallels a distinction in game theory 
between common knowledge (an infinite recursion of shared knowledge states, such that A 
knows that B knows that A knows that B knows, ad infinitum), and shared knowledge (any 
lesser, finite level of shared knowledge states). We test whether self-conscious emotions are 
sensitive to this distinction. In Experiment 1, participants read vignettes and reported how they 
would feel in emotion-evoking scenarios with varying levels of knowledge. In Experiment 2, 
participants reported their emotions after performing a karaoke song for a panel of judges over a 
live two-way video feed, with either shared or common knowledge. Results from both 
experiments showed that self-conscious emotions were more intense when the focal event was 
common knowledge than when it was shared knowledge. The results show that not only the 
presence of an audience, but also the precise level of knowledge one shares with the audience 
affects the intensity of self-conscious emotions. We discuss how the regulatory functions of self-
conscious emotions—managing relationships and social status—can be illuminated by game 
theory models in which players’ best strategies depend on whether they have shared versus 
common knowledge. 
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Introduction 
Imagine tripping over your feet in front of a crowd. Afterwards, you might fix your gaze 
on your cell phone or a magazine to avoid eye contact with the audience. Similarly, after 
disappointing your family, friends, or coworkers, it can be hard to look them in the eye. Why do 
people avoid acknowledging faux pas or transgressions that they know an audience already 
knows about?  
Transgressions and faux pas evoke the negative self-conscious emotions of shame, 
embarrassment, and guilt, which help people manage relationships and social status (Beer, 
Heerey, Keltner Scabini, & Knight, 2003; Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Miller, 1995; Steckler & 
Tracy, 2014; Tangney & Tracy, 2012; Tracy & Robins, 2004). People’s transgressions can harm 
their reputation or relationships if other people know about them, and research confirms that the 
presence of an audience intensifies feelings of embarrassment, shame, and guilt (Bosch et al., 
2009; Gruenewald, Kemeny, Aziz, & Fahey, 2004; Modigliani, 1971; Smith, Webster, Parrot, & 
Eyre, 2002; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; Wolf, Cohen, Panter, & Insko, 2010). 
However, these studies did not test whether these feelings are more intense when an actor 
acknowledges their offense. 
This difference between evading and acknowledging unflattering events parallels a 
distinction in game theory between common knowledge and!shared&knowledge.!Common 
knowledge is defined as an infinite recursion of shared knowledge states, such that A knows X, 
A knows that B knows X, A knows that B knows that A knows X, A knows that B knows that A 
knows that B knows X, ad infinitum. In contrast, shared knowledge refers to any lesser, finite 
level of such knowledge states (e.g., A knows that B knows that A knows X, but nothing more). 
Game theory models show that in many situations, a person’s best move differs depending on 
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whether they have common knowledge or shared knowledge about the payoffs (Chwe, 2001; 
Rubinstein, 1989; Schelling, 1960). Further, psychological research shows that people do in fact 
represent common knowledge and shared knowledge as qualitatively distinct and they make 
different strategic decisions based on this distinction, consistent with game theoretic models 
(Thomas et al., 2014).  
If the self-conscious emotions have strategic functions, then the difference between 
common and shared knowledge might explain why people avoid eye contact after a faux pas or 
transgression. Specifically, people’s evasive behaviors might function to prevent common 
knowledge. Moreover, people’s intensified self-conscious emotions might alert them when 
common knowledge of a transgression occurs so they can manage its strategic consequences, or 
motivate them to avoid such occurrences in the future.  
The Present Research 
In two experiments we investigate whether the negative self-conscious emotions are 
sensitive to the difference between common knowledge and shared knowledge. In Experiment 1, 
participants read vignettes describing situations that typically evoke either negative self-
conscious emotions or the negative basic emotions of sadness or anger, with varying levels of 
knowledge. Participants then rated how intensely they would expect to feel these emotions and 
exhibit associated physical responses. The strategic hypothesis predicts that participants will 
report more intense self-conscious emotions when an event is common knowledge than when it 
is shared knowledge.  
Experiment 2 tests whether knowledge levels and eye contact affect actual experiences of 
embarrassment. Participants performed a karaoke song for a panel of judges in a separate room 
connected by a live two-way video feed, and then rated how strongly they felt a set of emotions. 
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In the common knowledge condition, participants were told that the judges knew about the two-
way live video feed. In the shared knowledge condition, participants were told that the judges 
falsely believed they were watching a one-way video feed that was unknown to participants. In 
addition, the video of the judges that participants saw either showed the judges looking straight 
into the camera or looking slightly to the side. The strategic hypothesis predicts that common 
knowledge will lead to greater feelings of embarrassment. Further, if eye contact is a reliable cue 
for common knowledge, then the presence of eye contact should similarly elicit more intense 
embarrassment.  
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1 participants reported how they would react to different levels of 
knowledge in five scenarios. Three of the scenarios were designed to evoke negative self-
conscious emotions. Participants imagined that they got caught making fun of a friend, audibly 
passing gas during a lecture, or dishonestly reporting purchases to a club for reimbursement. 
Two basic emotion scenarios were included as controls to test whether any effect of different 
knowledge levels is specific to self-conscious emotions. In one scenario, designed to evoke 
sadness, participants imagined discovering their romantic partner was about to end the 
relationship. In another scenario, designed to evoke anger, participants imagined discovering an 
acquaintance trying to sabotage a valued friendship.  
To test the effect of knowledge levels on reported emotions, each participant read 
multiple vignettes that described different levels of knowledge of the focal event in one of the 
five scenarios. That is, the scenario varied between-subjects whereas knowledge levels varied 
within-subjects. The different knowledge levels included private knowledge, in which 
participants shared no knowledge of the focal event with another person, shared knowledge, in 
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which participants and another person had some finite level of shared knowledge about the focal 
event, and common knowledge, in which the focal event was commonly known between 
participants and another person.  
Because negative self-conscious emotions are typically caused by one’s own 
transgressions, the focal event in the self-conscious scenarios involved something the participant 
did that could be discovered by an observer. However, because negative basic emotions tend to 
be evoked by other people’s actions, the focal event in the basic emotion scenarios involved the 
participant as an observer discovering something about someone else’s behavior. That is, 
participants assumed the role of the actor in the self-conscious scenarios and the role of an 
observer in the basic emotion scenarios. 
Method 
 Participants. One hundred participants from the United States were recruited from 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service for each of the five scenarios (N = 500), and paid $2-$3 for 
their participation. Participants who failed comprehension checks or an attention check (see 
Procedure) were excluded, yielding a final sample of 361 participants (55% female, Mage = 34.1, 
SDage = 11.1). 
 Procedure. Participants read instructions explaining the task and were given definitions 
of the six emotions, derived from standard dictionaries, that they would be asked to rate in the 
study: 
• Anger—A strong feeling of displeasure, grievance, annoyance, and hostility 
• Embarrassment—A feeling of acute and painful self-consciousness, uncomfortableness, 
awkwardness, and humiliation 
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• Fear—An unpleasant feeling of anxiety or apprehension caused by the presence or 
anticipation of danger 
• Guilt—An awareness of having done wrong or failed in an obligation, accompanied by 
feelings of remorse and regret 
• Sadness—A feeling of unhappiness, grief, and sorrow 
• Shame—A painful negative emotion that combines feelings of dishonor, unworthiness, 
distress, and humiliation, and is caused by the awareness of having done something 
wrong or foolish 
To ensure they clearly understood how each emotion is characterized, participants then answered 
six comprehension questions in which they were given a definition and had to select the 
corresponding emotion. Participants who answered any of these questions incorrectly were 
excluded from analyses.  
 Participants then read five versions of one scenario, each with a different level of 
knowledge (presented in a random order). After each vignette, participants used slider bars to 
report how strongly they would experience each of the six emotions on a scale of 0-100, and how 
likely and intensely they would exhibit 16 different physical reactions associated with these 
different emotions on a scale of 0-100. These physical responses were drawn from previous 
emotion research and included: avoid gaze, blanch, blush, clench teeth, cover or touch face, cry, 
frown, glare, hang head down, nervous laughter, open eyes wide, raise eyebrows, sheepish grin, 
slump shoulders, stammer, and tremble (see Ekman, 2003; Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Tracy & 
Robins, 2004). 
Participants then reported basic demographic information and responded to a simple 
attention check. This attention check was disguised as a final question that asked participants to 
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report which emotions from a list of 20 they were experiencing but had an instruction buried in 
the prompt that asked them to select “only the enthusiastic option” to show that they were paying 
attention. Participants who did not select this option were excluded from analyses. Participants 
were then debriefed and paid. 
 The five scenarios. Each participant read vignettes describing one of the following five 
scenarios which were designed to elicit self-conscious emotions (teasing, farting, and 
dishonesty), sadness (break up), or anger (sabotage): 
• Self-conscious emotion scenarios 
o Teasing—Participants took the perspective of someone talking to a friend, and 
mocking a mutual friend’s speech impediment, when the person being mocked 
unexpectedly shows up. 
o Farting—Participants took the perspective of someone who audibly farts in a 
crowded lecture hall. 
o Dishonesty—Participants took the perspective of a person planning to submit a 
dishonest reimbursement request to a club, which is discovered by their 
housemate. 
• Basic emotion scenarios 
o Break up—Participants took the perspective of someone who discovers that their 
romantic partner is going to break up with them by overhearing a voicemail left 
by their romantic partner’s friend. 
o Sabotage—Participants took the perspective of someone who overhears an 
acquaintance who is trying to sabotage their relationship with a good friend. 
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The five knowledge levels. Each participant read five different versions of a scenario with 
different levels of knowledge about the focal event. Because participants assumed the role of the 
actor in the self-conscious scenarios, but assumed the role of observer in the basic emotion 
scenarios, participants had different kinds of knowledge in some of the conditions in the two 
types of scenarios. As such, the knowledge levels are broken out separately here for the self-
conscious emotion scenarios and basic emotion scenarios, and labeled according to the level of 
knowledge participants had. 
• Self-conscious emotion scenarios: 
1. Private knowledge 1—Only the participant knows about their transgression 
2. Private knowledge 2—An observer is aware of the participant’s transgression, but 
the participant doesn’t realize this 
3. Shared knowledge 1—The participant knows that an observer knows about their 
transgression, but the observer is unaware they know this 
4. Shared knowledge 2—The participant knows that an observer knows about their 
transgression, the observer knows the participant knows this, but the observer is 
unaware that the participant knows they know this 
5. Common knowledge—The participant’s transgression is commonly known (i.e., 
the participant knows the observer knows about it, knows the observer knows 
they know, ad infinitum) 
• Basic emotion scenarios: 
1. No knowledge—The participant is unaware of the focal event 
2. Private knowledge 1—The participant is aware of the focal event, but the other 
person doesn’t realize this 
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3. Private knowledge 2—The participant is aware of the focal event, and the other 
person knows this, but the participant doesn’t know the other person is aware they 
know 
4. Shared knowledge—The participant is aware of the focal event, and the 
participant knows that the other person is aware that they know about it, but the 
other person is unaware they know this 
5. Common knowledge—The focal event is commonly known (i.e., the other person 
knows the participant knows about it, knows the participant knows they know, ad 
infinitum) 
The full text of all vignettes is supplied in Appendix B of the Supplementary Materials. 
 Data analysis. Although shame, embarrassment, and guilt are distinct emotions, they are 
similar enough that people often conflate them (Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Tangney et al., 1996; 
Tangney & Tracy, 2012). Thus, as a preliminary step, we analyzed correlations between these 
emotions within each knowledge condition of the three self-conscious emotion scenarios. As 
expected, ratings of embarrassment, shame, and guilt were highly correlated in every knowledge 
condition of all three self-conscious scenarios, so scale scores were computed by averaging 
ratings of these emotions within each of the five knowledge conditions of all three scenarios 
(reliabilities of these 15 SCE scale scores ranged from α = .791 to α = .948). Similarly, self-
reported physical reactions associated with the self-conscious emotions—blush, cover or touch 
face, hang head down, nervous laughter, sheepish grin, slump shoulders, and stammer11—were 
also highly correlated, so analogous scale scores were computed (reliabilities of these 15 scale 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!11!Gaze avoidance was not included in these composites, even though it is commonly associated 
with the self-conscious emotions, because avoiding or making eye contact can alter the 
prevailing level of knowledge.!
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scores ranged from α = .682 to α = .850). These scale scores are used for all analyses of the self-
conscious emotions and their physical concomitants in the self-conscious emotion scenarios.  
 For each scenario, we first perform manipulation checks to test whether each scenario 
evoked the intended emotion by comparing the mean reported level of each emotion, averaged 
across all five knowledge levels within each scenario12. Subsequent analyses then focus on the 
dominant emotion (the one with the highest mean) and its physical concomitants. 
Results 
 Preliminary analyses. Paired sample t-tests confirmed that ratings of the self-conscious 
emotions were higher than the next highest rated emotion in the teasing (MSCE = 42.3 vs. Msad = 
18.0, t(77) = 14.71, p < .001, d = 1.69), farting (MSCE = 24.8 vs. Mfear = 9.4, t(69) = 11.57, p < 
.001, d = 1.38), and dishonesty scenarios (MSCE = 31.1 vs. Mfear = 22.1, t(64) = 4.58, p < .001, d = 
0.57). Analogous tests confirmed that ratings of sadness were highest in the break up scenario 
(Msad = 54.8 vs. Manger = 40.3, t(76) = 6.44, p < .001, d = 0.74), and that ratings of anger were 
highest in the sabotage scenario (Manger = 52.2 vs. Msad = 21.3, t(70) = 10.26, p < .001, d = 1.22).  
Self-conscious emotion scenarios. Figure 3.1 shows self-conscious emotion ratings 
(Figure 3.1a) and associated physical reactions (Figure 3.1b) across knowledge levels, in each of 
the three self-conscious scenarios. The results show that self-conscious emotions and their 
physical concomitants were lowest in the two private knowledge conditions, intermediate in the 
two shared knowledge conditions, and highest in the common knowledge condition in all three 
scenarios, as predicted. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!12!All mean emotion ratings for each knowledge condition in every scenario are provided in 
Table SM1 in Appendix A of Supplementary Materials.!
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Figure 3.1 Ratings of self-conscious emotions (3.1a, on the left) and likelihood of displaying 
their physical concomitants (3.1b, on the right) in the three self-conscious emotion scenarios, 
across the different knowledge levels. Each line in Figure 3.1a represents the combined average 
ratings of embarrassment, shame, and guilt in the respective scenarios. Each line in Figure 3.1b 
represents the combined average ratings of seven physical reactions associated with these 
emotions in the respective scenarios. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
Repeated-measures ANOVAs confirmed that self-conscious emotions significantly 
increased as knowledge levels increased in the dishonesty, F(4, 256) = 49.02, p < .001, !!!!= .43, 
teasing, F(4, 308) = 53.16, p < .001, !!!!= .41, and farting scenarios, F(4, 276) = 86.65, p < .001, !!!!= .56. Planned post hoc tests confirmed that in all three scenarios self-conscious emotions 
were higher in the common knowledge condition than in the shared knowledge conditions (all ps 
< .001), and higher in the shared knowledge conditions than in the private knowledge conditions 
(all ps < .001). Repeated-measures ANOVAs also confirmed that the physical reactions 
associated with self-conscious emotions significantly increased as knowledge levels increased in 
the dishonesty, F(4, 256) = 23.12, p < .001, !!!!= .27, teasing, F(4, 308) = 36.95, p < .001, !!!!= 
.32, and farting scenarios, F(4, 276) = 51.08, p < .001, !!!!= .43. Planned post hoc tests 
confirmed that in all three scenarios ratings of these reactions were higher in the common 
knowledge condition than in the shared knowledge conditions (all ps < .001), and higher in the 
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shared knowledge than private knowledge conditions (all ps < .005, except p = .016 for shared 
knowledge 1 vs. private knowledge 1 in the dishonesty scenario).  
Basic emotion scenarios. Figure 3.2 shows ratings of sadness in the break up scenario 
and anger in the sabotage scenario across knowledge levels (Figure 3.2a), and the corresponding 
physical responses of crying and teeth clenching, respectively (Figure 3.2b). The results show 
that acquiring private knowledge caused a large increase in reported anger and sadness, but that 
these emotions and their associated physical responses were relatively more stable across the 
additional levels of knowledge; however, reported anger was higher in the common than shared 
knowledge condition, and participants reported that they were less likely to cry in the common 
than shared and private knowledge conditions. 
 
  
Figure 3.2 Ratings of sadness in the break up scenario and anger in the sabotage scenario (3.2a, 
on the left), and ratings of likelihood of crying in the break up scenario and teeth clenching in the 
sabotage scenario (3.2b, on the right), across the different knowledge levels. Error bars represent 
standard error. 
 
Break up scenario. Repeated-measures ANOVAs revealed significant differences across 
knowledge levels for both sadness, F(4, 304) = 203.01, p < .001, !!!!= .73, and the associated 
physical reaction of crying, F(4, 304) = 72.33, p < .001, !!!!= .49. However, post hoc tests 
showed that this was primarily because of the large difference between responses in the no 
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knowledge condition and the other four conditions, in which responses were all similar. Reported 
sadness in the no knowledge condition was more than ten-times lower than in the four conditions 
in which participants had any knowledge of the impending break up (all ps < .001), and there 
was only one slightly significant difference between any of these four conditions (p = .047). 
Participants also reported that they were more than seven-times more likely to cry in the four 
conditions in which they knew about the impending break up than in the no knowledge condition 
(all ps < .001). The only significant difference between these other four conditions was that 
participants reported they would be less likely to cry in the common knowledge condition than in 
the private or shared knowledge conditions (all ps < .001). 
Sabotage scenario. Repeated-measures ANOVAs revealed significant differences across 
knowledge levels for both anger, F(4, 280) = 86.90, p < .001, !!!!= .55, and the associated 
physical reaction of teeth clenching, F(4, 280) = 34.42, p < .001, !!!!= .33. Post hoc tests showed 
that reported anger in the no knowledge condition was more than two-times lower than in the 
four conditions in which participants had any knowledge (all ps < .001), and it was not 
significantly greater in the shared knowledge condition than in the private knowledge conditions. 
Reported anger was however significantly greater in the common knowledge condition than in 
the shared knowledge condition (p = .004). Participants also reported that they would be more 
than twice as likely to clench their teeth in the four conditions in which they knew about the 
sabotage attempt than in the no knowledge condition (all ps < .001), and participants were not 
significantly more likely to report that they would clench their teeth in the common knowledge 
condition than in the shared knowledge condition. Oddly, participants reported a significantly 
lower likelihood of clenching their teeth in the private knowledge 2 condition than in the 
!112!
common knowledge condition (p = .015), and even than in the private knowledge 1 condition (p 
= .009).  
Experiment 2 
 The results of Experiment 1 support the strategic hypothesis in hypothetical scenarios. 
Experiment 2 brings the phenomenon into the lab to test whether the difference between shared 
and common knowledge affects actual experiences of embarrassment. In Experiment 2, 
participants performed a karaoke song for a panel of four judges in a separate room through a 
live two-way video feed and then reported how strongly they felt different emotions. During 
their performance, participants were shown a karaoke-style video with the lyrics to the song; 
however, this was embedded in a larger video display showing a live feed of the judges in the 
other room which forced participants to view the judges for their entire performance (see Figure 
3.3). In fact, there were no live judges and participants were shown one of two pre-recorded 
videos. One video showed the judges looking straight into the camera (Figure 3.3a), whereas the 
other showed them looking slightly to the side (Figure 3.3b). Additionally, participants were 
either told that the judges knew that there was a live two-way video feed, and that the judges 
knew participants were aware they knew this, or were told that the judges falsely believed they 
were watching a one-way video feed, and that the judges thought that participants were unaware 
of their presence. This experiment thus tests how embarrassment is affected by different 
knowledge levels (shared knowledge vs. common knowledge) and eye contact (eye contact vs. 
no eye contact) in a 2 × 2 full factorial between-subjects design. 
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Figure 3.3 Representative screenshots of the videos participants saw in the eye contact (3a, on 
the top), and no eye contact conditions (3b, on the bottom) in Experiment 2. The black screen 
with words in the lower left corner was an embedded video that provided lyrics to the karaoke 
song. 
 
Method 
 Participants. One hundred and twenty-six participants were recruited from the Harvard 
University study pool, and paid $10, or given course credit for participation. Thirteen 
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participants were excluded from analyses, because they expressed suspicion during debriefing 
(see Procedure), or didn’t actually perform the karaoke song, leaving a final sample of N = 113 
(57% female, Mage = 28.1, SDage = 13.3). 
 Procedure. Participants signed up for a study described as an experiment on how 
anonymity affects judges’ evaluations of someone’s performance, and which stated that they 
would either be assigned to perform a karaoke song, or to judge someone else’s performance. 
Upon arrival, participants were told that we were studying how the relationship between judges 
and performers affects judges’ evaluations—an important unanswered question in the age of 
reality TV—and that in each study we recruit a panel of judges and a performer. All participants 
were then informed that they had been assigned to the performer role, and that four other 
participants assigned to the role of judges were already situated in a room across the hallway. 
Participants were then told that they would perform a karaoke song that the judges would 
observe over a live two-way video feed, and that this two-room set up with the video feed was 
necessary to ensure that the environment was the same when judges believed they were 
anonymous and when they did not. 
 Participants assigned to the common knowledge condition were then told: “You have 
been selected for the condition in which the judges know that you are aware of their presence. 
You will be able to see them on the two-way video feed during your performance, and they know 
that you can see them through the two-way video feed. In other words, both you and the judges 
know that you are watching each other over a two-way video feed during your performance.” 
Participants assigned to the shared knowledge condition were instead told: “You have been 
selected for the anonymous condition, in which the judges think that you are unaware of their 
presence. However, in order to keep the performances the same across conditions, we actually 
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always tell the performers about the judges. In addition, you will be able to see them on the two-
way video feed during your performance, but they don’t know this. In other words, even though 
you can see the judges over this feed, they think that you don’t know they are there, and that they 
are simply watching a one-way video feed of your performance.” Participants in both conditions 
were then told that after the song ended, the video feed would cut off, and they would be given a 
short survey13. 
 Participants were then escorted into a small private room with a large computer monitor 
that had a built in video camera, speakers, and a microphone for them to sing into. The 
researcher set the computer up in front of the participant, and then told the participant that she 
had to go set up the video feed in the judges’ room. Participants were told that as soon as the 
researcher got this set up, they would see a video feed of the judges as well as a karaoke-style 
video with the song lyrics, and were instructed to begin their performance as soon as the song 
started. After 30 seconds, a video appeared on the computer screen with the researcher’s head 
right in front of the camera (as though she was just turning on the video camera in the other 
room). Immediately thereafter, the song (Rolling in the Deep by Adele) began to play, and 
participants saw a large video showing the judges in the other room, with a small karaoke-style 
video embedded in the lower left hand corner that displayed the lyrics to the song (see Figure 
3.3). In the eye contact condition, the video of the judges showed them looking directly into the 
camera (Figure 3.3a); in the no eye contact condition, the video of the judges showed them 
looking askance, as though they were watching the participant’s performance on a screen a few 
feet to the side of the camera filming them (Figure 3.3b).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!13!Complete instructions provided to participants are supplied in Appendix C of Supplementary 
Materials!
!116!
 After the song finished, the video feed shut off, and a survey popped up on the computer 
screen, in which participants were asked to rate how strongly they experienced different 
emotions on a 1-5 scale in a slightly modified Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). 
The PANAS includes 10 items comprising a negative affect scale, and 10 items comprising a 
positive affect scale (see Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988), and was used to disguise our primary 
interest in embarrassment, by embedding it in a larger battery of emotion ratings. However, the 
PANAS does not specifically ask about embarrassment, and so one of the positive affect items 
was replaced with embarrassed.  
Participants then answered a few questions about their experience with karaoke, and 
provided some basic demographic information. Participants then exited the room, where they 
met the researcher, and were given a funnel debriefing. The funnel debriefing began with very 
vague questions about what participants thought the study was about, which were followed by 
more and more specific questions about whether they thought everything had been clearly 
explained to them, whether they were at all suspicious during the study, and concluded with a 
direct question about whether they believed the judges were real. Participants were then fully 
debriefed and paid. 
Results 
 Figure 3.4 displays participants’ reported embarrassment in the two conditions, and 
results showed that participants were more embarrassed in the common knowledge condition. A 
2 (shared knowledge vs. common knowledge) × 2 (eye contact vs. no eye contact) ANOVA 
revealed a marginally significant effect of knowledge level on ratings of embarrassment, F(3, 
109) = 3.83, p = .053, !!!!= .03 (see Figure 3.4a), but no significant effect of eye contact, F(3, 
109) = 0.96, p = .328, !!!!= .01, or significant interaction, F(3, 109) = 0.15, p = .703, !!!!= .00. 
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Figure 3.4 Average reported embarrassment (3.4a, on the left), and average reported 
embarrassment with general negative affect subtracted out (3.4b, on the right), in the shared and 
common knowledge conditions in Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
 However, as the results of Experiment 1 suggest, the effects of shared versus common 
knowledge can be relatively specific to the self-conscious emotions. Hence, we wanted to 
separate participants’ embarrassment ratings from their general negative affect. We estimated 
negative affect by averaging the 10 items of the negative affect scale from the PANAS (α = .891) 
and then we subtracted this value from ratings of embarrassment. A 2 × 2 ANOVA revealed a 
slightly stronger effect of knowledge level on this refined measure of embarrassment, F(3, 109) 
= 4.77, p = .031, !!!!= .04 (see Figure 3.4b), but no significant effect of eye contact, F(3, 109) = 
1.82, p = .181, !!!!= .02, or significant interaction, F(3, 109) = 0.16, p = .691, !!!!= .00. These 
results support the prediction that participants would be more embarrassed when their 
performance was common knowledge than shared knowledge, but provide no support for the 
prediction that eye contact would increase embarrassment. 
Discussion 
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 This study provides evidence from two experiments that a transgression or faux pas 
evokes more intense negative self-conscious emotions when it is common knowledge than when 
it is shared knowledge. In Experiment 1, participants reported that they would feel more 
embarrassed, guilty, and ashamed in scenarios when an offense was common versus shared 
knowledge. In Experiment 2, participants reported feeling more embarrassed by a karaoke 
performance in front of a panel of judges when they believed it was common knowledge than 
when they believed it was shared knowledge. Previous research has shown that people 
experience more intense self-conscious emotions when an audience is present. These results 
suggest that the level of knowledge an individual shares with the audience also matters: 
Realizing that other people know about one’s offense can be uncomfortable, but it is even more 
agonizing if the offense becomes common knowledge.  
Why do the self-conscious emotions function this way? In the introduction we suggested 
this could serve a strategic function, because there are situations in which an individual’s best 
move depends on whether something is shared or common knowledge. These types of situations 
are modeled in game theory as coordination games, and both relationships and social status can 
be characterized as coordination games. In a coordination game, individuals can benefit by 
coordinating their behavior, but there is more than one way to do so, and coordination failures 
are costly. For example, everyone can benefit by adhering to established social norms, but these 
can take many different forms, and failing to coordinate on the same norms can be costly (e.g., a 
foreigner who fails to recognize some local custom may face condemnation or social exclusion). 
Likewise, people can benefit by coordinating on one of many possible types of relationships 
(e.g., friends, lovers, boss-employee, etc.), each of which is governed by distinct expectations 
and norms (Fiske, 1992; Haslam, 2004; Lee & Pinker, 2010), and coordination failures can be 
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costly (e.g., getting fired for behaving inappropriately in front of a boss when one gets too 
friendly). Social status can also be modeled as a coordination game, because it is an abstract 
social construction based solely on the prestige, power, and deference collectively granted to 
someone by others. Here too, coordination failures can be costly, as when one invites costly 
retaliation by failing to acknowledge the high status of a powerful individual, or squanders effort 
and social capital by sucking up to someone with low status. We suggest that two core functions 
of the self-conscious emotions—managing relationships and social status—explain the 
sensitivity of self-conscious emotions to these different knowledge states, because both involve 
the strategic logic of coordination.  
If the self-conscious emotions evolved according to such strategic logic, this might help 
explain another one of their distinctive features: They involve not only facial displays like basic 
emotions but also dynamic, full body postures (Keltner, 1995; Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Lewis, 
2000; Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008; Tracy & Robins, 2004). Shame and embarrassment are 
associated with slumping the shoulders, hanging the head, and touching the face. Likewise, much 
of the discomfort of blushing seems to come from the fact that the blusher knows onlookers 
know they know they are blushing, and so on (see Thomas et al., 2014). Pride, a positive self-
conscious emotion, is associated with puffing the chest and raising the arms. These full-bodied, 
dynamic displays might function to manipulate knowledge levels among senders and receivers. 
In short, people’s evolved strategies and recursive mental state reasoning might explain why 
some of the key characteristics of self-conscious emotion signals differ from those of the basic 
emotions. 
Eye contact did not lead to greater embarrassment in Experiment 2. It could be the case 
that eye contact doesn’t provide a sufficient cue to common knowledge, contra our hypothesis. 
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Or, this null result may have been due to a relatively weak manipulation, because eye contact 
was video-mediated, and even in the no eye contact condition participants could still see judges’ 
eyes (see Figure 3.3b). Given the prevalence and importance of eye contact in human social life 
(see for example, Baron-Cohen, 1997), we suspect our experimental design simply failed to 
capture the phenomenon sufficiently, and believe further research is warranted before drawing 
any strong conclusions. 
One unexpected result was that participants reported greater anger in the common 
knowledge condition than in the shared knowledge condition. The two basic emotion scenarios 
were included to test whether the different effects of shared and common knowledge are specific 
to self-conscious emotions. As explained above, the hypothesized effect of shared versus 
common knowledge on the self-conscious emotions was based on these emotions’ fundamental 
role in managing relationships and social status, and the coordination dynamics involved in both 
endeavors. However, basic emotions such as anger and sadness can also serve such social 
functions (Frank, 1988; Reed, DeScioli, & Pinker, 2014; Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2009), and 
may thus be sensitive to the distinction between shared and common knowledge in some social 
circumstances.   
 We close by noting that these results bolster previous findings showing that the 
categorical difference between shared and common knowledge—long recognized by game 
theorists (Rubinstein, 1989; Schelling, 1960), economists (Chwe, 2001; Geanakoplos, 1992), 
philosophers (Lewis, 1969), linguists (Clark, 1996; Clark & Marshall, 1981; Smith, 1982), 
sociologists (Adut, 2008), anthropologists and political scientists (Cronk & Leech, 2012), legal 
theorists (McAdams & Nadler, 2005), and even computer scientists (Alberucci & Jäger, 2005; 
Halpern & Moses, 1990)—has important and far-reaching psychological implications. Previous 
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research has demonstrated that the distinction between shared and common knowledge matters 
for cooperation and coordination (Thomas et al., 2014), and plays an important role in explaining 
strategic uses of indirect speech (Lee & Pinker, 2010). This study adds self-conscious emotions 
to the list of human psychological systems that are sensitive to the difference between shared and 
common knowledge. 
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CONCLUSION 
 These!studies!provide!the!first!direct!evidence!for!a!psychology!of!common!knowledge.!They!also!hint!at!its!potentially!wideRranging!applications,!by!demonstrating!how!common!knowledge!can!affect!arenas!of!human!social!life!in!which!important!underlying!aspects!of!coordination!are!implicit!and!unobvious.!For!example,!the!effects!of!common!knowledge!on!indirect!speech!and!selfRconscious!emotions!that!are!explored!in!Papers!2!and!3!seem!to!be!much!less!obvious!than!the!more!explicit!decision!of!whether!or!not!to!try!and!work!together!in!the!coordination!games!employed!in!Paper!1.!The!depth!and!breadth!of!theory!on!the!topic!suggests!both!that!such!empirical!work!is!long!overdue,!and!that!the!findings!presented!here!merely!scratch!the!surface!of!a!potentially!vast!unexplored!area!of!human!psychology!and!social!behavior.!!The!first!paper!shows!that!people!recognize!common!knowledge,!differentiate!it!from!lower!levels!of!shared!knowledge,!and!utilize!these!different!knowledge!states!strategically.!In!the!experiments!reported!in!the!paper,!participants!engaged!in!interactive!scenarios!that!embodied!the!coordination!game!Rubinstein!(1989)!used!in!his!famous!proof.!These!studies!were!designed!to!test!how!different!levels!of!knowledge!would!affect!behavior!in!a!canonical!coordination!game.!The!results!unequivocally!supported!the!hypothesis!that!common!knowledge!leads!people!to!attempt!to!coordinate!with!others!for!mutual!benefit,!even!when!doing!so!is!risky!and!entails!a!large!opportunity!cost.!These!findings!provide!an!important!proof!of!concept,!by!showing!that!people!recognize!the!strategic!importance!of!different!kinds!of!knowledge!when!trying!to!coordinate!with!others,!and!that!common!knowledge!plays!an!important!role!in!facilitating!coordination.!
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These!studies!also!offer!multiple!converging!lines!of!evidence!suggesting!that!the!mind!has!a!dedicated!representation!for!common!knowledge,!which!is!categorically!distinct!from!representations!for!lower!levels!of!shared!knowledge.!Distinct!representations!for!these!two!kinds!of!knowledge!could!provide!evidence!of!adaptive!design,!because!this!mirrors!the!categorical!difference!between!these!knowledge!states!in!game!theory!models!of!coordination;!however,!further!research!is!needed!to!confirm!this!conclusion.!The!results!reported!in!the!second!paper!support!a!strategic!theory!of!indirect!speech,!which!postulates!that!indirect!speech!offers!speakers!an!optimal!way!to!try!and!transition!between!relationships!with!a!listener,!by!preventing!common!knowledge!of!a!proposition.!In!the!study,!participants!engaged!in!two!scripted!interactions,!one!involving!a!bribe!proposition,!the!other!a!sexual!proposition,!while!cardiovascular!measures!were!taken!to!assess!their!affective!responses.!Participants’!responses!to!direct!and!indirect!propositions!in!the!two!scenarios!were!consistent!with!the!social!and!reputational!costs!described!by!the!theory.!Participants’!responses!to!survey!questions!about!the!sexual!proposition!also!supported!the!theory’s!prediction!that!indirect!speech!can!help!speakers!prevent!rumors!from!spreading.!Even!though!this!study!did!not!directly!test!any!of!the!theory’s!predictions!regarding!common!knowledge,!by!supporting!the!overall!theory,!these!results!provide!indirect!evidence!that!common!knowledge!plays!an!important!role!in!explaining!strategic!uses!of!indirect!speech.!It!is!worth!noting!that!in!other!studies!not!reported!here,!we!have!found!more!direct!evidence!for!the!role!of!common!knowledge!in!explaining!indirect!speech.!The!third!paper!provides!evidence!from!two!studies!that!the!selfRconscious!emotions!of!shame,!guilt,!and!embarrassment!are!sensitive!to!the!distinction!between!
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shared!and!common!knowledge.!In!the!first!study,!participants!read!fictional!scenarios!in!which!they!committed!some!transgression,!and!reported!that!they!would!expect!to!feel!more!ashamed,!embarrassed,!and!guilty!when!their!transgression!was!common!knowledge!than!when!it!was!shared!knowledge.!A!similar!pattern!of!results!was!observed!in!a!second!lab!study,!in!which!participants!performed!a!karaoke!song!for!a!panel!of!judges!over!a!twoRway!video!feed.!In!this!study,!participants!who!believed!the!twoRway!video!feed!was!commonly!known!reported!higher!levels!of!embarrassment,!than!participants!who!believed!the!judges!erroneously!believed!they!were!watching!a!oneRway!video!feed!of!the!participant’s!performance,!and!that!the!participant!was!unaware!of!their!presence!(i.e.,!the!performance!was!shared!knowledge).!This!paper!thus!shows!another!psychological!context!in!which!common!knowledge!plays!a!role,!and!that!it!affects!the!selfRconscious!emotions!of!embarrassment,!shame,!and!guilt.!Taken!together,!these!three!papers!suggest!that!our!evolved!psychology!has!been!shaped!by!the!strategic!demands!of!coordination,!and!that!the!mind!contains!computational!mechanisms!designed!to!recognize!common!knowledge.!Furthermore,!they!demonstrate!that!common!knowledge!applies!to!more!than!just!situations!involving!the!kinds!of!explicit!coordination!problems!that!are!typically!modeled!by!game!theorists!(e.g.,!situations!in!which!people!must!decide!whether!or!not!to!work!together!for!mutual!benefit,!such!as!those!employed!in!Paper!1).!Throughout!this!dissertation!I!have!argued!that!common!knowledge!likely!plays!a!role!in!many!arenas!of!human!social!life,!yet!I!have!only!provided!evidence!for!a!few.!However,!by!demonstrating!that!common!knowledge!is!more!than!just!a!theoretical!curiosity,!I!believe!this!opens!the!door!for!understanding!its!many!other!diverse!applications.!!
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In!closing,!I!would!like!to!suggest!an!analogy!that!I!believe!helps!clarify!why!common!knowledge!might!matter!in!so!many!different!contexts.!I!have!suggested!that!the!one!thing!that!ties!all!these!contexts!together!is!that!they!involve!coordination,!which!is!backed!by!research!in!game!theory.!Coordination!games!are!an!abstract!mathematical!concept!(like!perfect!circles!or!normal!distributions)!that!merely!provide!a!structural!account!of!a!situation,!but!say!nothing!about!the!possible!semantic!contexts!that!might!embody!such!a!structure.!I!would!like!to!suggest!that!common!knowledge!is!a!deep!mathematical!concept!(much!like!π!or!eigenvalues),!which!pops!up!all!over!the!place!because!of!deep!underlying!isomorphisms!in!contexts!that!can!on!the!surface!seem!completely!unrelated.!Just!as!π!pops!up!in!explanations!of!many!physical!phenomena!that!share!deep!underlying!geometric!isomorphisms,!and!eigenvalues!pop!up!in!many!different!informational!contexts!because!of!deep!underlying!isomorphisms!in!information!structures,!I!suggest!that!common!knowledge!pops!up!all!over!the!place!in!human!social!life!because!of!deep!underlying!isomorphisms!involving!coordination.!Now!it’s!time!for!the!necessary!empirical!work!to!be!done!to!elaborate!and!confirm!this!conjecture.!! !
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR PAPER 3 Appendix!A:!Table!of!Mean!Emotion!Ratings!in!Experiment!1!
'
Table&SM1!Mean!emotion!ratings!across!knowledge!levels!in!Experiment!1&!
Scenario Emotion 
Knowledge level condition M(SD) 
1 2 3 4 5 Average 
Teasing Embarrassment 22.3(23.4) 25.8(27.8) 48.9(23.9) 44.0(26.9) 64.2(23.5) 41.1(17.8) 
 Guilt 30.9(24.2) 31.3(23.5) 50.4(24.3) 48.4(27.3) 60.3(26.7) 44.3(18.6) 
 Shame 26.8(25.4) 27.8(25.9) 47.8(25.9) 45.8(27.4) 60.3(23.4) 41.7(19.4) 
 Average SCEs 26.7(22.7) 28.3(24.6) 49.1(22.7) 46.1(25.5) 61.6(22.6) 42.3(17.4) 
 Anger 2.9(9.9) 3.4(10.9) 4.5(12.5) 5.3(15.4) 7.3(18.5) 4.7(12.1) 
 Fear 5.4(11.4) 5.9(10.1) 10.0(15.0) 10.6(17.5) 13.7(19.5) 9.1(11.7) 
 Sadness 10.2(19.2) 10.8(20.6) 18.1(22.8) 21.7(26.8) 29.1(28.3) 18.0(20.3) 
Farting Embarrassment 18.0(22.5) 17.8(19.7) 36.3(22.3) 47.3(24.7) 62.4(23.6) 36.4(17.8) 
 Guilt 10.8(17.4) 9.8(11.7) 16.2(17.5) 17.8(20.4) 25.7(24.8) 16.0(15.9) 
 Shame 12.4(20.3) 13.0(15.8) 21.1(21.0) 26.9(24.4) 37.1(28.0) 22.1(19.0) 
 Average SCEs 13.7(17.7) 13.5(13.5) 24.5(17.1) 30.7(19.6) 41.7(21.6) 24.8(15.3) 
 Anger 2.2(6.4) 1.3(3.9) 3.9(9.4) 4.6(8.9) 8.1(14.5) 4.0(6.9) 
 Fear 11.4(19.4) 6.1(11.8) 7.8(16.6) 9.1(17.3) 12.3(21.5) 9.4(14.7) 
 Sadness 1.3(3.4) 2.0(6.4) 4.3(8.8) 6.9(13.4) 9.4(17.7) 4.8(8.5) 
Dishonesty Embarrassment 14.2(18.4) 15.5(19.1) 33.1(22.4) 38.1(22.7) 44.5(23.4) 29.1(16.4) 
 Guilt 29.9(24.3) 25.4(21.9) 37.0(23.2) 39.6(24.7) 41.6(27.6) 34.7(21.5) 
 Shame 19.4(20.1) 21.2(22.4) 31.9(23.0) 34.3(25.1) 40.5(29.5) 29.5(21.2) 
 Average SCEs 21.1(18.2) 20.7(18.7) 34.0(21.2) 37.3(21.9) 42.2(25.5) 31.1(18.8) 
 Anger 8.8(14.2) 10.4(15.0) 15.5(17.5) 10.5(13.0) 19.0(17.4) 12.8(11.9) 
 Fear 21.6(19.9) 13.3(16.1) 24.6(20.2) 23.6(22.4) 27.3(22.8) 22.1(16.6) 
 Sadness 6.4(12.6) 5.3(11.5) 7.2(10.7) 11.5(16.8) 11.6(14.8) 8.4(10.1) 
Break up Embarrassment 1.7(6.7) 34.6(26.9) 37.1(27.5) 43.6(30.8) 46.8(31.6) 32.8(19.0) 
 Guilt 2.0(10.2) 8.6(16.0) 9.9(17.3) 10.8(17.2) 9.4(17.4) 8.1(12.0) 
 Shame 2.9(11.9) 20.9(26.9) 15.9(22.1) 21.6(28.3) 21.8(28.8) 16.6(18.8) 
 Average SCEs 2.2(6.9) 21.4(18.6) 21.0(18.2) 25.3(20.5) 26.0(21.1) 19.2(13.8) 
 Anger 4.2(14.8) 52.0(27.1) 49.5(26.2) 48.9(28.0) 47.1(28.1) 40.3(20.6) 
 Fear 2.5(10.0) 23.7(25.3) 26.9(26.8) 28.4(28.1) 26.1(28.8) 21.5(20.3) 
 Sadness 6.2(20.9) 69.3(22.9) 68.2(21.3) 65.6(23.6) 64.5(26.4) 54.8(17.6) 
Sabotage Embarrassment 13.6(18.5) 14.5(20.6) 16.9(20.8) 19.6(25.7) 18.9(27.7) 16.7(19.3) 
 Guilt 7.1(14.4) 4.3(9.4) 5.5(11.4) 5.2(11.1) 4.4(10.8) 5.3(9.8) 
 Shame 6.2(12.1) 6.3(13.5) 7.0(12.6) 8.6(17.5) 8.8(18.1) 7.4(13.3) 
 Average SCEs 9.0(13.2) 8.3(12.8) 9.8(12.7) 11.1(16.6) 10.7(16.9) 9.8(12.9) 
 Anger 22.4(27.6) 59.5(23.2) 56.9(21.5) 58.4(23.1) 63.6(22.9) 52.2(19.5) 
 Fear 9.2(14.5) 8.3(14.3) 9.0(13.7) 9.6(15.0) 9.5(15.0) 9.1(12.6) 
 Sadness 11.4(18.7) 24.5(22.3) 25.1(23.4) 22.4(23.1) 23.1(22.9) 21.3(19.4) 
'! !
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Appendix!B:!Vignettes!Used!in!Experiment!1'
'
Self9conscious'Emotion'Scenario'1:'Teasing'Scenario!!
Private'knowledge'1!You!have!a!good!friend!Lisa!who!has!a!slight!speech!impediment,!always!pronouncing!“r”!as!“w.”!!For!example,!she!calls!your!mutual!friend!“Wobert”!instead!of!“Robert.”!You!and!your!friends!sometimes!joke!about!Lisa’s!impediment,!but!you!would!never!do!so!when!she!is!around.!!!One!day!at!the!local!shopping!mall,!you!run!across!your!friend!Robert,!and!out!of!habit!call!out,!“Wobert!”!!!Robert!laughs!at!the!inside!joke!just!as!Lisa!appears!out!of!a!nearby!store,!far!enough!away!that!she!could!not!have!heard!you!over!the!crowd.!!
Private'knowledge'2!You!have!a!good!friend!Lisa!who!has!a!slight!speech!impediment,!always!pronouncing!“r”!as!“w.”!!For!example,!she!calls!your!mutual!friend!“Wobert”!instead!of!“Robert.”!You!and!your!friends!sometimes!joke!about!Lisa’s!impediment,!but!you!would!never!do!so!when!she!is!around.!!!!One!day!at!the!local!shopping!mall,!you!run!across!your!friend!Robert,!and!out!of!habit!call!out,!“Wobert!”!!!
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Robert!laughs!at!the!inside!joke!just!as!Lisa!appears!out!of!a!nearby!store.!She!hears!you!make!fun!of!her!impediment.!But!you!don’t!realize!this,!mistakenly!thinking!that!she!is!far!enough!away!that!she!could!not!have!heard!you.!!
Shared'knowledge'1!You!have!a!good!friend!Lisa!who!has!a!slight!speech!impediment,!always!pronouncing!“r”!as!“w.”!!For!example,!she!calls!your!mutual!friend!“Wobert”!instead!of!“Robert.”!You!and!your!friends!sometimes!joke!about!Lisa’s!impediment,!but!you!would!never!do!so!when!she!is!around.!!!!One!day!at!the!local!shopping!mall,!you!run!across!your!friend!Robert,!and!out!of!habit!call!out,!“Wobert!”!!!Robert!laughs!at!the!inside!joke!just!as!Lisa!appears!out!of!a!nearby!store.!She!hears!you!make!fun!of!her!impediment!and!her!facial!expression!changes.!You!immediately!spot!this!out!of!the!corner!of!your!eye,!but!you!pretend!not!to!have!noticed!Lisa’s!reaction,!continuing!to!act!as!though!nothing!out!of!the!ordinary!has!happened.!As!far!as!Lisa!is!concerned,!you!are!unaware!that!she!overheard!the!joke.!When!she!joins!you!it!is!clear!that!she!does!not!realize!that!you!were!aware!that!she!heard!you.!!
Shared'knowledge'2!You!have!a!good!friend!Lisa!who!has!a!slight!speech!impediment,!always!pronouncing!“r”!as!“w.”!!For!example,!she!calls!your!mutual!friend!“Wobert”!instead!of!“Robert.”!You!and!your!
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friends!sometimes!joke!about!Lisa’s!impediment,!but!you!would!never!do!so!when!she!is!around.!!!!One!day!at!the!local!shopping!mall,!you!run!across!your!friend!Robert,!and!out!of!habit!call!out,!“Wobert!”!!!Robert!laughs!at!the!inside!joke!just!as!Lisa!appears!out!of!a!nearby!store.!She!hears!you!make!fun!of!her!impediment!and!her!facial!expression!changes.!You!try!not!to!make!eye!contact!with!her!by!quickly!looking!in!the!opposite!direction;!however,!you!realize!she!managed!to!catch!you!in!the!act!of!looking!away.!Yet,!by!this!time,!you!had!already!turned!far!enough!that!it!does!not!appear!to!her!that!you!noticed!that!she!saw!you.!!!
Common'knowledge'You!have!a!good!friend!Lisa!who!has!a!slight!speech!impediment,!always!pronouncing!“r”!as!“w.”!!For!example,!she!calls!your!mutual!friend!“Wobert”!instead!of!“Robert.”!You!and!your!friends!sometimes!joke!about!Lisa’s!impediment,!but!you!would!never!do!so!when!she!is!around.!!!!One!day!at!the!local!shopping!mall,!you!run!across!your!friend!Robert,!and!out!of!habit!call!out,!“Wobert!”!!!!Robert!laughs!at!the!inside!joke!just!as!Lisa!appears!right!behind!you!out!of!a!nearby!store,!you!all!three!make!eye!contact,!and!it!is!obvious!that!she!heard!the!joke.!
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'
Self9conscious'Emotion'Scenario'2:'Farting'Scenario!!
Private'knowledge'1!While!sitting!in!the!middle!of!a!crowded!lecture!hall,!you!feel!severe!bloating!in!your!intestines!and!immediately!regret!the!bean!salad!you!ate!for!lunch.!You’re!trapped!in!the!middle!of!a!row!with!tight!seats!and!do!not!want!to!cause!a!disturbance,!but!you’re!in!such!intense!pain!that!you!cannot!concentrate!on!the!lecture.!Without!other!options,!you!decide!to!try!to!pass!gas!silently.!You!succeed!and!the!fart!goes!unnoticed.!!
Private'knowledge'2!While!sitting!in!the!middle!of!a!crowded!lecture!hall,!you!feel!severe!bloating!in!your!intestines!and!immediately!regret!the!bean!salad!you!ate!for!lunch.!You’re!trapped!in!the!middle!of!a!row!with!tight!seats!and!do!not!want!to!cause!a!disturbance,!but!you’re!in!such!intense!pain!that!you!cannot!concentrate!on!the!lecture.!Without!other!options,!you!decide!to!try!to!pass!gas!silently.!Unfortunately,!the!person!sitting!next!to!you!hears!the!fart!and!briefly!glances!over.!But!because!the!room!is!noisy,!and!you!are!focused!on!the!lecture,!you!don’t!notice!her!glance,!and!mistakenly!think!you!have!succeeded!in!doing!so!unnoticed.!!
Shared'knowledge'1!While!sitting!in!the!middle!of!a!crowded!lecture!hall,!you!feel!severe!bloating!in!your!intestines!and!immediately!regret!the!bean!salad!you!ate!for!lunch.!You’re!trapped!in!the!
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middle!of!a!row!with!tight!seats!and!do!not!want!to!cause!a!disturbance,!but!you’re!in!such!intense!pain!that!you!cannot!concentrate!on!the!lecture.!Without!other!options,!you!decide!to!try!to!pass!gas!silently.!Unfortunately,!the!person!sitting!next!to!you!hears!the!fart!and!briefly!glances!over.!While!you!secretly!notice!her!glance,!you!do!not!react,!and!so!she!has!no!way!of!knowing!that!you!noticed;!she!goes!back!to!taking!notes.!That!is,!as!far!as!she!knows,!you!think!you!have!succeeded!in!passing!gas!silently.!!!!
Shared'knowledge'2'While!sitting!in!the!middle!of!a!crowded!lecture!hall,!you!feel!severe!bloating!in!your!intestines!and!immediately!regret!the!bean!salad!you!ate!for!lunch.!You’re!trapped!in!the!middle!of!a!row!with!tight!seats!and!do!not!want!to!cause!a!disturbance,!but!you’re!in!such!intense!pain!that!you!cannot!concentrate!on!the!lecture.!Without!other!options,!you!decide!to!try!to!pass!gas!silently.!Unfortunately,!the!person!sitting!next!to!you!hears!the!fart!and!briefly!glances!over.!You!notice!her!glance,!and!reflexively!flinch!in!response,!which!she!sees.!However!you!never!actually!look!over,!and!so!she!doesn’t!think!you!are!aware!that!she!saw!you!flinch;!she!goes!back!to!taking!notes.!That!is,!as!far!as!she!knows,!you!do!not!know!that!she!saw!you!flinch!when!she!heard!you.!!!!
Common'knowledge'While!sitting!in!the!middle!of!a!crowded!lecture!hall,!you!feel!severe!bloating!in!your!intestines!and!immediately!regret!the!bean!salad!you!ate!for!lunch.!You’re!trapped!in!the!middle!of!a!row!with!tight!seats!and!do!not!want!to!cause!a!disturbance,!but!you’re!in!such!intense!pain!that!you!cannot!concentrate!on!the!lecture.!Without!other!options,!you!decide!
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to!try!to!pass!gas!silently.!Unfortunately,!the!person!sitting!next!to!you!hears!the!fart!and!briefly!glances!over.!You!can’t!help!but!look!over!and!meet!her!gaze,!making!it!obvious!to!both!you!and!her!that!she!has!noticed!the!fart.!!!
Self9conscious'Emotion'Scenario'3:'Dishonesty'Scenario'
'Think!of!a!school!or!community!organization!that!you!have!been!a!part!of!in!the!past:!a!sports!team,!a!theater!club,!a!church!or!political!group,!or!an!interestRbased!group!like!a!ski!club.!Now!imagine!that!you!and!your!roommate,!Sam,!both!just!joined!this!organization,!and!you!go!to!the!first!meeting!together.!!!The!first!meeting!of!the!year!begins!with!you!and!Sam!both!meeting!the!club!members!who!seem!like!your!kind!of!people,!and!you!are!really!looking!forward!to!being!a!part!of!the!group.!Everyone!is!enjoying!small!talk!over!snacks!when!the!President!of!the!group!briefly!takes!the!floor!to!explain!the!policies!and!customs!of!the!group.!She!emphasizes!that!the!group!has!a!tight!budget,!and!that!there!is!a!strict!policy!regarding!receipts!for!club!expenses!to!make!sure!they!are!used!properly,!and!so!that!they!are!not!found!in!violation!of!the!rules!if!they!are!audited!by!the!national!organization.!She!goes!on!to!say!it!is!a!very!serious!infraction!to!charge!personal!expenses!to!the!group.!!!
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After!the!announcements,!the!club!selects!people!for!different!roles,!and!you!volunteer!to!get!drinks!for!all!of!the!meetings.!You!are!told!to!turn!in!a!reimbursement!form!with!your!receipts!to!the!Treasurer!for!reimbursement.!!!A!week!later,!you!and!your!roommate!go!to!the!second!meeting!with!the!drinks,!and!have!a!great!time,!but!realize!when!you!get!home!that!not!only!did!you!forgot!to!turn!in!your!receipt,!but!now!you!can’t!find!it!anywhere.!You!have!been!on!a!tight!budget!yourself,!and!are!stressed!about!having!to!absorb!the!cost!for!the!drinks!that!you!brought!to!the!meeting.!!!Before!the!next!meeting,!you!buy!some!drinks!for!yourself,!which!you!bring!home.!Since!you!were!never!properly!reimbursed!at!the!last!meeting,!you!think!it!is!fair!to!simply!turn!in!this!receipt,!since!the!drinks!you!bought!for!yourself!were!equal!to!what!you!bought!for!the!last!meeting.!You!realize!that!even!though!this!is!a!perfectly!fair!solution!in!terms!of!cost!to!the!club,!it!is!against!the!rules.!You!ask!Sam!whether!you!should!do!this,!and!Sam!says!that!not!only!would!it!be!wrong!to!do!so,!but!that!it!isn’t!that!much!money!anyways.!!!
Private'knowledge'1'You!are!annoyed!that!because!of!a!bureaucratic!requirement!you!are!out!the!money!that!you!are!entitled!to!from!the!last!meeting,!so!you!submit!the!personal!receipt!with!your!reimbursement!form.!Sam!has!no!idea!that!you!are!doing!this.!!!
Private'knowledge'2!
!149!
You!are!annoyed!that!because!of!a!bureaucratic!requirement!you!are!out!the!money!that!you!are!entitled!to!from!the!last!meeting,!so!you!submit!the!personal!receipt!with!your!reimbursement!form.!Before!submitting!the!reimbursement!form,!you!leave!it!on!the!kitchen!table!at!your!house,!where!Sam!sees!it!and!discovers!that!you!are!trying!to!break!the!rules,!but!chooses!not!to!do!anything!about!it.!However,!you!were!not!at!home!at!the!time,!so!you!never!realize!that!Sam!has!seen!it.!!
Shared'knowledge'1!You!are!annoyed!that!because!of!a!bureaucratic!requirement!you!are!out!the!money!that!you!are!entitled!to!from!the!last!meeting,!so!you!submit!the!personal!receipt!with!your!reimbursement!form.!Before!submitting!the!reimbursement!request,!you!leave!it!on!the!kitchen!table!at!your!house,!where!Sam!sees!it!and!discovers!that!you!are!trying!to!break!the!rules,!but!chooses!not!to!do!anything!about!it.!Peeking!out!your!bedroom!door,!you!see!Sam!pick!up!the!form!and!look!at!it.!Sam!puts!it!down!without!ever!realizing!you!saw!him.!!!!
Shared'knowledge'2!You!are!annoyed!that!because!of!a!bureaucratic!requirement!you!are!out!the!money!that!you!are!entitled!to!from!the!last!meeting,!so!you!submit!the!personal!receipt!with!your!reimbursement!form.!Before!submitting!the!reimbursement!request,!you!leave!it!on!the!kitchen!table,!where!Sam!sees!it.!Peeking!out!your!bedroom!door,!you!see!Sam!pick!up!the!form!and!look!at!it.!Sam!now!knows!that!you!were!trying!to!break!the!rules,!but!chooses!not!to!do!anything!about!it.!However,!at!that!point!the!door!creaks!slightly,!and!as!Sam!begins!to!turn!to!see!you,!you!quickly!step!back!from!the!door.!!
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Common'knowledge'You!are!annoyed!that!because!of!a!bureaucratic!requirement!you!are!out!the!money!that!you!are!entitled!to!from!the!last!meeting,!so!you!submit!the!personal!receipt!in!your!reimbursement!form.!Before!submitting!the!reimbursement!request,!you!leave!it!on!the!kitchen!table.!While!Sam!has!it!in!hand!and!is!reading!it!you!walk!into!the!room,!and!before!you!notice!Sam!is!reading!the!request,!you!say!hi.!Sam!looks!up!at!you,!you!make!eye!contact,!and!realize!that!he!has!discovered!your!improper!reimbursement!form.!!!!
Basic'Emotion'Scenario'1:'Break'up'Scenario!
'
No'knowledge!You!have!been!dating!your!partner!for!just!over!3!years.!You!are!deeply!in!love!with!them,!think!that!they!are!probably!“the!one”,!and!have!been!seriously!contemplating!marriage.!You!don’t!live!together,!but!you!both!have!keys!to!each!other’s!houses!and!it’s!not!uncommon!to!be!at!their!house!even!when!they’re!not!home.!One!afternoon!you!decide!to!head!over!to!their!house!a!bit!earlier!than!planned!so!that!you!can!surprise!them!with!dinner.!!!You!arrive!at!their!house!while!they’re!still!at!work,!and!are!excited!because!now!you!know!dinner!will!be!a!surprise.!While!you!are!preparing!the!meal!their!phone!rings,!but!you!can’t!get!to!it!in!time!to!answer!because!you!have!to!wash!your!hands!first.!The!answering!
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machine!gets!the!call,!and!you!hear!one!of!their!good!friends!start!to!leave!a!message.!You!decide!to!let!the!machine!take!it!at!this!point,!since!you!would!just!have!to!deliver!the!same!message!anyways.!In!the!message,!the!friend!says,!“Hey,!I!hope!you’re!doing!OK.!Have!you!decided!when!you!are!going!to!have!the!breakup!talk?!I!know!these!things!are!hard,!and!so!please!feel!free!to!reach!out!to!me!if!you!want!any!support!after!you!end!your!relationship.”!However,!because!you!immediately!resumed!cooking!when!the!answering!machine!picked!up,!you!don’t!hear!any!of!the!message!over!the!running!water!of!the!sink.!!
Private'knowledge'1!You!have!been!dating!your!partner!for!just!over!3!years.!You!are!deeply!in!love!with!them,!think!that!they!are!probably!“the!one”,!and!have!been!seriously!contemplating!marriage.!You!don’t!live!together,!but!you!both!have!keys!to!each!other’s!houses!and!it’s!not!uncommon!to!be!at!their!house!even!when!they’re!not!home.!One!afternoon!you!decide!to!head!over!to!their!house!a!bit!earlier!than!planned!so!that!you!can!surprise!them!with!dinner.!!!You!arrive!at!their!house!while!they’re!still!at!work,!and!are!excited!because!now!you!know!dinner!will!be!a!surprise.!While!you!are!preparing!the!meal!their!phone!rings,!but!you!can’t!get!to!it!in!time!to!answer!because!you!have!to!wash!your!hands!first.!The!answering!machine!gets!the!call,!and!you!hear!one!of!their!good!friends!start!to!leave!a!message.!You!decide!to!let!the!machine!take!it!at!this!point,!since!you!would!just!have!to!deliver!the!same!message!anyways.!The!answering!machine!is!loud!and!right!by!the!kitchen,!so!you!can!hear!the!entire!message.!The!friend!says,!“Hey,!I!hope!you’re!doing!OK.!Have!you!decided!when!
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you!are!going!to!have!the!breakup!talk?!I!know!these!things!are!hard,!and!so!please!feel!free!to!reach!out!to!me!if!you!want!any!support!after!you!end!your!relationship.”!You!don’t!know!what!to!do,!so!you!pack!up!the!food!you!brought!over!and!head!home.!!
Private'knowledge'2!You!have!been!dating!your!partner!for!just!over!3!years.!You!are!deeply!in!love!with!them,!think!that!they!are!probably!“the!one”,!and!have!been!seriously!contemplating!marriage.!You!don’t!live!together,!but!you!both!have!keys!to!each!other’s!houses!and!it’s!not!uncommon!to!be!at!their!house!even!when!they’re!not!home.!One!afternoon!you!decide!to!head!over!to!their!house!a!bit!earlier!than!planned!so!that!you!can!surprise!them!with!dinner.!!!You!arrive!at!their!house!while!they’re!still!at!work,!and!are!excited!because!now!you!know!dinner!will!be!a!surprise.!While!you!are!preparing!the!meal!their!phone!rings,!but!you!can’t!get!to!it!in!time!to!answer!because!you!have!to!wash!your!hands!first.!The!answering!machine!gets!the!call,!and!you!hear!one!of!their!good!friends!start!to!leave!a!message.!You!decide!to!let!the!machine!take!it!at!this!point,!since!you!would!just!have!to!deliver!the!same!message!anyways.!The!answering!machine!is!loud!and!right!by!the!kitchen,!so!you!can!hear!the!entire!message.!The!friend!says,!“Hey,!I!hope!you’re!doing!OK.!Have!you!decided!when!you!are!going!to!have!the!breakup!talk?!I!know!these!things!are!hard,!and!so!please!feel!free!to!reach!out!to!me!if!you!want!any!support!after!you!end!your!relationship.”!You!don’t!know!what!to!do,!so!you!pack!up!the!food!you!brought!over!and!head!home.!Unbeknownst!
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to!you!however,!your!partner!sees!you!pull!out!of!their!driveway,!and!so!they!will!realize!that!you!heard!the!message.!!
Shared'knowledge!You!have!been!dating!your!partner!for!just!over!3!years.!You!are!deeply!in!love!with!them,!think!that!they!are!probably!“the!one”,!and!have!been!seriously!contemplating!marriage.!You!don’t!live!together,!but!you!both!have!keys!to!each!other’s!houses!and!it’s!not!uncommon!to!be!at!their!house!even!when!they’re!not!home.!One!afternoon!you!decide!to!head!over!to!their!house!a!bit!earlier!than!planned!so!that!you!can!surprise!them!with!dinner.!!!You!arrive!at!their!house!while!they’re!still!at!work,!and!are!excited!because!now!you!know!dinner!will!be!a!surprise.!While!you!are!preparing!the!meal!their!phone!rings,!but!you!can’t!get!to!it!in!time!to!answer!because!you!have!to!wash!your!hands!first.!The!answering!machine!gets!the!call,!and!you!hear!one!of!their!good!friends!start!to!leave!a!message.!You!decide!to!let!the!machine!take!it!at!this!point,!since!you!would!just!have!to!deliver!the!same!message!anyways.!The!answering!machine!is!loud!and!right!by!the!kitchen,!so!you!can!hear!the!entire!message.!The!friend!says,!“Hey,!I!hope!you’re!doing!OK.!Have!you!decided!when!you!are!going!to!have!the!breakup!talk?!I!know!these!things!are!hard,!and!so!please!feel!free!to!reach!out!to!me!if!you!want!any!support!after!you!end!your!relationship.”!You!don’t!know!what!to!do,!so!you!pack!up!the!food!you!brought!over!and!head!home.!However,!you!see!your!partner!driving!down!the!street!as!you!pull!out!of!the!driveway,!so!you!know!that!your!partner!will!realize!that!you!heard!the!message.!
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Common'knowledge!You!have!been!dating!your!partner!for!just!over!3!years.!You!are!deeply!in!love!with!them,!think!that!they!are!probably!“the!one”,!and!have!been!seriously!contemplating!marriage.!You!don’t!live!together,!but!you!both!have!keys!to!each!other’s!houses!and!it’s!not!uncommon!to!be!at!their!house!even!when!they’re!not!home.!One!afternoon!you!decide!to!head!over!to!their!house!a!bit!earlier!than!planned!so!that!you!can!surprise!them!with!dinner.!!!You!arrive!at!their!house!while!they’re!still!at!work,!and!are!excited!because!now!you!know!dinner!will!be!a!surprise.!While!you!are!preparing!the!meal!their!phone!rings,!but!you!can’t!get!to!it!in!time!to!answer!because!you!have!to!wash!your!hands!first.!The!answering!machine!gets!the!call,!and!you!hear!one!of!their!good!friends!start!to!leave!a!message.!You!decide!to!let!the!machine!take!it!at!this!point,!since!you!would!just!have!to!deliver!the!same!message!anyways.!Right!then!your!partner!walks!in,!makes!eye!contact!with!you,!and!you!both!hear!the!friend’s!message!say,!“Hey,!I!hope!you’re!doing!OK.!Have!you!decided!when!you!are!going!to!have!the!breakup!talk?!I!know!these!things!are!hard,!and!so!please!feel!free!to!reach!out!to!me!if!you!want!any!support!after!you!end!your!relationship.”!!!
Basic'Emotion'Scenario'2:'Sabotage'Scenario!!
No'knowledge'
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You!go!to!the!mall!to!buy!some!muchRneeded!new!clothes.!After!making!your!purchase!you!walk!out!of!the!store!and!see!two!of!your!friends,!Mike!and!John,!hanging!out!and!talking.!Mike!is!one!of!your!best!friends,!but!you!and!John!aren’t!especially!close,!and!you’re!only!really!friends!because!you!are!both!in!the!same!friend!group.!You!and!John!get!along!fine,!he!just!isn’t!someone!who!you!would!normally!hang!out!with!if!he!wasn’t!always!hanging!out!with!your!other!friends.!!!They!don’t!see!you!walking!up,!and!you!realize!they!are!talking!about!you!when!you!overhear!one!of!them!say!your!name.!John!is!lying!about!you!to!Mike!saying!that!you!always!say!bad!things!about!him!when!he’s!not!around,!and!that!you!told!him!you!don’t!really!like!Mike!very!much,!and!follows!that!up!with,!“I!just!don’t!understand!how!you!could!be!friends!with!such!a!jerk.”!However,!even!though!you!were!close!enough!to!hear!your!name,!you!weren’t!actually!able!to!hear!anything!else!that!John!said,!so!you!don’t!realize!he!was!badRmouthing!you!to!Mike.!Before!either!of!them!realizes!that!you!are!there,!you!duck!into!a!nearby!store.!!
Private'knowledge'1!You!go!to!the!mall!to!buy!some!muchRneeded!new!clothes.!After!making!your!purchase!you!walk!out!of!the!store!and!see!two!of!your!friends,!Mike!and!John,!hanging!out!and!talking.!Mike!is!one!of!your!best!friends,!but!you!and!John!aren’t!especially!close,!and!you’re!only!really!friends!because!you!are!both!in!the!same!friend!group.!You!and!John!get!along!fine,!he!just!isn’t!someone!who!you!would!normally!hang!out!with!if!he!wasn’t!always!hanging!out!with!your!other!friends.!
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!!They!don’t!see!you!walking!up,!and!you!realize!they!are!talking!about!you!when!you!overhear!John!say!your!name.!Before!either!of!them!notices!that!you!are!within!hearing!distance,!you!hear!John!lying!about!you!to!Mike!saying!that!you!always!say!bad!things!about!him!when!he’s!not!around,!and!that!you!told!him!you!don’t!really!like!Mike!very!much.!It’s!apparent!that!he’s!trying!to!sabotage!your!friendship,!since!he!follows!this!up!with,!“I!just!don’t!understand!how!you!could!be!friends!with!such!a!jerk.”!Before!either!of!them!realizes!that!you!overheard!them,!you!duck!into!a!nearby!store.!!
Private'knowledge'2!You!go!to!the!mall!to!buy!some!much!needed!new!clothes.!After!making!your!purchase!you!walk!out!of!the!store!and!see!two!of!your!friends,!Mike!and!John,!hanging!out!and!talking.!Mike!is!one!of!your!best!friends,!but!you!and!John!aren’t!especially!close,!and!you’re!only!really!friends!because!you!are!both!in!the!same!friend!group.!You!and!John!get!along!fine,!he!just!isn’t!someone!who!you!would!normally!hang!out!with!if!he!wasn’t!always!hanging!out!with!your!other!friends.!!!They!don’t!see!you!walking!up,!and!you!realize!they!are!talking!about!you!when!you!overhear!John!say!your!name.!Before!either!of!them!notices!that!you!are!within!hearing!distance,!you!hear!John!lying!about!you!to!Mike!saying!that!you!always!say!bad!things!about!him!when!he’s!not!around,!and!that!you!told!him!you!don’t!really!like!Mike!very!much.!It’s!apparent!that!he’s!trying!to!sabotage!your!friendship,!since!he!follows!this!up!with,!“I!just!don’t!understand!how!you!could!be!friends!with!such!a!jerk.”!You!don’t!think!
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that!either!of!them!has!noticed!you!yet,!and!you!duck!into!a!nearby!store.!However,!unbeknownst!to!you!John!actually!saw!you!duck!into!the!store!and!realizes!you!must!have!heard!him.!!
Shared'knowledge  You!go!to!the!mall!to!buy!some!muchRneeded!new!clothes.!After!making!your!purchase!you!walk!out!of!the!store!and!see!two!of!your!friends,!Mike!and!John,!hanging!out!and!talking.!Mike!is!one!of!your!best!friends,!but!you!and!John!aren’t!especially!close,!and!you’re!only!really!friends!because!you!are!both!in!the!same!friend!group.!You!and!John!get!along!fine,!he!just!isn’t!someone!who!you!would!normally!hang!out!with!if!he!wasn’t!always!hanging!out!with!your!other!friends.!!!They!don’t!see!you!walking!up,!and!you!realize!they!are!talking!about!you!when!you!overhear!John!say!your!name.!Before!either!of!them!notices!that!you!are!within!hearing!distance,!you!hear!John!lying!about!you!to!Mike!saying!that!you!always!say!bad!things!about!him!when!he’s!not!around,!and!that!you!told!him!you!don’t!really!like!Mike!very!much.!It’s!apparent!that!he’s!trying!to!sabotage!your!friendship,!since!he!follows!this!up!with,!“I!just!don’t!understand!how!you!could!be!friends!with!such!a!jerk.”!You!don’t!think!that!either!of!them!has!noticed!you!yet!and!you!duck!into!a!nearby!store.!However,!right!as!you!duck!into!the!store!you!look!back!and!see!John!turn!his!head!back!towards!Mike,!and!you!realize!that!he!must!know!you!heard!him.!!
Common'knowledge'
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You!go!to!the!mall!to!buy!some!much!needed!new!clothes.!After!making!your!purchase!you!walk!out!of!the!store!and!see!two!of!your!friends,!Mike!and!John,!hanging!out!and!talking.!Mike!is!one!of!your!best!friends,!but!you!and!John!aren’t!especially!close,!and!you’re!only!really!friends!because!you!are!both!in!the!same!friend!group.!You!and!John!get!along!fine,!he!just!isn’t!someone!who!you!would!normally!hang!out!with!if!he!wasn’t!always!hanging!out!with!your!other!friends.!!!They!don’t!see!you!walking!up,!and!you!realize!they!are!talking!about!you!when!you!overhear!John!say!your!name.!Before!either!of!them!notices!that!you!are!within!hearing!distance,!you!hear!John!lying!about!you!to!Mike!saying!that!you!always!say!bad!things!about!him!when!he’s!not!around,!and!that!you!told!him!you!don’t!really!like!Mike!very!much.!It’s!apparent!that!he’s!trying!to!sabotage!your!friendship,!since!he!follows!this!up!with,!“I!just!don’t!understand!how!you!could!be!friends!with!such!a!jerk.”!Just!as!you!are!about!to!duck!into!a!nearby!store,!John!looks!over!at!you!and!you!make!eye!contact!with!him,!making!it!obvious!to!both!of!you!that!you!heard!what!he!said.!!! !
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Appendix!C:!Full!Instructions!Given!to!Participants!in!Experiment!2!
'
Common'Knowledge'Condition!Recently,!many!reality!TV!shows!have!been!introduced!in!which!a!panel!of!judges!judge!someone’s!performance.!However,!the!relationship!between!the!judges!and!the!performers!may!impact!their!judgments.!In!this!study!we’re!interested!in!how!judges’!anonymity!may!affect!their!judgments.!!!For!each!study!we!recruit!a!panel!of!judges!and!a!performer.!In!this!experiment!you!have!been!assigned!the!role!of!the!performer,!and!I!have!already!set!the!judges!up!in!the!room!across!the!hallway.!You!will!perform!a!karaoke!song,!which!they!will!observe!over!a!live!twoRway!video!feed.!We!are!using!the!video!feed!so!that!we!can!use!the!same!environment!both!when!the!judges!are!anonymous!and!when!they!are!not.!In!one!condition!the!judges!know!that!you!know!they!are!there,!and!in!the!other!they!believe!they!are!anonymous!and!that!you!don’t!know!they!are!there.!!You!have!been!selected!for!the!condition!in!which!the!judges!know!that!you!are!aware!of!their!presence.!You!will!be!able!to!see!them!on!the!twoRway!video!feed!during!your!performance,!and!they!know!that!you!can!see!them!through!the!twoRway!video!feed.!In!other!words,!both!you!and!the!judges!know!that!you!are!watching!each!other!over!a!twoRway!video!feed!during!your!performance.!!Is!this!all!clear,!and!do!you!have!any!questions?!
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!After!the!song!ends,!the!feed!will!cut!off,!and!you!will!click!on!a!button!to!answer!a!few!questions!in!a!very!short!survey!about!your!performance.!Once!you!finish!the!survey,!your!part!in!the!experiment!is!done,!and!you!can!come!out!of!the!room!and!let!me!know!you’re!finished.!!Finally,!in!order!to!keep!your!data!anonymous,!you!have!been!assigned!a!Participant!ID!number!that!will!not!be!associated!with!your!name.!I!have!written!it!down!on!this!post!it!note!that!I!will!leave!with!you!in!the!room,!because!you!will!have!to!enter!this!number!at!the!beginning!of!the!survey.!Please!make!sure!you!enter!the!number!correctly,!because!it!is!the!only!way!we!will!be!able!to!identify!your!data.!!Any!questions?!!!Alright,!then!let’s!begin.!You!can!just!follow!me!into!this!room!over!here.!!! !
!161!
Shared'Knowledge'Condition!Recently,!many!reality!TV!shows!have!been!introduced!in!which!a!panel!of!judges!judge!someone’s!performance.!However,!the!relationship!between!the!judges!and!the!performers!may!impact!their!judgments.!In!this!study!we’re!interested!in!how!judges’!anonymity!may!affect!their!judgments.!!!For!each!study!we!recruit!a!panel!of!judges!and!a!performer.!In!this!experiment!you!have!been!assigned!the!role!of!the!performer,!and!I!have!already!set!the!judges!up!in!the!room!across!the!hallway.!You!will!perform!a!karaoke!song,!which!they!will!observe!over!a!live!twoRway!video!feed.!We!are!using!the!video!feed!so!that!we!can!use!the!same!environment!both!when!the!judges!are!anonymous!and!when!they!are!not.!In!one!condition!the!judges!know!that!you!know!they!are!there,!and!in!the!other!they!believe!they!are!anonymous!and!that!you!don’t!know!they!are!there.!!You!have!been!selected!for!the!anonymous!condition,!in!which!the!judges!think!that!you!are!unaware!of!their!presence.!However,!in!order!to!keep!the!performances!the!same!across!conditions,!we!actually!always!tell!the!performers!about!the!judges.!In!addition,!you!will!be!able!to!see!them!on!the!twoRway!video!feed!during!your!performance,!but!they!don’t!know!this.!In!other!words,!even!though!you!can!see!the!judges!over!this!feed,!they!think!that!you!don’t!know!they!are!there,!and!that!they!are!simply!watching!a!oneRway!video!feed!of!your!performance.!!!Is!this!all!clear,!and!do!you!have!any!questions?!
!162!
!After!the!song!ends,!the!feed!will!cut!off,!and!you!will!click!on!a!button!to!answer!a!few!questions!in!a!very!short!survey!about!your!performance.!Once!you!finish!the!survey,!your!part!in!the!experiment!is!done,!and!you!can!come!out!of!the!room!and!let!me!know!you’re!finished.!!Finally,!in!order!to!keep!your!data!anonymous,!you!have!been!assigned!a!Participant!ID!number!that!will!not!be!associated!with!your!name.!I!have!written!it!down!on!this!post!it!note!that!I!will!leave!with!you!in!the!room,!because!you!will!have!to!enter!this!number!at!the!beginning!of!the!survey.!Please!make!sure!you!enter!the!number!correctly,!because!it!is!the!only!way!we!will!be!able!to!identify!your!data.!!Any!questions?!!!Alright,!then!let’s!begin.!You!can!just!follow!me!into!this!room!over!here.'
 
 
